

# The Future of Germany and the Atlantic Alliance

---

Constantine C. Menges

The AEI Press

*Publisher for the American Enterprise Institute*  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

1991

DD 257

.4  
.M47  
1991



Distributed by arrangement with

National Book Network  
4720 Boston Way  
Lanham, MD 20706

3 Henrietta Street  
London WC2E 8LU England

**Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data**

Menges, Constantine Christopher.

The future of Germany and the Atlantic alliance / Constantine C. Menges.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-8447-3731-3

1. Germany—Foreign relations—1945– 2. Germany—Politics and government—1945– 3. German reunification question (1945–1990)  
4. Europe—Politics and government—1945– 5. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. I. Title.

DD257.4.M47 1991

327.43—dc20

91-15366  
CIP

AEI Studies 512

© 1991 by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without permission in writing from the American Enterprise Institute except in the case of brief quotations embodied in news articles, critical articles, or reviews. The views expressed in the publications of the American Enterprise Institute are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the staff, advisory panels, officers, or trustees of AEI.

The AEI Press  
Publisher for the American Enterprise Institute  
1150 17th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

Printed in the United States of America

In loving memory of three German members of my family who endured, resisted, and transcended the Nazi dictatorship and who were among the millions who participated in the rebuilding of the democratic Germany of today: Johanna Keim Menges, Heinrich Menges, Hedwig Schuman Menges.

# Contents

---

PREFACE	xi
<b>1 INTRODUCTION</b>	1
Two Views about a Reunified Germany and the Atlantic Alliance 2	
Contemporary Soviet Foreign Policy—Two Views 5	
Looking to the Future 9	
<hr/>	
PART ONE	
FROM DEFEAT TO DIVISION AND A DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION	
<b>2 GERMANY IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, 1945–1955</b>	13
Occupation and the Start of Cold War 14	
The Return of Political Parties 17	
Two Germanys, Two Coalitions, 1948–1955 20	
<b>3 FROM CONFRONTATION TO NORMALIZATION, 1955–1975</b>	28
Coexistence and Confrontation, 1955–1963 28	
Continuity and Steps toward Normalization 33	
<i>Ostpolitik</i> and the Eastern Treaties 36	
<b>4 DOMESTIC POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY, 1975–1989</b>	39
Three Political Stages 39	
Soviet Actions 41	
The SPD Moves Away from the Atlantic Alliance 42	
CDU-CSU Perspectives 51	
The Alliance Paradox—Public Support and a Gathering Anti-NATO Coalition 53	
<hr/>	

---

<b>PART TWO</b>	
<b>THE TRANSITION TO A NEW EUROPE</b>	
<hr/>	
<b>5 THE DEMOCRATIC OPENING OF EASTERN EUROPE, 1989-1990</b>	59
The Unraveling	62
A Perspective on the Events of 1989-1990	79
<hr/>	
<b>6 THE ROAD TO GERMAN REUNIFICATION</b>	85
Phase One—The East German People Reject the Regime	86
Phase Two—The East German Communist Party Seeks Control through Reforms	88
Phase Three—East Germany Promises Democratic Elections, the Soviets Accept German Reunification	93
Phase Four—The Accelerating Momentum of de Facto Unification	98
<hr/>	
<b>PART THREE</b>	
<b>ALTERNATIVE FUTURES</b>	
<hr/>	
<b>7 REUNIFICATION AND CONTINUING COMMITMENT TO THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE</b>	117
Internal and International Dimensions	119
Implications of a Reunified Germany's Membership in NATO	128
<hr/>	
<b>8 REUNIFICATION AND DE FACTO NEUTRALIZATION</b>	133
Soviet Policy toward Postwar Germany	134
The New Germany	138
France and Other NATO Members	141
The United States	143
Eastern Europe	148
Consequences of the de Facto Neutralization of Germany	153
Soviet-German Economic Relations—Cooperation to Compulsion	157
"All-European Security" and Soviet Dominance	159

---



---

<b>PART FOUR</b>	
<b>CONCLUSION</b>	
<hr/>	
<b>9 THE EAST EUROPEAN AND GERMAN TRANSFORMATIONS— CONCEPTUAL PERSPECTIVES</b>	165
The Disintegration of Communism in Eastern Europe	165
The Moral and Political Genesis of Self-Emancipation in Eastern Europe	170
The Existence of the European-Atlantic Democracies	173
Miscalculations of the Communist Elites and the Paradox of Dictatorship	175
The Loss of Fear and the Demonstrative Effect of Success	178
German Reunification within NATO	180
Implications for the Further Study of Politics	184
Conditions for the Unraveling of Other Communist Regimes	185
The Soviet Union, Germany, and the Future Foreign Policy of Germany	186
<hr/>	
<b>10 TOWARD THE NEW EUROPE</b>	189
Two Possible Futures—In Summary	189
The Results of the New Germany's First National Elections	194
The Fragility of the East European Transitions	197
A Design for Transition to the New Europe	200
Lessons from the Evolution of the European-Atlantic Institutions	202
Parallel Communities for Freedom and Peace	216
Conclusion	222
<hr/>	
APPENDIX 1: Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, September 12, 1990	225
APPENDIX 2: Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Good Neighborliness, Partnership, and Cooperation, November 9, 1990	233
<hr/>	
NOTES	241

---

## CONTENTS

BIBLIOGRAPHY	261
ABOUT THE AUTHOR	269
INDEX	271
FIGURE	
4-1 European Views on the Need for NATO, 1969–1988	54
LIST OF TABLES	
4-1 West Germany—Three Political Stages, 1949–1990	40
5-1 Stages of the Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe, 1977–1990	82
6-1 Results of the March 18, 1990, Election in East Germany	98
7-1 The Road to Reunification of Germany within the Atlantic Alliance, 1990	127
8-1 Warsaw Pact Principal Trading Partners, 1986	150
8-2 East European Reliance on Energy Imports, 1988	151
8-3 Energy Imports from the USSR as a Share of Total Energy Imports, 1970–1977	151
8-4 National Forces and Foreign Troops Deployed in NATO and Warsaw Pact Countries, 1989	154
10-1 Results of the December 1990 German National Election	196
10-2 Overview of Institutions Aiding the East European Transitions, 1989–1991	201
10-3 Evolution of European-Atlantic Institutions, 1948–1986	203
10-4 Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, November 19, 1990	212
10-5 Design for Parallel Communities of Freedom and Peace	217

## Preface

The historic changes of 1989–1990—transitions to democracy in Eastern Europe and German reunification—offer the hope of a bright future of freedom and peace in the new Europe. At the same time, major historical opportunities, especially those that emerge with drama and suddenness, also entail significant risks.

This book explains why the future foreign policy of the new, reunified Germany may well tilt the balance of the complex forces now reshaping Europe, the Soviet Union, and the U.S.-European relationship—either in the direction of the positive opportunities, or toward the shadows of uncertainty and risk that would accompany a German shift toward de facto neutralism and away from the full security partnership it has had with NATO and the United States. The reunification of Germany in 1990 as a continuing member of the Atlantic Alliance was an enormous accomplishment for the people of Germany, for the Western leaders who steadfastly sought Soviet permission for this result, and for the idea of freedom represented by the West. Now the next challenge is to ensure that the positive international results of German reunification that this book discusses are realized, and to avoid the potential negative effects that might develop despite the current intentions of Germany and all of its Western allies.

My approach to the analysis of the future of Germany and Europe combines both historical optimism and a sense of concern deriving from forces in the present and from the history of this century. It is my view that a reunified Germany continuing as a full political, economic, and security partner of the West can and will make an enormous contribution to increasing the prospects of a successful democratic transition in Eastern Europe, which in turn will be a beacon for the peoples of the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, if as a result of its own internal politics, of changes in the U.S.-European relationship, of the hopes for a new European collective security system replacing NATO, and of the Soviet Union's pursuing its strategic interests the new Germany shifts

toward de facto neutralism, this could well undermine the very institutions that have kept peace and promoted freedom in Europe. It is for this reason that both the positive and negative futures need to be conceptualized and their implications assessed, as is done here. The following are among the implications considered: East-West relations, German-Soviet relations, German-U.S. relations, and the future of NATO and of Europe.

In order to better understand the future, this book begins with an overview of divided Germany as a focal point of the cold war, and of the domestic sources of German foreign policy (Part One). Next there is a discussion of the transition to a new Europe, with an analysis of the reasons for the unraveling of communism and of the complex, fast-paced interaction between the internal German and the international aspects of reunification (Part Two). The alternative futures of German foreign policy and their implications are then discussed (Part Three). In conclusion there is a conceptual analysis of what can be learned from the transformations in Eastern Europe and Germany, and drawing upon four decades of evolution in European-Atlantic institutions, a design for a prudent and balanced policy to make the bright future more probable is suggested (Part Four).

Before the dramatic events of 1989, as I was just completing a previous book, it seemed to me that the December 1990 West German elections were going to mark a turning point in that important country's future. For that reason, it seemed a good time to reexamine the relationship between West Germany and its allies. I appreciate the fact that Christopher DeMuth, president of the American Enterprise Institute, and David Gerson, executive vice president, agreed that this work should be done.

I am deeply grateful to the following organizations and individuals who combined to provide the resources that permitted me to write this book: Michael Joyce, president of the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation of Milwaukee, Wisconsin; William F. Buckley and Ambassador Evan Galbraith of the Historical Research Foundation of New York; Sir James Goldsmith, financier of wide-ranging interests; James Piereson, executive director of the John M. Olin Foundation of New York; and Daniel McMichael and Richard Larry of the Scaife Foundation of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

I also appreciate the skilled assistance in the final stages of this project by James Sheehan, who is now a research associate in my program on Transitions to Democracy. Robert Egge of Rockford College worked with me as a college intern, compiled much of the statistical data, showed great interest in this project, and has my thanks for his excellent work.

I also wish to thank a number of colleagues and associates for their interest in my work over the past year: at George Washington University, President Stephen Trachtenberg, Dean Maurice East, and Assistant Dean Henry Nau; at the Center for Security Policy, Frank Gaffney, Sven Kraemer, Jennifer White, Roger Robinson, and Rinelda Bliss-Walters. While thanking them and others, I am of course solely responsible for the contents of this book.

My parents opposed the Nazi regime and were fortunate in being able to escape and find refuge in the United States, where I arrived as a four-year-old near the end of World War II. My family—both those who escaped and those who did not—always understood that at times evil regimes may control states, but that no people or group is evil and that individuals are responsible for their actions. I have had the opportunity often to return to Germany and have witnessed the growth of democratic institutions there. I also want to thank my relatives in Germany and the many political leaders and citizens of West Germany whom I have come to know in the course of many visits, starting with my return for a summer as a ten-year-old, and from whom over the years I have learned much about the past, the present, and the future of a Germany that has become an exemplary democracy.

CONSTANTINE C. MENGES  
*Washington, D.C.*

# 1

## Introduction

Much of this century's most dramatic and tragic history has revolved around the actions and destiny of Germany. The failure of German democracy in the years after World War I—caused by both the rightist and the Communist extremes—opened the way for the Nazi dictatorship and its war on the nations and peoples of Europe.

After World War II the Grand Alliance of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union pledged to permit "free and unfettered elections" to determine the future governments of European countries liberated from fascist control. But the Soviet Union used cunning, deceptively rigged elections, and mostly concealed force to bring pro-Soviet Communist regimes to power in Eastern Europe and in its occupation zone of Germany.

In their three occupation zones, the Western Allies—France, the United Kingdom, and the United States—facilitated and presided over the establishment of a constitutional democracy with a mixed free-market and welfare-state economic system. By 1990 Communist East Germany had a population of about 17 million people and democratic West Germany about 61 million. In the decades after World War II, the different conditions of life in the two parts of Germany and the continuing conflicts over that division exemplified the struggle between democracy and communism, a major focus of international politics.

With Germany poised at the threshold of reunification in 1990, the question arose whether it would occur within the context of continued German participation in the Atlantic Alliance or would require or result in a neutral reunited Germany. In the peaceful protests of 1989 and the free elections of March 18, 1990, the people of East Germany clearly showed their overwhelming rejection of the dictatorship, which as in all Communist countries had combined years of repression, symbolic manipulation, and mass mobilization with a failure to attain its own professed objectives, much less those of the people, in political, cultural, or economic life.

Until the beginning of the end of communism in Eastern Europe

in 1989, the historical record showed that Communist regimes could fail in virtually every way that mattered but still could dominate the population and help other pro-Communist or anti-Western groups around the world take and keep power. This record of Communist success in the domain of power provides a sobering context for a review of the opportunities and prospects for Germany and Europe that the events of 1989 have opened.

### **Two Views about a Reunified Germany and the Atlantic Alliance**

In early 1990 the battle lines over Germany were clearly staked out by both sides. After personal consultations with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, on February 1, 1990, the interim East German Communist Prime Minister Hans Modrow, announced that there should be a united, neutral, demilitarized Germany within present borders and that its capital should be Berlin.<sup>1</sup> This position was then explicitly endorsed by Gorbachev and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. The contrary position, stated by West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl in late 1989 and endorsed by the United States and other NATO members, was that if the people in both Germanys voted for reunification in a process of free elections this then should occur, and the reunified Germany should remain in the NATO alliance.<sup>2</sup>

In January 1990 West Germany further proposed that in a reunified Germany there would be no deployment of any NATO troops past the current West German border, that for a time the Soviet Union might continue to maintain some portion of its estimated 380,000 troops in the current East Germany, and that these troops might even have joint exercises with NATO troops, so that Germany might become a place for East-West reconciliation. This West German conception of reunification was endorsed by U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker III soon after being announced, and again on the eve of Baker's February 1990 negotiations in Moscow.<sup>3</sup> Subsequently, on February 13, 1990, a meeting of NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organization foreign ministers in Canada led to the announcement that the four World War II Allies (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union) and the two Germanys would begin formal negotiations for reunification.<sup>4</sup>

Thus, after four decades, the positions of the Soviet Union and the East German Communist leadership on one side and the United States and the West German government on the other had remained virtually the same: in 1952, seeking to block West German rearmament, Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin had proposed reunification and neutrality with "a guarantee of democratic rights to the German

people. . . . All democratic parties and associations were to be allowed freedom of activity, including liberty to meet, publish, and decide on their own international relations."<sup>5</sup> In addition, Stalin had proposed that a reunified Germany be free to join the United Nations, and that it "have such armed forces as needed for defense" and be allowed to produce arms, though the types and quantities were to be prescribed by the treaty that established reunification. Further, Germany was to promise not to enter a military coalition directed against any state it had fought between 1939 and 1945, and all Allied forces were to be withdrawn and all foreign bases closed within twelve months.

In the fall of 1954, to block West Germany's movement toward membership in the NATO alliance the post-Stalin Soviet leadership again proposed German reunification, linked to its neutrality.<sup>6</sup> What both the United States and Soviet Union understood then, and even more in 1990, was that the outcome of this longstanding and then renewed political battle for Germany's future would have a major impact in determining the future of Europe; would it be shaped primarily by the values and institutions of freedom, through the free association of sovereign states, or by the Soviet regime's gradual and subtly growing dominance? Rather than seek additional European Communist regimes, in the next few years the Soviet Union wants access on its own terms to a growing share of Western Europe's best technology, its agricultural and industrial products, and its money and directed investments on Soviet territory.

Until July 1990, the Soviet Union held firmly to its demand that German reunification could occur only if Germany left NATO (or became a nominal member of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact). But then, in the context of a summit meeting between Gorbachev and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, the Soviets agreed that a reunified Germany could remain in NATO. In return Kohl agreed to provide the Soviets with large sums in financial aid, to accept certain limits on the size and armament of German military forces, and to set the end of 1994 as the date when the 380,000-strong Soviet military forces must withdraw fully from their current bases on the territory of the former East Germany. This study discusses the complex process of international diplomacy and internal evolution within both German states that led to this result—an outcome widely perceived as a significant accomplishment for the Atlantic Alliance and for the governments of Chancellor Kohl and President Bush, both of whom took the lead and worked closely together to attain it.

This study also analyzes the transition to a new Europe and the Soviet decisions made during the 1989–1990 popular protests against Communist rule in Eastern Europe. The results of free elections in

Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany in 1990 brought democratic groups to office and showed clearly that only small minorities supported the Communist parties. As these Communist regimes unraveled in the fall and winter of 1989–1990, Gorbachev made the important decision not to use Soviet military force to prop up the national Communist regimes. This decision and the Soviet decision to permit a reunified Germany to remain in NATO were widely perceived as the final evidence of a definitive and irreversible change in Soviet foreign policy, of the end of the cold war, and of the arrival of the day of a new Europe, “whole and free.”

But there is another perspective on these historic and positive events. The Soviet leadership initially expected and intended the changes in Eastern Europe to lead to reform Communist regimes, with a change in leadership from the Brezhnev generation to younger, reform-minded “perestroika Communists” like Gorbachev. Such a change was in fact attempted in Romania and Bulgaria, where the Communist leadership changed but there were no genuinely fair and free elections in 1990. As the 1989–1990 events in Eastern Europe moved well beyond reform communism in four of the countries—reflecting the courageously expressed hopes of the overwhelming majorities of the citizens for freedom and independence—the Soviet Union continued to refrain from the use of force. This restraint was practiced in part because of the impact of ten years of warfare and stalemate in Afghanistan on Soviet military institutions, and in part because the Soviet leadership reached two conclusions. First, using force could undo years of effort to establish a new spirit of normal, cooperative relations with the industrial democracies and would jeopardize the large-scale economic and technological assistance they could provide to the Soviets in the post-cold war climate of international relations. Second, should the independent and emerging democratic countries of Eastern Europe be perceived as constituting a threat or obstacle to Soviet purposes, the Soviets could then use political means, coercion, and if necessary force to restore Communist parties to power.

Further, given the long established Soviet goal of neutralizing Germany—meaning its de facto removal from effectively armed membership in a militarily credible Atlantic Alliance—it is quite possible that acquiescence in German reunification within NATO, in combination with the negotiation of a new Soviet-German treaty of friendship and a vastly expanded political and economic relationship, would be seen by the Soviets as providing new opportunities to gradually detach Germany from effective military participation in NATO.

From this perspective, whether or not Germany formally remained in NATO, its neutralization might be accomplished through the cumulative effect of the removal of all or most U.S. and other NATO forces from German territory, through the removal of most nuclear weapons of all types from Germany, though unilateral cuts in Germany's military forces, and through German endorsement of the Soviet view that the countries of the new Europe should rely for defense on a collective security arrangement, to be managed by the thirty-four nations of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which would include all members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Without question, the beginning of transitions to democracy in Eastern Europe, the reunification of Germany, and Germany's continuing membership in the Atlantic Alliance are immensely important and positive historical developments. Nevertheless, the premise of this study is that while the future of Europe—West and East—is full of hope and promise, now is a time of historical transition, full of risk as well as opportunity. The foreign policy decisions of Germany and the Soviet Union will be among the most important factors shaping events in the coming years.

Therefore, the concluding portion of this study will explore both the future foreign policy of reunified Germany and the transition to a new Europe from two perspectives: first, from one where Germany remains a full member of a functioning NATO and second, from one where the new Soviet-German relationship is part of a complex of causes and trends that bring about the de facto neutralization of Germany. This study will also assess the international political consequences of each alternative future. Of course, determining whether it is necessary to consider carefully the implications of a Soviet strategy to create a neutral Germany depends on judgments about contemporary Soviet foreign policy.

### **Contemporary Soviet Foreign Policy—Two Views**

Many Western observers of the Soviet Union believed by 1990 that it was so weakened by internal economic problems, interethnic clashes, and a spreading, organized opposition to the regime that Gorbachev needed the economic benefits of fully normalized relations with the West, and might even become a convert to genuine democracy. According to this view Moscow no longer had the desire or capability to threaten Western interests.

Yet it is important to recall that the Soviet Union of the late 1940s, which succeeded in helping pro-Soviet Communist movements take

power in ten countries,<sup>7</sup> was a country by any objective measure far, far weaker than the Soviet Union of the 1990s. Indeed, it was weaker still in comparison with the United States of 1945, which was victorious in Europe and against Japan. Then the United States produced half the world's economic goods and had 12 million under arms, a nuclear monopoly, and an untouched, prosperous continent, while much of Europe and Asia, especially Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union, were physically devastated by World War II.

Furthermore, with a government of consent by the governed the United States was the exemplar of the political and military triumph of democratic values over those of fascism and imperial militarism. The war effort had been overwhelmingly endorsed by the people, who showed their support through free and fair elections.

By contrast the Stalin regime conducted a reign of terror during the 1930s that led in its last years to the execution or imprisonment of millions of ordinary citizens as well as a large proportion of the Communist party military and government leadership. After its 1939–1941 alliance with Adolf Hitler failed to prevent a German military attack in June 1941, hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops deserted to fight on the invaders' side. In addition, millions of Soviet citizens, hating the devil they knew (Stalin) far more than the invading forces whom they believed at first to be liberators, had openly repudiated communism and the Soviet regime.

Therefore at the end of World War II the Soviet regime faced a far more powerful United States—not only in economic and military terms (until it reduced its armed forces from 12 million to 1.5 million by 1946) but also in its political support. The massive, internal opposition to Communist rule revealed by wartime events provided a striking contrast to the overwhelming consensus for democracy among the people of the United States. Nevertheless, despite its objectively far weaker situation, the Soviet Union outmaneuvered the United States politically in Eastern Europe and China. This historical context of the immediate postwar era is important to recall as we consider the future of Germany and the Atlantic Alliance in the decade of the 1990s—when the Soviet Union is widely perceived as far weaker than the United States.

The unraveling of the long-entrenched Communist regimes of Eastern Europe in 1989–1990, the far greater openness of discussion (*glasnost*) about life in the contemporary Soviet Union, the secessionist intentions and actions of the Baltic and other republics, and the new visibility of ethnic minorities, such as the Azerbaijani Moslems, have all encouraged many Western observers to believe that the Soviet regime will also unravel or transform into a social democracy. Gor-

bachev's welcome decision in 1989 not to use force to preserve the regimes of Eastern Europe is interpreted as indicating a fundamental worldwide change in Soviet foreign policy objectives and methods.

Among the many observers who have reached this conclusion, some argue that the new policy reflects authentically "new thinking" by the Gorbachev regime; others say that international and domestic Soviet failures compel the Soviets to seek economic and technological benefits from the free world; and still others believe in a combination of both factors. An especially widespread opinion holds that the Soviet Union faces such economic catastrophe and severe internal dissent that the regime must pursue a benign foreign policy, lacking the resources to maintain and expand its empire abroad.<sup>8</sup> Those holding this opinion tend to believe that events after German reunification—whatever the political maneuvering—will produce positive results for both a reunified Germany and the free world.

But one can view the actions of the Soviet Union under Gorbachev since 1985 from another perspective: that there is a dual Soviet foreign policy, combining normalization and tactical accommodation with the United States, Europe, China, and Japan with the continued pursuit of key Soviet objectives. These include a neutral Germany, the substantial weakening or dismantling of the NATO alliance, the enhancement of its dominance in strategic nuclear forces, the determination to maintain in power nearly all of the eleven pro-Soviet regimes that Moscow had helped to seize power during the détente of the 1970s, and the continuation of indirect aggression to bring new pro-Soviet regimes to power in key geopolitical and economic areas such as the Persian Gulf oil states (despite cooperation against the aggression of Iraq in 1990) and southern Africa.

Evidence accumulates for the continuing threat from this second dimension of Soviet foreign policy. During the first five Gorbachev years, 1985–1989, the Soviet military budget increased by 15 percent. Soviet strategic offensive forces continued to grow more powerful through modernization, and the Soviet Union seeks to be first with a strategic defense system as well. One million men were added to the military during the first Gorbachev years (the unilateral reduction of 500,000 proposed in 1988 is not yet completed), and Soviet espionage operations have increased.<sup>9</sup> Equally important has been the clear determination of the Gorbachev regime to use diplomacy, propaganda, covert action, and military support to maintain in power virtually all of the eleven pro-Soviet regimes established during the détente of the 1970s. These include the five in countries where armed anti-Communist resistance movements have fought for more than a decade to remove those regimes.<sup>10</sup>

The USSR participated in or supported highly visible diplomatic settlements in 1987–1988 for Central America, Afghanistan, and Angola, which were widely perceived as signs of Soviet withdrawal from zones of influence and power. Most of the estimated 350,000 foreign Communist troops were removed from direct combat, and most Soviet forces were removed from Afghanistan by February 1989. At the same time, however, the Gorbachev regime sustained its political and military support for these pro-Soviet regimes, helping them to stay in power. The estimated value of Soviet provided military supplies to those five regimes nearly doubled, from about \$6 billion annually in 1985 when Gorbachev came to power to about \$10 billion in 1989.<sup>11</sup> The most dramatic example of this continuing Soviet effort to keep and consolidate the victories of the 1970s has been one of the largest military airlifts in history. A reported 4,800 military supply flights were made from February to October 1989 to the pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan, and these have continued at an estimated 40 flights each day to deliver about \$250 million worth of weapons and arms monthly. Further, there has been no indication that relations have ended with longtime Soviet allies such as Cuba, North Korea, Syria, and Libya, the operating bases for much of the violence aimed at free world countries through the indirect aggression and armed subversion.

With the very significant exception of Soviet unwillingness to use military force in Eastern Europe in late 1989 to repress popular demands for political liberalization, contemporary Soviet actions under Gorbachev resemble actions during previous post-World War II efforts at détente. All these efforts point to a duality of method and continuity of purpose in their current foreign policy.

Moreover, the Soviet Politburo and Central Committee have learned the lessons of Russian history. The 1989 events in Eastern Europe have taught them again that dictatorial institutions may remain stable for long periods yet prove brittle under pressure. They understand that while some reforms and limited internal openings may be useful, mistakes can rapidly lead to major threats to the regime. The military intimidation, economic blockade, and other coercive actions to roll back Lithuania's declaration of independence of March 11, 1990, reflect a determination to maintain the authority of Moscow within the entire Soviet Union. Soviet leaders are likely to remember that even during the Great Patriotic War the Stalin regime, although less repressive than during the terror of the 1930s, still maintained control over the government, the military, the secret police, and the people.

Gorbachev and the other key leaders of the Soviet regime want

to make communism more open and more economically effective, and they may be willing to introduce some real political competition inside and outside the party. Nevertheless, although they prefer limited and secret coercion, the Soviet leadership will use whatever coercion and violence they think necessary to determine all major Soviet internal and international actions.

Failure by the Gorbachev-led Soviet regime to accomplish its internal and foreign policy objectives in the coming years could well lead to other major shifts, either toward repression or toward far greater liberalization. But during the early 1990s the future of Germany will probably be markedly affected by the actions of a Soviet Union that remains under Communist control, possesses a powerful military apparatus, and pursues its decades-long foreign policy objectives. They include a compliant Germany, one that has become a de facto neutral even if it still officially belongs to NATO. In this way the Soviet regime could gradually dominate Germany and perhaps all of Europe.

### **Looking to the Future**

The current political struggle over Germany's destiny involves not only the Soviet Union, the United States, the NATO countries, and the new leadership in Eastern Europe, but also the nearly 80 million people in the reunited Germany. The last time such a dramatic time of international decisions faced Germany was during the interwar years of the Weimar Republic. At that time a combination of significant political mistakes by well-intentioned German and Western leaders led to the events that permitted Nazi extremists to take power, thereby setting the course toward World War II. Important decisions will again have to be made, not only by well-intentioned Western and German leaders, but by the people of the former West Germany, who have adhered to the ideals and institutions of parliamentary democracy for forty years, and by the East Germans, who have shown by their flight from communism, their peaceful quest for freedom in 1989, and their votes in the 1990 elections that they too want freedom.

German reunification has strengthened the cause of democracy in Eastern Europe and thus in the world. But reunification could also be followed by the de facto neutralization of Germany, whether or not it remains a formal member of the Atlantic Alliance. The final outcome may well have dramatic consequences—for good or for ill. One perceptive American commentator expressed anxiety about the future in these words: "Is there not a terror in millions of human minds and hearts that the nightmare visage of the past may be the

## INTRODUCTION

face of the future? Did not the two earlier German unifications lead to war?"<sup>12</sup>

Now that German reunification has been achieved, the true nature of the future relationship between Germany and the Atlantic Alliance is an open issue that will be determined by a complex blend of international and German political decisions. This book illuminates the underlying historical and contemporary factors, describes and analyzes the transition to a new Europe and a new Germany, discusses the implications of possible alternative futures, and concludes with suggestions for a Western strategy to ensure that the new, reunited Germany remains a democratic partner of the Atlantic Alliance, in security as well as in economic endeavors.

## PART ONE

### From Defeat to Division and a Democratic Transition

1988 party program, entitled "Our Responsibility in the World Today." It pressed the following conclusions:

- "Improved superpower relations have given greater operating freedom to both East and West Europe—and thus to Germany. The CDU's German policy is aimed at . . . the unity and freedom of Germany in a free and united Europe. . . ."
- "The Federal Republic of Germany is especially vulnerable to political and military threats and therefore particularly dependent on the protection of the United States and its partners in the western alliance."
- "As a member of the European Community and of the Atlantic Alliance, the Federal Republic of Germany . . . [rejects] any neutralism in the East-West conflict."
- "NATO is irreplaceable because it protects Europe against war and political blackmail. . . . Europe needs America. America needs Europe."
- "Christian Democrats consider that peace is more than mere absence of war. Stable peace can exist only in a social order founded on the principles of justice and liberty where human rights are fully recognized. Therefore arms control and disarmament alone cannot ensure peace. . . . As long as the conflict between freedom and oppression persists, the free nations must be capable and ready to defend themselves. Security by military means and a policy of active dialogue, defense readiness, and readiness for rapprochement are not contradictions, they presuppose and complement each other. They are the foundation of our Christian Democratic policy of *détente*."<sup>27</sup>

The contrasts between this program and the 1988 SPD program were significant. The CDU affirmed the Atlantic Alliance; the SPD favored a "European peace order." The CDU said genuine peace required internal political changes in the Warsaw Pact countries, leading to full recognition of human rights and liberty; the SPD was silent on this issue. The CDU said arms control and disarmament must be complemented by military deterrence; the SPD was ambiguous on this issue. These differences grew even more important after the dramatic events of 1989.

The CDU foreign policy of solidarity with the Atlantic Alliance combined with rapprochement toward the East worked well during the 1980s. The 1983 decision to deploy nuclear-armed missiles maintained Atlantic Alliance cohesion and strengthened the U.S. negotiating position for seeking the phased elimination of all INFs.<sup>28</sup> The Atlantic Alliance's growing strength in conventional arms, in which

Germany played the largest part, also contributed to an increased Soviet interest in reducing forces in Europe. And the Kohl administration negotiated a series of agreements with East Germany under the rubric of its "policy of small steps" from 1987 to 1989, permitting more than 10 million East Germans to visit West Germany<sup>29</sup>—a success that confirmed the merit of Kohl's 1983 rejection of Honecker's threatening demands.

#### **The Alliance Paradox—Public Support and a Gathering Anti-NATO Coalition**


Support for the Atlantic Alliance was always strong among the citizens of West Germany. In fact, among the major European NATO countries, the citizens of West Germany have consistently given the highest level of support to the Atlantic Alliance (see table 4-1). From 1969 until the end of 1988 public support for the statement, "NATO is still essential to my country's security," was higher than 80 percent. The October 1988 figure showed 76 percent of Germans considering NATO essential and only 13 percent considering it "no longer essential."<sup>30</sup>

Soviet President Gorbachev's policies of normalization toward Western Europe certainly contributed to his personal popularity in virtually all the NATO countries. But even in 1984, before the Gorbachev era, about 47 percent of West Germans did not feel threatened by the Soviet Union—a proportion about equal to the combined 1983 vote for the SPD and the Greens. By late 1988, 75 percent of West Germans felt no threat from the East, yet nearly the same large majority of Germans continued to support a public consensus that the alliance remained necessary.<sup>31</sup>

Much attention was paid to the 1987 opinion polls showing a plurality (not a majority) of West Germans and Britons trusting Gorbachev more than Reagan to reduce international tensions.<sup>32</sup> The response was surprising, but it probably reflected a broad hopefulness in the West and a particularly positive Western media image of Gorbachev. By contrast, Reagan's media image suffered because many citizens had disagreements with his domestic and foreign policies.

Only a tiny minority of Germans suggested the Federal Republic should withdraw from NATO (an average of 3 percent in the 1970s and 9 percent in the 1980s).<sup>33</sup> But in 1987 more than 70 percent were in favor of "withdrawing all nuclear weapons from Europe."<sup>34</sup> And although 51 percent in 1988 still said military deterrence was necessary to their security, 32 percent said it was not necessary. On the

FIGURE 4-1  
EUROPEAN VIEWS ON THE NEED FOR NATO, 1969-1988



NOTE: In the October 1980 and prior surveys, this question was asked only of those who had heard or read about NATO. To standardize data, percentages have been recalculated on the base of those asked the question.

SOURCE: Surveys conducted under the auspices of the U.S. Information Agency, using local firms in each country. Published in *Public Opinion*, May/June 1989 (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute), p. 21.

issue of a continued U.S. military presence in Europe, 32 percent in 1988 said they would welcome the withdrawal of American troops, 30 percent were undecided, and 38 percent were opposed to this action.<sup>35</sup> These data suggest that even before the hopeful developments of 1989 and 1990 in Eastern Europe and despite overwhelming public support for NATO membership, a strong sector of public opinion in West Germany favored an effective reduction of NATO's ability to provide credible military defense for Germany. Such a reduction would eliminate all nuclear weapons and, potentially, remove all U.S. and other allied troops.

By 1988, among politically relevant leadership groups there were two broad coalitions on NATO. One favored continuing full German participation in NATO; the other rhetorically endorsed the Atlantic

Alliance, but it proposed unilateral actions that could effectively end any functioning military alliance.

The NATO-supporting coalition was rooted primarily in the CDU-CSU and a group within the FDP, its coalition partner. It probably included some elements of the business sector, a small minority of religious leaders, and a very small element of the national media.

The coalition for de facto neutrality through a "restricting" of Germany's relationships with the United States and with NATO included the SPD and the Greens (together accounting for 46 percent of the electorate), a significant proportion of organized labor, and a range of business firms seeking expanded opportunities for trade with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. This view was also shared by many politically active religious leaders, a group that had been moving to the left since the 1970s, and by the majority of the media, which had also become largely self-identified with the views of the left in German politics. To this cluster of left-neutralism could be added small groups of the far right, which also rejected the existing relationships with the United States and with NATO.

Before the events of 1989 in Eastern Europe, it seemed that in the 1990 elections the SPD would avoid directly challenging Germany's membership in NATO, instead proposing arms control and reduction initiatives and a reformed relationship with U.S. forces. Such moves could have led in time to a de facto neutrality for Germany. For example, the SPD submitted an eighteen-page "major parliamentary question" to the Kohl government in March 1989, and stated that "the equal rights which the Federal Republic enjoys in the alliance can no longer be reconciled with the fact that the [foreign] forces stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany have retained the privileges which the sending states were granted at the end of World War II in their function as occupying powers."<sup>36</sup> The U.S. ambassador to Germany, Vernon Walters, stated that the new limitations and restrictions proposed by the SPD on the United States and other Allied forces stationed in Germany would render Germany incapable of defending itself.<sup>37</sup> Before the events of 1989, it seemed that the SPD's intended approach to the 1990 elections was to focus public attention on the already objectionable activities of NATO and especially American armed forces in Germany. It could then demand a major renegotiation of the rights of such Allied military forces.

If Kohl's CDU government had refused to support these SPD objectives, the SPD could depict the CDU-CSU as being subservient to U.S. and NATO interests at the expense of the West German people. Together with a package of proposals for disarmament and

for restructuring NATO forces to make them capable only of defensive operation (to be done in conjunction with a similar restructuring by Warsaw Pact forces), this refusal might have permitted the SPD to court the political left and appeal to German nationalism. Such SPD "neutralist nationalism" (the phrase is Walter Hahn's) could have turned the 1990 elections into a referendum on reducing the role of U.S. and NATO forces in Germany, thereby moving Germany away from the Atlantic Alliance.

Thus by the summer of 1989, on the eve of the dramatic transformation of Eastern Europe, both West German coalitions had established their positions regarding the major issue facing a reunified Germany in the 1990s: whether it should and would remain a full member in the Atlantic Alliance. The CDU-CSU, in coalition with the FDP, had demonstrated its belief that the best foundation for an effective *Ostpolitik* was a secure and reliable *Westpolitik*—it could pursue both with vigor. The SPD, while continuing a rhetorical commitment for the immediate future to the Atlantic Alliance, in fact rejected many of its key security concerns, ignored the democratic opposition in East Germany and Eastern Europe, abandoned prospects for German reunification, and legitimized the East German Communist regime. It furthermore undercut the interests of Germany's key ally, the United States, in Nicaragua and other third world conflicts. In effect, while the CDU-CSU held firmly to its commitment to the West and simultaneous pursuit of détente with the East during the 1980s, the SPD tilted strongly toward the primacy of *Ostpolitik* and the abandonment of any Western-oriented security policy. The events of late 1989 in Eastern Europe would render a judgment on these two different political perspectives.

## PART TWO

# The Transition to a New Europe

force. An additional inhibition might have been the "lessons of Afghanistan," which affected both the Soviet political and military leadership. Some 300,000 Soviet, Vietnamese, and Cuban troops had been in combat for more than a decade with armed anti-Communist resistance movements in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Angola, Mozambique, and Nicaragua. Only months earlier (in February 1989) Soviet troops had withdrawn from Afghanistan after ten bloody years and failure to crush the armed anti-Communist resistance movements.

Thus, Gorbachev's reasons for not using Soviet military forces in Eastern Europe might include a combination of possible factors. Initially, he may have been politically overconfident about communism's ability to hold power. He may have been concerned with maintaining détente and access to Western resources. He may have felt unwilling to risk prolonged combat against East European resistance movements emboldened by the military stalemate forced upon Soviet and other foreign Communist military forces in the developing regions.

Furthermore, the economic needs of the Soviet Union would argue strongly against using troops in Eastern Europe—the Western capital, trade, and technology that Gorbachev seeks from détente with the United States, Europe, and Japan would be jeopardized. The Soviets recalled the consequences of their invasion of Afghanistan in 1979: a suspension of détente with the United States and a significant reduction in financial opportunities for the Soviet Union.

Finally, we can consider the hypothesis of a former Soviet citizen and current analyst of Soviet issues, Lev Navrozov. He suggests that in the face of unraveling Communist rule, Gorbachev and the Soviet politburo decided to cut their losses and settle for a "Finlandized" Eastern Europe. Like Finland, these countries would be non-Communist but militarily nonthreatening, allied with no powerful countries. By tolerating this "concession" they could hope to achieve the benefit of the de facto neutralization of Germany, and thus the likely expulsion of the United States from Europe. The Soviets sought to maintain the institutions of the Warsaw Pact military alliance until early 1991, when they announced it would be dissolved in April 1991. In doing so, Gorbachev's spokesman repeated that the Soviet Union hoped that in exchange NATO would be dismantled.<sup>51</sup>

These perspectives suggest that a transition to a new Europe is indeed under way, thanks to the events of 1989 and 1990 in Eastern Europe. But whether democracy will become more secure in the new Eastern Europe or the receding presence of the United States will open new ambiguities may well depend on where the road after German reunification ultimately leads that important nation.

## 6

## The Road to German Reunification

*A European Germany, rather than a German Europe.*

THOMAS MANN

For decades the reunification of Germany was perceived as a distant possibility. It seemed in fact so distant that the German Social Democratic party ceased even to speak of it as a rhetorical goal of German foreign policy during the 1980s. Yet in a matter of only months the distant possibility was transformed to a reality. Thousands of East German men, women, and children fled to West Germany in the last months of 1989, a formal agreement was reached between NATO and the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers in February 1990 to begin talks on German reunification, the four occupying powers gave up all their rights in a treaty they signed in September 1990, and full reunification took place on October 3, 1990.

The process by which German reunification occurred in 1989–1990 combined internal political decisions and events in both Germanys with progressively intensifying U.S., Soviet, and West German diplomatic engagement. Examining this process is not only an interesting endeavor but also an important guide to the future. The largest undecided issue looming over the emerging order of Europe is, Will a reunified Germany remain in the Atlantic Alliance, or will it evolve into a neutral state?

Four phases characterized the road to German reunification:

1. From August to October 1989, the people of East Germany demonstrated their rejection of the regime.
2. From October 1989 to January 1990, the East German Communist party sought to maintain its control through an increasing tempo of political accommodations.
3. From February to March 1990, the East German election campaign marked the beginning of de facto unification.
4. From April to October 1990, the election of a democratic East German government opened the way to the beginning of serious negotiations between the two Germanys. Negotiations intensified

among the Soviet Union, the United States, and the German states in a political context where each passing month increased the prospects for reunification with Germany remaining in NATO.

#### Phase One—The East German People Reject the Regime

In the spring of 1989, U.S.-West German security relations were focused on the usual issues of alliance policy. The West Germans felt reluctant to modernize short-range nuclear weapons stationed on German territory, and the Bush administration and Prime Minister Thatcher were trying to persuade them to maintain the credibility of the nuclear deterrent based in Europe. In May 1989 President Bush proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union reduce their European-based forces to roughly equal levels of 290,000 each. This proposal would entail the withdrawal of about 30,000 U.S. forces and 300,000 Soviet forces. It was endorsed by the May 1989 NATO meeting.

In June 1989 Soviet leader Gorbachev paid a state visit to Bonn, where he received an enthusiastic welcome from both the Kohl government and the West German people. Gorbachev endorsed Bush's plan for cuts in conventional forces in Europe, but at the same time he called for negotiations to eliminate all short-range nuclear weapon—a position contrary to that of the United States and to the agreement just reached at the NATO summit. The joint Soviet-German declaration of June 13, 1989, agreed on the need to prevent war and guarantee the right of self-determination; but it said nothing about German reunification. Only Chancellor Kohl spoke of reunification, calling the continued division of Germany an "open sore." Gorbachev spoke of "a common European house," as he had for a number of years. And a Soviet official traveling with Gorbachev privately deplored the East German shootings of would-be escapees crossing the barbed wire at the internal border. He added that Moscow hoped one day there would be two "comfortable German apartments with lots of doors between them" in the common European house.<sup>1</sup>

When the reformist faction of the Hungarian Communist party dismantled its border fences with Austria in May 1989, it little expected the major impact this move would have on East Germany. During the summer of 1989 thousands of East Germans decided to use a vacation in Hungary as a stepping-off point to flee through Austria and then settle in West Germany. By the end of September 1989 some 30,000 East Germans had already fled to West Germany through Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

Gorbachev's decision to participate in the fortieth anniversary celebration of the East German Communist regime on October 7, 1989, was reported as perceived by "Western diplomats . . . as an indication that Moscow wants to ease pressure on East Germany's troubled leadership. . . ."<sup>2</sup> According to this view, Gorbachev regarded "Honecker as the archetypical aging leader whose rigidity is the chief obstacle to making communism work effectively"; but his interest in a stable and friendly East Germany argued for supporting him.<sup>3</sup> The East German Communist leadership was facing the crisis of tens of thousands of people continuing their efforts to flee the country.

By the time Gorbachev arrived in East Berlin on October 7, 1989, an estimated 45,000 East Germans had fled, and tens of thousands were demonstrating for greater freedom. Perceiving Gorbachev as a reformer, they shouted, "We are the people," "No violence," "Freedom," and "Gorby! Gorby!"<sup>4</sup> On October 9, 1989, Honecker met with visiting Chinese Deputy Prime Minister Yao Yi Lin. Thereafter the regime threatened that continuing demonstrations would be met with a Tiananmen Square-style crackdown. The official East German press agency reinforced this threat by reporting that "the two [East German-Chinese leaders] agreed there was evidence of a particularly aggressive antisocialist action by imperialist class opponents with the aim of reversing socialist development. In this respect there is a fundamental lesson to be learned from the counterrevolutionary unrest in Beijing and the present campaign against [East Germany] and other socialist states."<sup>5</sup>

The Kohl government had immediately welcomed the East German immigrants and declared that the exodus signified the desire of the East German people for freedom. The Social Democratic party reacted much more tentatively during this first phase. In September 1989 it intended to continue its party-to-party dialogue with the East German Communist party. Since the SPD leadership had publicly affirmed the right of East Germans to emigrate freely, however, the East German government canceled meetings planned with the SPD for mid-September 1989.<sup>6</sup>

One important international reaction to the East German exodus was President Bush's August 1989 statement that the United States continued to support German reunification, as it had always done in the past. U.S. Ambassador to West Germany Vernon A. Walters also took a strong affirmative stand on reunification and on freedom, as fundamental U.S. interests. This early and positive support for reunification from the U.S. president and his able ambassador in Bonn would continue and prove of great importance.

## Phase Two—The East German Communist Party Seeks Control through Reforms

Honecker's removal by younger leaders of the Communist party on October 18, 1989, marked a major turning point in German and European politics. The change in the top leadership was accompanied by the dissolution of the twenty-one member East German politburo, its replacement with a ten-member group, and the resignation of the entire forty-four member East German cabinet. The new East German leader, Egon Krenz, had long been in charge of the internal security organizations in East Germany and had been Honecker's close associate. Krenz said East Germany would now move toward reform as the Soviet Union was doing, stating, "We want a socialism that is economically effective . . . and most of all, has its face turned to the people."<sup>9</sup>

Soviet policy at this stage was visible in the results of a Warsaw Pact members meeting. This October 1989 meeting was the first to include representation of a government without a Communist majority—Poland's. The new Polish prime minister urged that the Warsaw Pact be transformed into more of a political than a military alliance and called for a "radical reconstruction of Comecon," the Communist trading bloc.<sup>8</sup> Speaking candidly, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze said, "We might not fully like the fact that it is non-Communists who are in the leadership of Poland, but we respect the will of the Polish nation."<sup>9</sup> At the same time all seven Warsaw Pact nations issued a joint communiqué opposing German reunification, criticizing West Germany's provision of automatic citizenship to East German refugees, and warning in classic Communist propaganda terms of the "danger of stepped up neo-Nazism" as a result of the demands for changes in East Germany.<sup>10</sup>

Peaceful demonstrations by hundreds of thousands of East Germans continued, as Krenz sought to demonstrate the reformist intentions of East Germany's new Communist leadership and to stop the continuing exodus. He pardoned all those guilty of fleeing from East Germany, a crime punishable by prison. Krenz promised in late October 1989 that travel restrictions would be relaxed, allowing East Germans to visit the West at least once a year.<sup>11</sup> From November 1 to 8, more than 50,000 East Germans showed their distrust of how long the regime's sudden openness might last by using the new travel opportunity to escape to West Germany; as a result about 2,000 persons each day continued to leave.

Expressing a view typical of those leaving, Ulrich Freiteger, a twenty-seven-year-old construction foreman, said, "We never became

part of the system. You can say we are anti-Communists. We are not going to West Germany to have the luxuries, to eat bananas, or to drive a better car. We didn't want to live in a jail."<sup>12</sup>

On November 4, 1989, more than 500,000 East Germans marched peacefully for democratic reforms in Berlin. On November 9 the Berlin Wall was opened, and de facto unification began. West Germans welcomed the tens of thousands of East German visitors who came to see the West.

Despite the conciliatory efforts of the Krenz regime, once the borders were open the exodus of East Germans to West Germany increased. As one East German explained, "They said we could go and I don't believe the changes are here to stay. The government didn't do this. It was the pressure from the people. So the government will try to stop it as soon they can quiet the people."<sup>13</sup>

To counter the continuing mistrust of the people reflected by the accelerating exodus, the East German Communist party convened an Extraordinary Congress in early December. Krenz was replaced as party leader by Gregor Gysi, a Communist lawyer who had frequently defended dissidents. The party promised to undertake major reforms and said it would consider permitting independent political groups to organize and have legal status. The Krenz politburo and central committee resigned and were partially replaced by Communists perceived as more committed to reform. These events followed the East German Parliament's December 1 alteration of the constitution, eliminating the Communist party's guaranteed monopoly on power.

**Kohl's Ten-Point Plan.** At the end of October 1989 Chancellor Kohl offered his first thoughts on how the reunification of Germany could be achieved. In an address to German and American leaders and scholars, he said that when East Germany attains genuine democracy, "then the people of both German states can decide by free secret ballot whether they want to reunify, and this could happen only if the citizens of both Germanys agree."<sup>14</sup> Kohl, like Adenauer, emphasized that reunification must occur under "a European roof" and that membership in the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community (EC) must continue. Further, Chancellor Kohl reaffirmed his commitment to the original goals of European political unification as defined by the 1958 Treaty of Rome, which established the European Economic Community. Kohl contended that the West German government should help facilitate reforms in East Germany; it should neither be too passive nor push too hard. There was no point in the West German government's telling the East German regime what to

do, he said, because the people of East Germany were already doing that in a very clear voice.

On November 28, 1989, Kohl presented a ten-point plan for German reunification. He pointed out that a new relationship had developed between the people of East and West Germany in the past several years because of the 10 million visits by East Germans to West Germany. These years had coincided with his administration, and Kohl believed the new level of normalized relations with East Germany he had fostered had helped the East German people understand life in West Germany. His plan proposed that East Germany first become genuinely democratic; then the peoples in both German states could decide whether to implement reunification.<sup>15</sup>

**The SPD Response.** During the dramatic weeks from the summer of 1989 to the removal of Honecker and the opening of the Berlin Wall, the response of the Social Democratic party of Germany provided a sharp contrast to that of the CDU.

Weeks after Honecker's removal and days after the Berlin Wall was opened, Walter Momper, a leading Social Democrat and the mayor of West Berlin, accused Chancellor Kohl of "spectacular failure during this decisive situation in German history."<sup>16</sup> The failure that Momper had in mind was Kohl's "deep dislike of the GDR's democratic development and its right to self-determination. He has not understood that the people in the GDR are not interested in reunification."<sup>17</sup> A leading SPD member of the Parliament (Bundestag) and its speaker for foreign policy, Karsten Voight, declared later in November 1989 that reunification would have to mean the end of German participation in the Atlantic Alliance.<sup>18</sup>

On December 18, 1989, the SPD held an Extraordinary Party Congress to debate the dramatic developments in East Germany. In the face of the overwhelming evidence, this congress reversed years of SPD policy and concluded that reunification was only a matter of time, as Willy Brandt put it, and the people of East Germany should have the right to determine the future of their state. The SPD consequently ended its longstanding close relations with the East German Communist party and instead took up the cause of the East German people directly.<sup>19</sup>

This decision came as the result of the events in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria, which together shook the SPD's belief that Communist domination of Eastern Europe would continue in the foreseeable future. In Bulgaria the long-ruling Communist leader Zhivkov had been unseated by a younger Communist faction on November 10; in Czechoslovakia the process of unraveling began with

mass demonstrations on November 17 and ended with the installation of a non-Communist government on December 10. At the December 1989 U.S.-Soviet summit meeting in Malta, Gorbachev expressed a Soviet commitment to national self-determination. And the December 4, 1989, meeting in Moscow of the leaders of five Warsaw Pact countries—Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and the Soviet Union—had pronounced the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia "illegal" and an "interference in [Czechoslovakia's] internal affairs." The Soviet Union further issued a separate statement expressing regret for its role in the 1968 invasion and calling its rationale "unfounded."<sup>20</sup>

**The Soviet Response.** Those actions certainly created the impression that Gorbachev meant what he said in July 1989: "The social and political orders in particular countries have changed in the past and may change in the future. This change is the exclusive affair of the people of that country."<sup>21</sup> At the same time, Soviet spokesmen made it clear after the opening of the Berlin Wall that the "common European home" the Soviet Union was seeking would have no Atlantic Alliance. An adviser to Gorbachev was quoted on November 10, 1989, as saying, "We have said many times that we are ready to disband the Warsaw Pact tomorrow if NATO were also disbanded. We think that these questions must be solved in the context of an all-European political process."<sup>22</sup>

In retrospect it seems that the Soviets expected for a reformist Communist regime such as Gorbachev's, committed to glasnost and perestroika, to succeed the Honecker regime in East Germany. They suggested this was an opportunity to end both alliances and thereby bring about the de facto neutralization of Western Germany and, perhaps, much of Western Europe.

The official Soviet spokesman made it clear immediately after the Wall was opened that reunification was not on the Soviet agenda: "Bonn should take into account that any policies considering changes in borders would not be suitable to any government in Europe and would cause deep distrust. A new regime has started on the East German side of the border, *but the border does remain* [emphasis added]."<sup>23</sup> One of Gorbachev's closest advisers, Alexander Yakovlev, said he believed the United States, Britain, and France did not really want the reunification of Germany and secretly hoped the Soviet Union would prevent it.<sup>24</sup> In November 1989 Gorbachev's official spokesman, Gennadi Gerasimov, pointed to Poland as an example of what the Soviets had in mind for changes in Eastern Europe: "Poland is a good member of the Warsaw Pact, and in Poland you have a

coalition. You don't have a Communist government there; governments may change, international obligations remain."<sup>25</sup>

Following the November 28 Kohl proposal for German reunification and the December U.S.-Soviet summit, Gorbachev criticized Kohl's plan as an attempt to "extract selfish benefits" from the process of change in Europe. Gorbachev said those changes could "open the way to cooperation" between two German states on a number of issues, but warned, "Let us not push or force the issue [of reunification]. History itself will decide this question."<sup>26</sup>

**The U.S. Response.** The United States responded to the unraveling of the Honecker regime and the opening of the Berlin Wall in several ways. There was praise for the Eastern Europeans, East Germans, and Gorbachev. President Bush said on November 10, 1989, "The process of reform initiated by the East Europeans . . . is real, offers us much hope, and deserves our continuing encouragement."<sup>27</sup> At the same time, according to Secretary of State James Baker, the Soviet Union was warned by the United States that any attempt to use repressive force in Eastern Europe would create serious problems in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Baker pointed out further that while the end of the Berlin Wall "could well be the start of a new world, nobody really knows what the next step will be. It is a very long step from free travel to free, fair, and democratic elections[:] when you talk about the distance from . . . free travel [to] such questions as German reunification, there is an even bigger jump there."<sup>28</sup>

While describing "NATO as an alliance destined to last" and promising a U.S. determination to "continue to be a very involved partner in NATO and to act in a manner that makes this clear to everyone," Bush also offered another message on the eve of the U.S.-Soviet summit in December 1989. He said there could be significant reductions in U.S. troops in Europe and that NATO could extend its role beyond defense to a number of cooperative issues.<sup>29</sup> The United States also consistently stated that after reunification the German people should decide as a sovereign state whether they wished to continue as members of the Atlantic Alliance and should be able to do so if that were the decision.

A potentially serious split in the Western position occurred in early December, following a summit meeting between French President François Mitterrand and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. Even though Chancellor Kohl had issued his ten-point plan for German reunification only days before, speaking in the Soviet Union Mitterrand said France must be prepared to "speak the truth" to Bonn on the issue of German reunification:

None of our countries—and especially one whose weight is so great and whose geographical position is such—can act without taking into account the balance of Europe. We should not begin by talking about changing borders. Seen from the West it is more urgent to reinforce the structure of the European Community.<sup>30</sup>

This agreement between France and the Soviet Union to oppose German reunification, along with the coolness of the United Kingdom, might have caused some in the West German government to reflect on an earlier era of European international politics—when France, Britain, and Russia established an entente to "contain" Germany.

### Phase Three—East Germany Promises Democratic Elections, the Soviets Accept German Reunification

The clear intention of the East German Communist party and the Soviet leadership to have a reformed Communist East Germany but not German reunification was undermined by a series of internal pressures. The reformist Communist faction that took over in early December included Gregor Gysi, the new Communist party chief, and Hans Modrow, the new prime minister. They established a weekly dialogue with the already visibly organizing prodemocratic groups, thus providing a means for consultation until free elections could determine a new government in the spring of 1990.

The most hated symbol of the Communist dictatorship was the *Staatssicherheitsdienst*, or State Security Service, commonly known as the Stasi. With an estimated strength of 85,000 personnel, it had about 130,000 regular informers and kept computerized files on some 5 million East Germans.<sup>31</sup> Gysi and Modrow promised that the secret police were being disbanded, but at the end of December both said the regime would establish a new internal security and intelligence service—as Gysi put it, in order "to protect us from nasty surprises, be they military, political, or economic."<sup>32</sup> Modrow's professed justification was the reported increase in neo-Nazi activities in East Germany. But a leader of the opposition Social Democrats in East Germany accused the regime of attempting to introduce "hysteria" with warnings of neo-Nazism simply as a pretext for keeping the secret police.<sup>33</sup> The democratic opposition groups told the regime they would cancel their weekly dialogues unless they were shown proof that the secret police were being disbanded and that no security service would be reconstituted, except by an elected government.

In mid-January 1990 the West German minister of the interior

said there was "no sign that agents have been withdrawn. The division of the Stasi responsible for espionage, the *Hauptverwaltung für Aufklärung* [HVA, or Main Administration for Reconnaissance], is functioning as it was in Honecker's time."<sup>34</sup> Along with these revelations a number of incidents occurred that broke the little confidence the new East German Communist leadership had been able to gather. A spray-paint desecration of the Soviet war memorial in East Berlin, for example, had the earmarks of a Stasi operation. As Kohl put it, the attempt to establish a secret police "was the symbol of what they had just overthrown in their peaceful revolution, the symbol of communism that had a catastrophic effect on the people."<sup>35</sup>

By the end of 1989, 350,000 East Germans had left through the newly opened borders. By the third week of January 1990, another 50,000 had joined them. The exodus increased as confidence in the reform Communists dwindled. The East German Communist party saw its membership decline from 2.4 million in 1989 to about 1.2 million at the beginning of 1990. On January 20, 1990, in an attempt to counter a loss of support within the party as well as the disaffection of the East German people, the party leadership expelled fourteen former leaders, including Egon Krenz.<sup>36</sup> The deputy chairman of the East German Communist party and mayor of Dresden, Wolfgang Berghofer, led forty key officials out of the Communist party, after failing to obtain its dissolution at an emergency meeting of the party leadership. Berghofer lamented that "the old SED [Communist party], and its leadership have ruined East Germany politically, economically, and morally in a shameful and irresponsible way."<sup>37</sup>

By the end of January 1990, the democratic opposition groups in East Germany had moved a long distance on the issue of reunification. Initially, most members of the New Forum and some other opposition organizations expected a "third way" of East German social democracy to be established. Increasingly numerous revelations about the hidden control exerted by the East German Communists, however, changed this position; even the reformist Communist leaders were intending to establish a new secret police. Furthermore, the pro-unification views of nearly all West German political leaders persuaded many democratic opposition groups to endorse reunification as the best guarantee of freedom and democracy in East Germany. By the end of January 1990, the New Forum, the CDU-CSU-affiliated Democratic Awakening movement, and the East German Social Democratic party had all voted to endorse reunification.<sup>38</sup>

On January 30, 1990, the East German Communist party reluctantly dropped its opposition and endorsed step-by-step, gradual unification; Prime Minister Hans Modrow cautioned that it must be

achieved within the context of a new European security structure. Modrow and Gysi went to Moscow to persuade Gorbachev there could be a form of German reunification acceptable to the Communist parties of both East Germany and the Soviet Union. Gysi later reported that Gorbachev supported his view that "the end of the unification process will be a demilitarized Germany without foreign troops."<sup>39</sup> Gysi went on to say that for Germany "neutrality is not enough. We want demilitarization."<sup>40</sup>

**Gorbachev Accepts Reunification.** Following this meeting in Moscow with Gysi and Modrow, Gorbachev dropped his objection to reunification, but said "it is essential to act responsibly and not seek the solution to this important issue on the streets."<sup>41</sup> Perhaps he was referring to the hundreds of thousands of East Germans demonstrating each week for reunification, or the 400,000 who had already left the country since August 1989.

To encourage Communist acceptance of reunification, Germany and the United States acted promptly. West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher announced that a reunified Germany would remain in NATO, but NATO troops would not be moved into the formerly East German territory.<sup>42</sup> President Bush proposed at the end of January 1990 that the United States and the Soviet Union both cut back their forces to 195,000 troops in Central and Eastern Europe; the Soviet Union currently had 565,000 and the United States 255,000.

As part of a regular process of U.S.-Soviet consultations, Secretary of State Baker visited Moscow from February 8 to 9, 1990. The meeting prompted Gorbachev to announce that "the USSR accepts [President Bush's] proposal to reduce the Soviet and American troops in foreign territories in Europe down to 195,000. If this proposal does not suit you we suggest the figure of 225,000 for the entire European region."<sup>43</sup> In recounting the discussion of Germany, Baker said, "I pointed out that unification has been a policy goal of the United States for over forty years. . . . I indicated that the United States does not favor neutrality for a unified Germany, that we favor a continued membership in or association with NATO."<sup>44</sup>

Immediately after Baker's visit, Chancellor Kohl arrived in Moscow for three hours of negotiations with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze. At the end of the talks on February 10, 1990, Kohl said, "General Secretary Gorbachev assured me unmistakably that the Soviet Union would respect the right of the German people to decide to live in one state and that it is a matter for the Germans to determine the time and the method."<sup>45</sup> Shevardnadze confirmed this, but at the same time he repeated the Soviet position and agreement with the

view of the East German leadership: both German states should leave their respective military alliances and form a neutral Germany, in a gradual unification process. Shevardnadze described a neutral demilitarized Germany as "a good old idea," reminding his audience that it had first been proposed by the Soviet Union in the early 1950s.<sup>46</sup> His pronouncements marked a turning point: from this time the issue at the focus of international and German politics was not whether Germany would be reunified, but whether it would be neutral or part of the Atlantic Alliance.

The twenty-three foreign ministers of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries met for the first time on February 12–13, 1990, in Ottawa, Canada. The original reason for the meeting had been to consider "open skies" types of verification measures for the reduction of conventional forces in Europe. But the focus turned out to be Germany and the U.S.-Soviet proposals for the reduction of foreign troops in Europe.

The United States would reduce its forces to 195,000 in Central Europe and keep an additional 30,000 troops in Europe but the Soviets should be limited to 195,000. Secretary of State Baker pointed out the U.S. need for these extra forces to compensate for being "an ocean away, whereas large numbers of Soviet troops would remain in the European part of the USSR."<sup>47</sup> The United States, West Germany, Britain, and France also agreed that two-plus-four talks should be held as a means of resolving the international issues of German reunification. The "two" referred to the two German states, the "four" to the four Allies responsible for Germany after its defeat in World War II. The Soviet Union accepted both proposals: the United States could maintain 225,000 troops in Europe, and the two-plus-four process of negotiation could be used to decide the international issues of German unification.<sup>48</sup>

These Soviet concessions were viewed as an important breakthrough, but only days later Soviet leaders repeated their concerns about Germany's future international role. Shevardnadze said in late February that reunification would not occur "as quickly as they imagine in Bonn. It requires several years."<sup>49</sup> Both Gorbachev and Shevardnadze then repeated their opposition to a reunified Germany's membership in NATO. Taking up a theme he was often to voice, Gorbachev said a united Germany should not "spell a threat or harm the national interests of neighbors or anybody else for that matter," and that only a peace agreement "can finally determine Germany's status in the European structure in terms of international law."<sup>50</sup>

While these events were occurring, East Germans were moving

to West Germany—85,000 of them in the first six weeks of 1990. In mid-February Prime Minister Modrow and Chancellor Kohl met in Bonn to discuss Modrow's request for a \$6–9 billion infusion of West German resources to help East Germany's crisis-ridden economy. In contrast with their first meeting in Dresden, East Germany, the previous December, it was now clear to both leaders that reunification was only a matter of time. Kohl offered to provide \$300 million in medical aid and credits for East Germany. Instead of the large-scale infusion of aid requested, however, he suggested the two countries begin planning for East Germany's adoption of the West German deutsche mark as its own currency. Modrow agreed, saying "a new chapter in German history has begun. The unity of Germany is closer."<sup>51</sup>

**Free Elections.** Just how close unity had come became apparent in the weeks before the March 18, 1990, national elections—the first free elections for East Germany since 1933. As the campaign began in late January, leaders from the major West German parties visited East Germany frequently to campaign for their affiliates. Undoubtedly the East German Communist leaders who opened the borders never imagined that only months later the banners, symbols, and leaders of West German parties—well known to East Germans from television—would be visible in campaign rallies throughout East Germany. On February 20, for example, more than 100,000 East Germans greeted Chancellor Kohl with chants of "Helmut! Helmut!" as he spoke in Erfurt, East Germany. Kohl said, "We are one Germany. We are one people."<sup>52</sup> And Willy Brandt made frequent appearances for the East German Social Democrats, quoting his formula for reunification: "What belongs together will grow together." By February 1990 opinion polls showed 75 percent of East Germans in favor of reunification, and except for the SPD, the major parties of West Germany and their East German correlates wanted it to be effected rapidly.<sup>53</sup>

At the start of the election campaign there were sixty political groups, but by March 1990 consolidation had reduced that number to twenty-three listed on the ballot. The fair and open campaign process, the close involvement of West German political parties, and the political history of East Germany all contributed to a result in which 70 percent of the votes were cast for parties affiliated with either the CDU-CSU or the SPD. As table 6-1 shows, the CDU-CSU-backed Alliance for Germany obtained 48 percent of the votes, the Social Democratic party of East Germany 22 percent.

With 94 percent of those East Germans eligible to vote participating, the election was judged by Western observers to be free and fair.

TABLE 6-1  
RESULTS OF THE MARCH 18, 1990, ELECTION IN EAST GERMANY

Party	Percentage of the Vote	Seats
Alliance for Germany (Christian Democratic-led coalition)	48	193
Social Democratic Party	22	87
Party of Democratic Socialism (renamed Communists)	16	65
Free Democratic Party	5	21
Others	9	34
	100	400

SOURCE: *The Economist* (London), June 23, 1990.

It provided a ringing endorsement for rapid German reunification. The major difference between the CDU-led Alliance for Germany and the SPD was that the center-right parties urged a rapid process of reunification while both the West German and East German SPD proposed a much slower process. Since the SPD was the leading party during the Weimar Republic era in the region that became East Germany, it had expected to win the election. Receiving only 22 percent of the vote thus disappointed the party. According to polls conducted at the time of the election, 91 percent of the voters in East Germany favored reunification. One German analysis concluded that this sentiment, along with a general disenchantment with socialism, explained the positive vote for the CDU-led coalition.<sup>54</sup>

The Communist party received 16 percent of the vote—and within East Berlin almost 30 percent. Although this share of the vote was larger than many expected, the election was nonetheless a massive repudiation of communism, reform communism included. A similar repudiation occurred in the subsequent free elections in Hungary (April 1990) and Czechoslovakia (June 1990). The dramatic fact and results of a reasonably free election in East Germany ushered in the post-Communist era and facilitated reunification.

#### Phase Four—The Accelerating Momentum of de Facto Unification

For forty years the Christian Democratic party of East Germany was a captive member of the Communist-led pseudo-coalition regime. Once Honecker was removed and political liberalization became possible, however, the Christian Democrats replaced their collaboration-

ist leaders. With extensive political and material help from the West German Christian Democrats, they forged a new party in the months leading to the March 18, 1990, elections. Chancellor Kohl himself visited East Germany six times and addressed hundreds of thousands of people at mass rallies.

The new chairman of the Christian Democrats was Lothar de Maizière, a former musician who, as an attorney, had defended political dissidents against the Honecker regime. After the election victory, de Maizière and the Alliance for Germany could have constructed a majority government by entering into coalition with the Free Democrats—a replication of the coalition in West Germany. But the Christian Democratic chairman hoped for a broader coalition of all the major democratic parties, including the SPD. He issued an invitation to them, saying, "From a sense of national responsibility and to make possible a broad base for decisive and effective actions by the government to be formed, we want to create a coalition as broad as possible."<sup>55</sup> De Maizière also outlined the issues requiring priority attention by the new government:

- to reach quick agreement with West Germany on a common currency and to establish economic and social union
- to replace East Germany's fifteen administrative regions with its original five largely autonomous states, similar to those in West Germany. This change would eventually permit direct accession of those states into West Germany, under Article 23 of the West German constitution. De Maizière believed such direct accession would hasten integration and facilitate automatic membership in the European Community
- to move quickly toward reunification within the broader context of European unity
- to ensure that East Germany fulfill existing treaties and obligations, including those to the Soviet Union.

Initially the East German Social Democratic party chairman, Ibrahim Boehme, rejected this invitation to join in forming a government. He contended that the East German Social Democrats would not enter into any coalition with either the Communist party or the German Social Union party—a sister party to West Germany's Christian Social Union (CSU). In West Germany, some Social Democratic leaders urged post-election unity with the CDU in East Germany—but not Oskar Lafontaine, the designated SPD opponent of Chancellor Kohl in the scheduled December 1990 West German elections. Lafontaine criticized Kohl (and indirectly the East German voters) for his promises of quick economic unification, saying, "The people put

trust in the man who promised a lot of money. That's Kohl. We'll be reminding him daily of his promises."<sup>56</sup>

In the course of several weeks of negotiations the East German Christian Democrats attempted to persuade the Social Democrats to join them in a grand coalition government. These negotiations were possibly facilitated by the March resignation of Boehme, who was accused of having been an informer for the East German secret police for many years.<sup>57</sup> On April 9 a grand coalition was agreed upon; it would encompass the CDU-Alliance for Germany, the Free Democrats, and the SPD. Among the twenty-four members of the new cabinet, the Christian Democrats would have fourteen ministries, the Social Democrats seven, and the Liberal Democrats three. De Maizière would be the prime minister. Markus Meckel, a Lutheran pastor and the acting chairman of the East German Social Democrats, would be the foreign minister. Another Lutheran clergyman, Rainer Eppelmann, leader of the small Democratic Awakening party, was appointed defense minister.<sup>58</sup>

In the negotiations for the grand coalition these East German democratic parties all agreed on a program to do the following:

- move rapidly toward reunification
- participate in the two-plus-four international negotiations on reunification
- exclude Communists from government
- keep a reunited Germany in NATO.

This last important commitment—undoubtedly a shock to the Soviets—was qualified by the stipulation that NATO renounce the first use of nuclear weapons and partially reorient its military strategy.

The elected East German democratic government also took a number of immediate, symbolic steps. In contrast to the Communist governments, which had always denied East German responsibility for Nazi crimes or reparations, the new East German government formally recognized "the responsibility of the entire German people for the past" and promised to "provide material support" to those who had been persecuted.<sup>59</sup> Concerning the Holocaust, the new East German government admitted "joint responsibility on behalf of the German people for the humiliation, expulsion, and murder of Jewish women, men, and children. . . . We feel sad and ashamed and acknowledge this burden of German history."<sup>60</sup> The new democratic government also formally apologized for having participated in the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. To Poland, anxious about the integrity of its borders after the reunification of Germany, the new government said the Polish people "should know that their right to

live within safe borders will not be questioned by territorial claims from us Germans, either now or in the future."<sup>61</sup>

**Economic Unification.** By early March 1990, 465,000 East Germans had crossed into West Germany, seeking asylum and resettlement. The exodus was continuing at a rate of more than 2,000 per day. As soon as the new East German government was formed, Chancellor Kohl moved to begin negotiations for economic and social union by the target date of July 1990. On April 23 Kohl agreed to exchange East German marks for West German deutsche marks at a one-to-one rate, for up to 4,000 deutsche marks per individual. The official exchange rate had been three East German marks for one West German deutsche mark, and the black market rate was five to one. With Kohl's offer an East German family of four could obtain 16,000 West German deutsche marks (about \$9,400) for 16,000 East German marks. In addition, all social insurance and pension payments from East Germany would be converted into West German currency and ultimately moved to a comparable level as economic unification occurred. For an estimated 2.7 million retirees in East Germany, for example, the April 1990 pension of about 420 East German marks would be converted first into West German deutsche marks and over time would likely rise to the expected average West German monthly pension level of 1,100 deutsche marks.<sup>62</sup>

East German Prime Minister de Maizière had made clear that this was the type of offer his government wanted. There would have to be a coexistence "for the next months," he said, of planned and market economies; his government's motto was, "As much market as possible and as much state as necessary."<sup>63</sup> Intensive negotiations continued over the next weeks between the two German governments, and by May 13 a draft treaty for economic unification was completed. Although the treaty covered most issues, it left unresolved such difficult ones as the allotment of private property and the agricultural and industrial restructuring of East Germany. These issues were to be treated in separate negotiations, to begin after economic unification, planned for July 2, 1990.<sup>64</sup>

The West German government announced it would establish a \$70 billion fund to carry out its obligations under a Treaty of Economic Unification.<sup>65</sup> On May 18 Chancellor Kohl and Prime Minister de Maizière, representing two German governments, signed a treaty to unite the two economies in a single social-market economy. Kohl called this "a first decisive step on the path to unity."<sup>66</sup> On June 21 both parliaments approved the Treaty of Economic Unification, which would take effect on July 2, 1990.

As a corollary, once economic unification took effect, there would be no more resettlement funds for East Germans coming into West Germany. Neither would there be any further continuation of the social services, housing, employment, and social insurance benefits that had hitherto been provided for the hundreds of thousands who had left East Germany. As Kohl had said to the people of East Germany immediately after the March 18 election,

The citizens of East Germany . . . want a social market economy—and soon. They clearly rejected any successors to the Communist party. . . . My message in this hour is: Stay home, help in your communities, in your factories, in your offices, together with us to build this wonderful land. We will help you.<sup>67</sup>

Kohl's strategy of moving forward on reunification step by step was working—but for some weeks the West German Social Democratic party almost derailed economic unification. Throughout the winter and spring of 1990, leaders of the SPD had charged that Kohl was rushing German reunification. Kohl contended there was a need to move quickly because Gorbachev's agreement on reunification was fundamental and it was uncertain how long he would remain in power in the Soviet Union. At a leadership meeting in late May 1990, the SPD decided to oppose the Treaty of Economic Unification. Even though the East German SPD had approved it and asked the West German SPD not to oppose it, the West German SPD preferred to negotiate for better protection for East German workers and industries.<sup>68</sup> The Social Democrats controlled the West German Bundesrat, the upper house of the legislature, and so their negative vote could delay passage of the treaty. After some weeks of strong opposition from within the party, however, Oskar Lafontaine was persuaded to withdraw from his initial decision and the SPD accepted the Treaty of Economic Unification.

**The International Dimension.** Following the East German elections, the tempo of international diplomacy on German unification increased markedly. There were meetings among Western leaders, bilateral Western-Soviet discussions, NATO meetings, European Community meetings, U.S.-Soviet negotiations at the level of foreign ministers, and a U.S.-Soviet summit at the end of May 1990.

There were two rounds of two-plus-four meetings among the two German states and the four World War II Allies, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union. By June 1990 these talks were known as the "five versus one," since all states

except the Soviet Union held the view that a reunified Germany should be in NATO. The newly elected governments of Czechoslovakia and Hungary also joined the East German government in endorsing a reunified Germany's membership in NATO.

On the one side, the Soviet Union proposed a formula to obtain a significant payment from West Germany in exchange for permitting reunification and withdrawing Soviet troops. The ultimate aim of the Soviet proposal was the neutralization of Germany and the dismantling of NATO. On the other side, Germany and its Atlantic Alliance Allies sought to ensure that a reunified Germany could remain in NATO and to prevent the Soviet Union from extracting unreasonable payments from West Germany if possible.

In the explicit and implicit negotiations held between April and June 1990, the Soviet position shifted in form but not in substance. On April 5 the Soviets said they would no longer insist that a unified Germany be militarily neutral, but they still would not accept a reunified Germany in NATO.<sup>69</sup> Both Germany and the United States immediately rejected this formulation, insisting that a reunified Germany should be able to remain in NATO.<sup>70</sup> On April 18 the Soviet Union sent East German Prime Minister de Maizière a letter specifically opposing a process of quick unification. Days later de Maizière met with Gorbachev in Moscow and told him personally that the East German government believed a reunified Germany should be part of the NATO security alliance, as neutrality was "no solution" for a united Germany; "We don't want to be a buffer zone," he said.<sup>71</sup> De Maizière offered to press for changes in NATO force structures and strategies, however, to reduce any threat to the Soviet Union.

For his part, Kohl pursued an active, multifaceted diplomatic strategy. To assure France and the other European states that a unified Germany intended to remain a part of democratic Europe, Kohl joined with President Mitterrand on April 20 to propose that the European Community move toward greater political unity and a common foreign policy by 1993. This joint French-German proposal would require a sharp acceleration in the pace of European integration planned for 1992. For France it represented an assurance that a reunited Germany would remain closely involved in cooperative Western institutions. A spokesman for the French foreign ministry made it clear that it was not a substitute for NATO, however: "For us the Alliance is absolutely essential."<sup>72</sup> While the French and German foreign ministers formally proposed this plan to an EC meeting, Presidents Mitterrand and Bush discussed the same issues in the United States. Mitterrand wanted assurance that the United States understood the French and German view of the long-term political

and security arrangements for Europe. When Bush concluded the meeting he noted that both France and Germany were committed to including a united Germany in the Atlantic Alliance.<sup>73</sup>

The French-German proposals were presented to the leaders of the twelve EC countries at their regular meeting on April 28, 1989, in Ireland. Prime Minister Thatcher of the United Kingdom had reservations and asked, "What does political union mean?" She agreed, though, that the foreign ministers of the European Community should draw up a detailed program of union for future consideration.<sup>74</sup> These issues were discussed further at the meeting of the foreign ministers on May 19, 1990, and at the regularly scheduled meeting of the EC heads of government on June 24–25, 1990. It was decided that by the end of 1990 the EC leaders would begin negotiations for greater political union by 1993. Kohl intended this joint French-German initiative both to reduce the likelihood that France would work against German reunification in the two-plus-four negotiations and to anchor Germany further in the institutions of democratic Europe.

To prepare for the first round of two-plus-four negotiations, NATO foreign ministers met in early May 1990. They decided to hold a summit meeting in early July to discuss ways of transforming NATO into an organization for greater political cooperation while retaining its military purpose. The NATO foreign ministers also recommended halting development of new short-range nuclear weapons and opening negotiations with the Soviet Union to eliminate existing nuclear weapon systems. They agreed to the Soviet proposal to temporarily keep Soviet troops in East Germany after German reunification was accepted.<sup>75</sup>

On the eve of the first round of two-plus-four talks, held in Bonn on May 5–6, the Soviet Union again proposed that NATO and the Warsaw Pact be abolished. Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze said Germany should become "a testing ground" for new forms of East-West security cooperation after its reunification. This meant a militarily "nonaligned" Germany, which would join both alliances for a transition period and thereby become "a place where [the alliances] would be gradually dissolved," to be replaced by "all-European security arrangements."<sup>76</sup> The United States and West Germany immediately rejected this proposal. Then at the May 1990 two-plus-four talks Shevardnadze went on to suggest that the 380,000 Soviet troops or a significant portion thereof might remain in a reunited Germany until 1995 or 1997.<sup>77</sup>

Alternatively, Shevardnadze proposed, if no agreement could be reached on Germany joining both alliances then Germany could

move forward on reunification with the issues of foreign troops and military alliances postponed for negotiations over the next several years. This approach was sharply rejected by Kohl, who called it Soviet "negotiation poker" and a potentially "fatal development" in the effort of a reunited Germany to regain full sovereignty.<sup>78</sup>

At the thirty-fifth anniversary of the Warsaw Pact Treaty on May 13, 1990, Soviet Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov and the Soviet general commanding the Warsaw Pact both asserted that the alliance was not in decline, as the West perceived. They reiterated that a united Germany could not be included in NATO.<sup>79</sup> The democratically elected East German and Hungarian leadership, however, had already said that a united Germany should be in NATO. Even before the elections, in the March 1990 Warsaw Pact meeting, the foreign ministers of Czechoslovakia and Poland had opposed the Soviet position and endorsed the membership of a united Germany in NATO.<sup>80</sup> The process of liberalization in four of the six Eastern European countries was leaving the Soviet Union isolated on the question of NATO membership for a reunified Germany.

The next opportunity for progress on the German issue would be the U.S.-Soviet summit meeting, May 30–June 3, 1990. In mid-May Secretary of State Baker visited Moscow to negotiate with Shevardnadze and Gorbachev on strategic arms reduction and other U.S.-Soviet issues. The United States made a number of concessions to Soviet positions, which had hardened considerably since earlier in 1990. The United States also refrained from taking any action against Soviet coercive measures to end the Lithuanian struggle for independence. The United States provided a number of new opportunities for trade as well, and it relaxed restrictions on the export of high technology to Eastern Europe and to the Soviet Union. These conciliatory gestures were further enhanced by the May 23 meeting of the NATO defense ministers, who decided to lower the readiness of some NATO military units and to explore a West German proposal to form multinational units.<sup>81</sup> They urged the Soviet Union to make greater progress on the conventional-forces-in-Europe negotiations, to bring Soviet force numbers below the threshold level believed capable of a surprise attack.<sup>82</sup>

Chancellor Kohl agreed that Germany would pay about \$750 million a year for at least five years to the Soviet Union, in reimbursement for the cost of their continuing troop deployments in East Germany. The estimated 380,000 Soviet forces in East Germany included more than 6,500 tanks, 5,000 rocket launchers, and 850 aircraft and helicopters on nineteen airfields. After making this con-

cession to the Soviet Union, Kohl visited President Bush in Washington just before the U.S.-Soviet summit.<sup>83</sup>

Another example of an effort made to reassure the Soviet Union was West German Foreign Minister Genscher's meeting with Shevardnadze on May 23 in Geneva. At this fourth round of 1990 Soviet-German ministerial discussions, Genscher reportedly arrived with a package of concessions West Germany was willing to offer the Soviet Union in exchange for its approval of German unification and membership in NATO. Those concessions included Kohl's offer of payment for the continued stationing of Soviet troops in East Germany, new bank credits, new economic aid for the Soviet Union from West Germany and other NATO countries, and West Germany's assumption of East Germany's contracts to supply the Soviets with uranium to power their nuclear plants. The West Germans would have to buy the uranium on the world market, since most East German uranium mines would be closed because of dangerous radioactivity. Perhaps the most important concession was West Germany's promise to urge the NATO Alliance to revise its strategy of "flexible response." Under this military doctrine, NATO would use both conventional and nuclear weapons, if needed, to halt an attack from the East. Genscher proposed that NATO use only conventional weapons, unless the East first used nuclear weapons in an attack.<sup>84</sup>

Nevertheless, on the eve of the May 1990 U.S.-Soviet summit meeting, Gorbachev issued a warning over the intentions of the West to have a unified Germany remain in NATO. He said the Soviet Union had the right to maintain its troops in East Germany under the agreement signed with the three Western Allies at the end of World War II. He added that the Soviet Union "will remain where it is now with its group of troops" if a reunified Germany joins NATO.<sup>85</sup> Gorbachev also emphasized a theme he would present to Bush—that the West would certainly oppose a reunified Germany's joining the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact, and therefore the West should sympathize with the Soviet Union's opposition to a reunified Germany in NATO.

Gorbachev made these statements just after concluding several hours of meetings with French President François Mitterrand. He suggested that, like France, a reunified Germany could remain a political member of NATO but not participate in its integrated military command. Gorbachev also endorsed Mitterrand's proposal for the creation of Pan-European institutions to act as political bridges between East and West. West Germany immediately rejected this Soviet proposal, but West German Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg noted the positive significance of the fact that "the Soviet president

is now beginning to concern himself in public with the prerequisites for [German] NATO membership."<sup>86</sup>

From Kohl's point of view, however, this Soviet proposal was an apparent repetition of French cooperation with the Soviet Union on approaches that would be unacceptable to West Germany, despite the joint French-German initiatives of the preceding months. It must have raised concerns about the future. The French foreign minister, Ronald Dumas, undoubtedly added to these concerns by stating after Gorbachev's May 1990 comments that "the request concerning the security of the Soviet Union is in my view legitimate. It is the duty of the West to address this concern. If we do not find a proper solution within a reasonable period of time there is a threat of crisis or tension between East and West."<sup>87</sup>

At the conclusion of his meeting with the prime minister of Canada the day before arriving in Washington, D.C., for his third visit to the United States, Gorbachev said the following about the West's insistence on a unified Germany's membership in NATO: "The West hasn't done much thinking, an old record that keeps playing the same note again and again. They try to dictate and this will not suit us."<sup>88</sup> Apparently as a result of Gorbachev's persuasiveness, Prime Minister Mulroney of Canada seemed to tilt toward the Soviet position; he remarked that an "inadvertent insensitivity to the feelings of the Soviet Union" had entered Allied thinking. Mulroney urged that the Atlantic Alliance consider ways to be more "accommodating" to Soviet concerns about Germany.<sup>89</sup>

The spring 1990 U.S.-Soviet summit took place in an atmosphere of great cordiality. The United States stood by the concessions it had made on the strategic-arms-reduction issues and on the transfer of high technology to the Soviet Union. It added the important concession of an opportunity for the Soviet Union to have most-favored-nation trading status with the United States. This was contingent only on the Soviet Parliament's codifying a policy change permitting the emigration of those Soviet citizens, including those who are Jewish, who sought to leave.

There were reports of intensive discussions on German issues, including U.S.-Soviet consideration of possible limitations on German military strength. The United States, though, demanded that there be no limits imposed exclusively on a sovereign, united Germany. As one senior U.S. official put it, "The Germans are paranoid about singularity and about being set out somehow. . . . That's why you know you don't talk about limits on the Germans, you talk about a Conventional Forces Europe agreement in which everyone would be limited . . . [including] the Germans."<sup>90</sup>

At the end of the U.S.-Soviet summit, the statements issued by the two leaders showed there had been no change in the position of either side on Germany.<sup>91</sup> Following the summit Gorbachev traveled to several American states, giving a speech in California that included a conciliatory-sounding argument for the end of both alliances in Europe:

Until now, alliances have been built on a selective, and in fact discriminatory basis. They were based on setting countries against each other. They divided countries and peoples much more than they united them. This system was perfected during the years of the cold war, producing the twin antipodes of the North Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact. But we are approaching a time when the very principles of alliance-building should become different. It should mean unity to create conditions for a life for every human being, protect the environment, combat hunger, diseases, drug addiction, and ignorance.<sup>92</sup>

Following this speech the Soviet Union announced it would withdraw some of its short-range nuclear weapons from Central Europe, "in order to create favorable conditions" for further negotiations on Germany and European security issues. The United States pointed out that the proposed withdrawals accounted for only 60 of about 14,000 Soviet tactical nuclear missile launchers in Central Europe and about 1,500 of its estimated 8,000 nuclear warheads.<sup>93</sup>

**The U.S. Nine-Point Approach.** After the U.S.-Soviet summit to end the stalemate on Germany, the United States proposed a nine-point approach. These "nine assurances" to the Soviet Union included:

- A united Germany would reaffirm its commitment not to develop nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.
- After the conclusion of a first conventional-forces-reduction treaty—then under negotiation in Vienna—the NATO Allies would be prepared to move toward negotiating a second agreement to reduce the manpower of national armies, including those of a united Germany.
- NATO would be prepared to speed up the pace of negotiations to limit short-range nuclear weapons in Europe.
- There would be a guarantee not only of the Polish border with Germany but also of the Soviet border with Poland—legitimizing territory Stalin removed from Poland.
- No NATO forces would be stationed in the territory of the former East Germany.

- Soviet troops would be allowed to remain in East Germany for a transitional period, with expenses paid by the German government.
- NATO would review and revise its military doctrine and deployments to make them less threatening to the Soviet Union.
- The NATO countries would support the institutionalization and expansion of the thirty-five-nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
- The Atlantic Alliance would approve German economic assistance to the Soviet Union, including payments for its German-based military forces and their housing once they returned to the Soviet Union, commercial lending, trade, and other commercial arrangements.<sup>94</sup>

U.S. Secretary of State Baker stated that the European Community, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and NATO all "must now play a greater role in deepening and broadening European unity"; but he added that

we must ensure that these organizations continue to complement and reinforce one another. NATO will continue to serve as the indispensable guarantor of peace—and therefore the ultimate guardian of democracy and prosperity. As President Bush stressed with President Gorbachev . . . we believe NATO will remain a cornerstone of both military security and political legitimacy in the new Europe.<sup>95</sup>

The seven members of the Warsaw Pact met in Moscow on June 7, and having pronounced an end to the idea that the West is "an ideological enemy," they appointed a special commission to draw up proposals to change the "character, functions, and activities" of their organization.<sup>96</sup> The declaration of the Warsaw Pact members echoed the Soviet approach and called for "the formation of a new all-European security system"; but the newly elected democratic president of Hungary, Josef Antal, publicly called for the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact within one year. Meeting in Scotland on the following day, the foreign ministers of the sixteen NATO countries declared they "extend to the Soviet Union and to all other European countries the hand of friendship and cooperation."<sup>97</sup> The NATO foreign ministers went on to say that they were determined to "seize the historic opportunities resulting from the profound changes in Europe to help build a new peaceful order."<sup>98</sup>

**Economic Concessions.** After the U.S.-Soviet summit, Warsaw Pact, and NATO meetings, Chancellor Kohl and East German Prime Minister de Maizière each met with President Bush in Washington, on

June 8 and 11 respectively. Bush repeated his view that "a united Germany and NATO will not be threatening to the Soviet Union," and Chancellor Kohl said "things are moving and in a good direction."<sup>99</sup> To maintain his strategy of keeping the momentum toward de facto unification Kohl now moved on two fronts. With apparent U.S. and NATO approval, he began to offer the Soviet Union the specific economic benefits that Genscher and Shevardnadze had discussed in May. German commercial banks offered a \$3 billion credit to the Soviet Union, to be guaranteed by the German government. Kohl and Mitterrand jointly urged that the European Community also provide substantial economic assistance to the Soviet Union. They made this proposal some days before the June 26–27 meeting in Ireland of the EC heads of state.<sup>100</sup> At that meeting the European Community agreed in principle to provide significant Western economic assistance to the Soviet Union, but it did not commit its twelve member-countries to specific amounts. Kohl's official spokesman then revealed that in the February 1990 Kohl-Gorbachev discussions and in subsequent telephone conversations, Western aid to the Soviet Union had been discussed as an exchange for Soviet permission to reunify.<sup>101</sup>

For many years political negotiations between East and West Germany were facilitated by giving the East Germans payment in hard currency, credits, and scarce goods or technology. By one informed estimate, West German payments to the Honecker regime amounted to billions of dollars annually. The intent was to promote a more open relationship and travel to West Germany for millions of visiting East Germans.<sup>102</sup> Kohl and the EC, supported by Bush stood ready to provide the Soviet Union with billions to persuade it to accept both reunification and German membership in NATO. With the EC endorsement in hand, Kohl could expect the July 1990 NATO summit also to endorse this approach, and the seven industrial democracies, including Japan, to consider large-scale economic aid to the Soviet Union at their summit meeting later in July 1990.

**Political Relations.** Having achieved U.S. and Western endorsement for the international dimension of his strategy for achieving irreversible unification, Kohl moved beyond economic unification to pursue the second aspect of his domestic strategy: political relations with East Germany. Since 1953 West Germany celebrated a "day of unification" on June 17, to symbolize the hope that East Germans would not again be crushed as they had been by Soviet forces on June 17, 1953. On that date in 1990, Chancellor Kohl attended a dramatic debate in the East German Parliament, where members of the Chris-

tian Democratic majority unexpectedly proposed that the Parliament immediately approve a process of political unification with West Germany.

The proposal called for reconstituting the five pre-World War II states that had existed in the territory of what had become East Germany, and then permitting each state to accept West German sovereignty under Article 23 of the West German constitution. By a vote of 267 to 92, with 7 abstentions, the East German Parliament sent the motion to committee—thereby postponing a decision, but keeping the possibility open. Chancellor Kohl received a standing ovation from the East German members of Parliament, and after the vote he said, "German unity is coming. It will come soon."<sup>103</sup> This event demonstrated that the East German Parliament had the legal authority and capacity to bring about the accession of East Germany into West Germany. It was a way of telling the Soviet Union that if the East German Parliament completed its vote, the only way to reverse such an action would be by the direct use of coercion or military force.

Thus, the June 17, 1990, debate and test-vote in the East German Parliament was clearly intended to signal to the Soviet Union that following economic unification on July 2, 1990, both German governments were ready to advance toward political unification, irrespective of Soviet views. Days later Kohl suggested the possibility of holding the first all-German elections in more than fifty years, in December 1990.<sup>104</sup> Shortly thereafter the West German government released details of an approach to complete political unification by holding democratic all-German elections on December 9, 1990. The West German Social Democrats pronounced such a quick approach to unity "not acceptable," contending that a number of issues required time to work out. One of these issues was the difference in electoral systems. In West Germany, unless a party gets more than 5 percent of the vote, it cannot win any seats in Parliament—since the West German population was more than three times that of East Germany, this would disadvantage small East German parties. The June 1990 announcement of a blueprint for political unification was nevertheless made by the Kohl government, to put further pressure on the Soviet Union.<sup>105</sup>

**Two-Plus-Four Talks.** All this occurred in preparation for the second round of two-plus-four negotiations on Germany, scheduled for June 22, 1990, in East Berlin. How would the Soviet Union respond to Germany's direct offer of extensive economic support, to the cordiality of the U.S.–Soviet summit, to the symbolism of NATO's June 1990

declarations of cooperation, and to the nine-point U.S. proposal to reassure the Soviet Union? Speaking to the Soviet Parliament on June 12, Gorbachev reiterated his call for "dual membership" for a unified Germany in NATO and the Warsaw Pact, but he made one important change. He said that "united Germany could declare that for this transition period it would honor all obligations it inherits from the Federal Republic of Germany and from the German Democratic Republic. The *Bundeswher* [West German armed forces] would as before be subordinate to NATO, and the East German troops would be subordinate to the government of the new Germany." Gorbachev also said he had told President Bush that "the American presence in Europe, since it fulfills a certain role in maintaining stability, is an element of the strategic situation, and does not represent a problem for us."<sup>106</sup> The West German government called Gorbachev's remarks "fundamentally positive," but it rejected the idea of a united Germany continuing in both alliances.<sup>107</sup> And the Soviet minister of defense, speaking a few days after Gorbachev, emphasized that the Soviet Union would agree to a unified Germany only if it joined a collective European security system that replaced NATO and the Warsaw Pact.<sup>108</sup>

At the June 22, 1990, meeting of the two-plus-four foreign ministers, Shevardnadze presented a detailed paper that set forth the Soviet position. It called for a "transition period" of three to five years, during which the four Allied powers would "limit the strength of Germany's armed forces," revamp their structure to make sure they are "rendered incapable for offensive operations," enforce a "ban on the resurgence of Nazi political ideology," and require "the preservation of memorials commemorating those who were killed in the fight against fascism."<sup>109</sup> Shevardnadze said furthermore that the Soviet Union wanted evidence of NATO's intention to transform itself into more of a political alliance. He called for the four powers to reduce their troops in Germany to "token contingents" or withdraw them completely. Shevardnadze's proposal also called for the four powers to remove all their troops from Berlin within six months after German reunification, although the 380,000 Soviet troops would remain in the former East Germany.<sup>110</sup>

In essence, the Soviet proposal harked back to the Stalin letter of 1952. It represented virtually all the Soviet foreign policy objectives pursued during the previous forty years with respect to West Germany: demilitarization, controls over German armed forces, de facto neutralization, withdrawal of Western military forces from Germany, and, implicitly, the end of NATO as a military alliance. It opened the way for direct Soviet interference in the internal affairs of a unified

Germany by proposing that the four powers retain for some years the authority to crush what any one of them, including the Soviet Union alone, might perceive as a "resurgence of Nazi political ideology." U.S. Secretary of State Baker rejected the Soviet proposal immediately and publicly, saying it "would restrict German sovereignty for some years" and calling such restriction unacceptable to the West. A united Germany, in Baker's view, should not be "singularized or discriminated against."<sup>111</sup> The British and West German foreign ministers made similar comments.

**Summary.** During the fall and winter of 1989 the people of Eastern Europe began the process of unraveling their long-established Communist regimes and of moving toward democracy and constitutional government. During the spring and summer of 1990 political liberalization moved forward in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and East Germany, although it was checked in Romania and Bulgaria. From September 1989 to June 1990 nearly 800,000 people fled from East Germany to West Germany, and the peoples and leaders of both Germanys made a series of fateful decisions that virtually guaranteed their peaceful reunification in freedom and democracy. The Soviet Union, however, remained determined that a united Germany not belong to the Atlantic Alliance as it existed in 1990, a political and military coalition to deter both coercion and direct attack. As spring turned to summer in 1990, the two Germanys moved toward de facto unification; but the future of a united Germany and Europe remained under the shadow of uncertainty regarding the design of the new international political order.