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Horst Fischer,  
Ruhr-Universität Bochum

Gert Krell,  
Hessische Stiftung für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung

Gottfried Niedhart,  
Universität Mannheim

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Barbara Munske

## The Two Plus Four Negotiations From a German-German Perspective

An Analysis of Perception

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To Bernd Bäcker †

who introduced me to the wonders of British humour  
which carried me through.

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## Preface

The upheavals in the former German Democratic Republic of the years 1989 and 1990 were of specific interest to me for various reasons. After many years living in the United Kingdom, I had returned practically on the eve of the "peaceful revolution" to my hometown West-Berlin to find everything in change. Additionally, I started teaching at the Dept. of Political Science at the Freie Universität Berlin in October 1989, being the assistant to Prof. Dr. Ulrich Albrecht. Together, we taught a course on International Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution over the period of one year. During that time, Prof. Albrecht "disappeared" regularly to join the international arena in his capacity as Head of the Policy Planning Staff of the East Berlin Foreign Office, while the students and I discussed the academic aspects of mediatively orientated international negotiations. Through his role in the "2+4" negotiations, I had the opportunity to visit the East Berlin Foreign Office and get a tiny insight into the goings-on.

I became interested in the unusual set-up of amateurs and academics, being "tested" under conditions of real-world international realities. Furthermore, my background of having studied peace research in the United Kingdom made me think of the possibility of combining traditional aspects of negotiation analysis with disciplines such as psychology, psychoanalysis and feminist theory in order to gain yet another insight into the negotiations different from those political scientists have and will provide. As Albrecht writes in retrospect: "Die konventionelle Politikwissenschaft erwies sich als weitaus zu Establishment-orientiert und damit zu konventionell, um hier nutzbar zu sein."<sup>1</sup>

The reader will judge whether this has been a worthwhile undertaking.

I decided to write this thesis in English because the "2+4" negotiations have received surprisingly little attention in the international literature, what has been written focuses by and large on the aspects of international law. Herewith, I would like to contribute to a more differentiated picture of the process of this German unification and negotiation analysis in general.

<sup>1</sup> Ulrich Albrecht, *Die Abwicklung der DDR. Die "2+4 Verhandlungen"*, Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen 1992, p.188.

## Acknowledgments

I would like to thank various people and institutions for their support and help during the writing of this thesis.

I am grateful to the Freie Universität Berlin for supporting me for two years with a NAFÖG grant; to the Berghof-Stiftung für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung in Berlin for their infrastructure which I used in the early stages of the thesis; to the Federal Press and Information Service in Bonn for providing me with relevant information and to my colleagues and friends at the University of Lancaster, England, for their support.

Most of all, however, I am grateful to the participants of the two German delegations: to the diplomats of the West German Foreign Office in Bonn and in particular to the members of the GDR delegation who were prepared to talk openly and continuously about their experiences and thoughts. They are the focus of this study and although some of them might not agree with my analysis and my findings, I would like to affirm that all of them have my deep respect.

I would like to thank both of my supervisors, Prof. Dr. Ulrich Albrecht and Prof. Dr. Klaus Boehnke. Albrecht was well aware of his difficult role as a supervisor while at the same time being subject of analysis. He made sure that he did not interfere, whilst still providing me with academic guidance. Boehnke was a very thorough reader and a critic of numerous ideas as well as an expert on American English.

Further, I would like to thank Prof. Hanns-Fred Rathenow for his support, especially in the early stages of the thesis; Prof. Astrid Albrecht-Heide for her ideas and spirit; Dr. Karl Ludwig Rintelen for his interest and valuable criticism; Dr. Hans Arnold who encouraged me repeatedly, Moritz Müller-Wirth for having decided to become a journalist and Detlef Richter for his word processing skills.

A big thank you to my parents and all my friends who put up with me over this period of time, who discussed ideas with me, read the chapters, cooked for me, made me cups of tea and most of all told me again and again to keep going: Sabeth Schmidthals, Kristina Nauditt, Heike Dilbner, Bärbel Schmidthals, Katja Koblitz, Ulrike Bangert, Dietmar Merkle, Kathryn Jenkins, Martina Fischer and of course above all, Dieter Hofmann.

## INTRODUCTION

"The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic are equal participants in the talks on the external aspects of the establishment of German unity."<sup>1</sup>

This study combines three aspects of international negotiations. Firstly, the foreign policy framework of the "2+4" negotiations from March to September 1990 on the external aspects of German unification is outlined. Secondly, an analysis of the perception of one negotiation delegation (the GDR delegation) is presented and contrasted with the perception of the other German delegation (the West German delegation).<sup>2</sup> Thirdly, a focus is taken not on the foreign policy dimension of the negotiations, but on the interplay of power and domination, and the relationship between "above and below" in terms of Hegel's association of servant and master. "Beide Momente sind wesentlich; - da sie zunächst ungleich und entgegengesetzt sind und ihre Reflexion in die Einheit sich noch nicht ergeben hat, so sind sie als zwei entgegengesetzte Gestalten des Bewußtseins; die eine das selbstständige, welchem das Fürsichsein, die andere das unselbstständige, dem das Leben oder das Sein für ein Anderes das Wesen ist; jenes ist der Herr, dies der Knecht."<sup>3</sup>

Structurally, the study is divided into two main parts: Its core consists of the theoretical and methodological chapters, the interviews with those who participated in the negotiation process and the analysis of these interviews. Part II (Documentation) covers the course of the negotiation process and events that occurred around it, the wording of the "2+4" treaty and associated treaties, and the biographies of the participants. Both parts complement each other; references are made to Part II at various stages, especially in Chapter 4.

- 1 "Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und die Deutsche Demokratische Republik sind gleichberechtigte Teilnehmer bei den Gesprächen über die äußeren Aspekte der Herstellung der deutschen Einheit." West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl after the first "2+4" conference in Bonn, May 6, 1990 in: Vertrag über die abschließende Regelung in bezug auf Deutschland, Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Bonn 1990, p. 1. In this study, statements and quotations are translated into English during Part I to facilitate an easier read; in Part II (the Documents) the respective original language is kept.
- 2 I have to clarify that in this study the delegation representing the former German Democratic Republic will be referred to as "GDR delegation", whereas the delegation representing the former Federal Republic of Germany will be referred to as "West German delegation". The abbreviation "FRG" is not used for the latter delegation, because this abbreviation refers at present equally to the united Germany.
- 3 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 1973, p. 150. Later in the discussion "Knecht" will be referred to as "servant". Benjamin (see Footnote 4) translates "Knecht" as "slave" in her work which is an imprecise translation as it implies a different relationship of dependency. "Servant" appears to be a more accurate translation in terms of Hegel's concept. I thank Dr. Hanne-Margret Birckenbach for drawing attention to this.

In this introduction, I will first clarify the overall research interest. I will then refer to the general negotiation setting and finally outline the methodological and theoretical structure.

### The Research Interest

The research interest of this study is an analysis of the interplay of power and domination within a negotiation setting as a politico-scientifically relevant dimension in the assumption of power and the keeping of power. Based on theoretical work by Jessica Benjamin<sup>4</sup> and Sandra Harding<sup>5</sup> and with the aid of socio-psychological and feminist approaches, the interplay of power and domination and their relevance to political situations will be examined. The basic theoretical postulate for an analysis of power and domination in this context is a gender-stereotypical characterization of "male"/"female" with respect to the two German delegations, the West German delegation representing the male, the GDR delegation representing the female part.

As all participants in the two German delegations were men, I will establish the argument that phenomena of power and domination versus submission are detectable in many communication settings, regardless of the biological sex of the participants; hence a prominent feature of communication is the interplay of power and domination. This is elaborated upon in Chapter 1, which outlines the theoretical framework of this study.

The process of German unification, during which the representatives of a ceasing GDR were in a position to negotiate future participation and representation, offered various possibilities for such an analysis. I considered whether or not the background of the internal German-German unification negotiations, that is to say, a bilateral negotiation setting, would be suitable to gain a detailed insight into the connection between power and domination. I rejected this, however, because a possible concentration on the German "victim-perpetrator" aspect and a simple reinforcement of East and West German stereotypes was to be avoided as far as possible. The reason for this is that the focus of this study is an investigation into power and domination in communicative

<sup>4</sup> Jessica Benjamin, *The Bonds of Love*, Virago Publishers, London 1990.

<sup>5</sup> Sandra Harding, *Feministische Wissenschaftskritik. Zum Verhältnis von Wissenschaft und sozialem Geschlecht*, Argument, Hamburg 1990.

interaction, and is not primarily an analysis of the difficulties of German unification.<sup>6</sup>

Hans-Joachim Maaz has been particularly prominent in introducing the aspect of "male"/"female" to the German unification process: "Die 'Ossis' spielen dabei den Part der Frau - sie gelten als depressiv, gehemmt und lassen sich lieber versorgen. Die 'Wessis' entsprechen dagegen dem üblichen Männerbild - sie sind dynamisch, dominant und oftmals auch großspurig."<sup>7</sup> The dichotomy he thus establishes is exactly what this study is not about, because such references appear to reinforce stereotypes rather than investigate them seriously. Reinforcing the stereotypes of East and West Germans, where East Germans are portrayed as victims and West Germans as perpetrators is, in my view, not helpful and does not further intellectual discourse. As Harding points out with reference to the discussion of racism: "... it is wrong to express racist prejudices. But to arrive at this understanding is only the beginning of grappling with what constitutes racist beliefs and behaviors."<sup>8</sup> Similarly, I argue that whilst the West German intention of annexing GDR territory and the GDR tendency to submissiveness might be morally wrong, they are, in my understanding, essentially elements of power and domination influenced by a complicated German-German past.

Hence, the so-called "2+4" negotiations on the external aspects of German unification seemed a more suitable focus, the GDR delegation including West German citizens as well as GDR citizens. This would not result in a simple, two-dimensional, dichotomic perception. Furthermore, the GDR delegation comprised by and large amateurs as opposed to trained diplomats. This factor gave a further incentive to focus an investigation of power and domination on these two delegations, in order to establish a possible link between power and domination on the one hand, and amateurs confronting professionals on the other.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>6</sup> I am, however, aware that it might be possible to detect the relevance of power and domination categories as part of the German unification dilemma, especially with regard to communication difficulties between East and West.

<sup>7</sup> Hans-Joachim Maaz/ Michael Lukas Moeller, *Die Einheit beginnt zu zweit*, Rowohlt Verlag, Berlin 1991, back cover.

<sup>8</sup> Sandra Harding, *Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?*, Open University Press, Buckingham 1991, p. 215.

<sup>9</sup> During the years 1989 and 1990, "amateurs" became political representatives in most Eastern European countries such as Czechoslovakia or Poland. The GDR Volkskammer (parliament) included many amateurs after the election of March 18, 1990. German President Richard von Weizsäcker made a special reference to amateurs in his address to the Day of German Unity in: *The Unification of Germany. A Documentation*. Published by the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, Bonn 1991, p. 158. It is an interesting further research task to analyse the impact of amateurs in political decision-making in more depth than can be accomplished by this study.

The research question posed was therefore: Is it possible to substantiate the assumption that power and domination are relevant categories in the relationship between two negotiation delegations? How did it feature in the attitudes of, and communication between, the two German delegations?

The hypotheses formulated for this study are therefore twofold:

- I. The GDR delegation's attitude was based on a fascination with political power and on a desire to identify with the elite in power.<sup>10</sup>
- II. The GDR delegation was faced with the arrogance of power which may be termed "above" and which, in turn, lead the GDR delegation to develop characteristics which may be described as "below".<sup>11</sup>

The sequencing of these hypotheses accounts for the focus of this study being the GDR delegation, rather than a reciprocal analysis of both delegations. Thus, the internal perspective of the GDR delegation will be examined first, before their interaction with the West German delegation is analysed, therefore Hypothesis II is based upon Hypothesis I.

To clarify, this study will not focus on the content of the negotiations or attempt to speculate on possibly different results had circumstances or personnel decisions been different. I argue that the outcome of this particular negotiation process would not have been altered significantly if the participants in the GDR delegation had been trained diplomats, because the progress of the negotiations was based on the balance of power in the foreign policy area, where the main focus was convincing the Soviet Union to agree to German unity in accordance with West German foreign policy interests.

Rather, I attempt to investigate the interaction of participants in such an unusual negotiation setting, that is to say, with amateurs present. This approach is perceived to be relevant in terms of a politico-scientific view of negotiation analysis but, in addition, it is based on the assumption that by crossing the traditional boundaries between disciplines - what Peace Research is all about - it is possible to gain more comprehensive insights into political phenomena. Hence, using a political setting as a framework; not remaining within it by using theories on international relations only, but tackling it with the aid of different disciplines, might open up beneficial views on the issue.

<sup>10</sup> "Fascination with power" refers here to what I call "the substructure"; the atmosphere of power and its image of security and temptation in presenting an illusion of political participation.

<sup>11</sup> The categories "above" and "below" are not to be valued here, but are intended to describe one party's perceived reality of holding power and the other's perceived reality of powerlessness. That these categories are subjective and, very importantly, interrelated is a focus of Chapter 1.

To familiarise the reader with the subject of research, I shall now recapitulate the main aspects of the negotiation process which are relevant to this study (for a more detailed account refer to Document I).

### Subjects of Research

The subjects of research are the representatives of the GDR delegation who participated in the "2+4" negotiations on the administrative level. This delegation is contrasted with its West German counterpart.

Although seven months of negotiations will be reviewed, the main events of the "2+4" negotiations occurred over a period of a mere three and a half months due to the July 1990 Caucasus meeting between West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Soviet President Michail Gorbachev. This extremely short period of time for decision-making and "getting into it" left the GDR delegation with hardly any chance to rethink positions or to establish new strategies, not only in terms of influencing the negotiation process to a substantial degree, but with reference to their own integrity.

This is in contrast to the other delegations, which consisted of professionals and of diplomats who knew each other from previous negotiations, some from the 1970's negotiations on the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin,<sup>12</sup> and whose diplomatic routine was therefore not necessarily hindered by lack of time. This phenomenon was described by one member of the West German delegation: "Of course, this made our work with the Allies a whole lot easier, also with the Soviet Union. They remembered the Quadripartite Agreement and had been in the negotiations then, they knew what it was all about."<sup>13</sup>

On the other hand, at the start of the negotiation process, even the West German delegation envisaged the period of time required to amount to up to two years, and one has to take into account that the situation of German unification was new to everyone involved, even the well-organised and trained diplomats. And yet, one can argue that the time pressure, that is, the sudden order to press ahead

<sup>12</sup> The Quadripartite Agreement of September 3, 1971, the so-called Berlin Agreement, between the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union confirmed the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers, notwithstanding their differing legal views. The Soviet Union agreed to facilitate transit traffic by road, rail and waterway between the two German states and not to impede it. The Agreement also provided that the link between the Federal Republic and Berlin (West), which the Allies declared not to be a constituent part of the Federal Republic, ought to be maintained and developed.

<sup>13</sup> "Das hat natürlich die Arbeit mit den Alliierten erleichtert, auch mit der Sowjetunion. Die hatten noch das Vier-Mächte-Abkommen im Kopf und hatten damals mitverhandelt, die wußten worum es geht". In: Interview with West German delegation.

with the negotiations rapidly because "unity ought not to turn sour",<sup>14</sup> influenced the GDR delegation more than it influenced the others involved.

The negotiations on the external aspects of German unification, or the "2+4" negotiations, were agreed upon at the Ottawa conference in February 1990. At the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Ottawa on February 13, 1990, a communiqué was published, officially announcing that the three Western powers, the Soviet Union and West and East Germany were to discuss the external aspects of German unification, including the security of neighbouring nations.<sup>15</sup> The GDR was at that time still represented by government ministers from the previous political structures, as the first so-called free elections in the GDR were to be held on March 18, 1990. Therefore, the GDR Foreign Minister who took part in the first round of talks was still Oskar Fischer.

Although no agreement has yet been reached in the literature as to who actually introduced the term "2+4", one view is that it originated at the meeting between James Baker and Hans-Dietrich Genscher in Washington on February 2, 1990. Contrary to this, Albrecht argues that the term was first used by the spokesman of the Moscow Foreign Ministry, Gerassimov, on February 10, 1990, with respect to Gorbachev's declaration that German unification was to be left to the Germans.<sup>16</sup> Arguing that it might have been in the West German interest to avoid any suggestion of a possible peace treaty, it seems feasible that the term "2+4" was proposed at the Washington meeting. On the other hand, it was in the Soviets' interest to ensure German participation, because the key to unification lay, at least at that time, in Moscow, and it was only possible to rule out doubts through German-Soviet dialogue.

The term was finally introduced at the Ottawa (or Open-Skies) Conference in February, and the negotiations on the external aspects of German unification will be referred to as "2+4" throughout this study.

The negotiations themselves lasted from March to September 1990. At issue were the four main subjects:

1. *An agreement on the Polish border binding under international law.* There was disagreement as to whether to draw up the treaty during the negotiation process and then have it ratified by a united Germany, or whether to wait for an independent statement from each German government, confirming their

<sup>14</sup> "Der Prozeß darf nicht sauer werden, innen wie außen." Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Wir brauchen einen Vertrag in: Der Spiegel, 17/1990, p. 17.

<sup>15</sup> Bulletin des Presse-und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung, Bonn 20.2.1990, No.27, p. 215.

<sup>16</sup> Ulrich Albrecht, Die Abwicklung der DDR. Die "2+4-Verhandlungen" - ein Insiderbericht, Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen 1992, p. 22.

intention to ratify such a treaty. Additionally, an official statement was needed, either from both German governments or from a united German government, for the final definition of its territory, i.e., the territory of the GDR, West Germany and Berlin.

2. *A decision on the united Germany's participation in international security structures.* Prevalent ideas were for the united Germany to embed itself in both the Warsaw Pact and NATO, to decide on neutrality or, of course, to become a member of NATO only. In addition, the questions of a merger of the two German armies and a possible reduction of troops needed to be agreed upon. Declarations in accordance with the Vienna disarmament process were expected with regard to troop reductions by a united German army and the rejection of ABC weapons. The CSCE process was regarded as essential by all participants.
3. *The status of Berlin.* The transfer of rights and responsibilities previously held by the four Allied powers to the united Germany. A decision was expected on the future stationing of Allied troops in Berlin and on what had previously been the Allied air corridor. In addition, it was necessary to discuss the use of former Allied military and technological institutions, and their possible transformation into CSCE institutions.
4. *Transfer of Allied rights and responsibilities.* This point on the agenda was not just linked to the status of Berlin, as further decisions were needed on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from GDR soil, the stationing of West or all-German troops on GDR territory, a possible assurance concerning the preservation of Soviet monuments and the final reinstatement of German sovereignty.<sup>17</sup>

There were differing positions with regard to the military function of a united Germany.<sup>18</sup> At the beginning of the negotiations, the Soviet Union made it clear that a united Germany's membership of NATO only was unacceptable. The Soviet position was that a united Germany could, possibly, be granted membership of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Preferably however, the historic opportunity should be used to neutralise and demilitarise Germany, leaving an army for self-defence only. At the beginning of the negotiations, the Soviet Union was still in a relatively strong position and aware that a positive outcome of the negotiation process depended on their agreement or veto. By May, Shevardnadze declared

<sup>17</sup> In: Vertrag über die abschließende Regelung in Bezug auf Deutschland, 1990, p. 7-12.

<sup>18</sup> Details are provided in Document I. The information here is largely based on the reports on the administrative meetings 1-8 and on media information about "2+4" from the Federal Press Information Office, Documents 17519-23474.

that a compromise between the West German and Soviet positions was possible. He linked this with the discussion of potential West German loans to the Soviet Union.<sup>19</sup> The ultimate Soviet goal was to sign an official peace treaty in which European security structures would be outlined. Additional issues such as trade agreements between the GDR and Soviet Union - trade with the Soviet Union amounted to nearly sixty per cent of GDR exports - the removal of Cocom export restrictions on new technology, and the preservation of Soviet monuments were promoted by the Soviets.

The French saw the negotiation process differently. They did not send first-rate diplomats to the negotiations, which indicates their limited interest in the negotiations and, possibly, their conflicting view of German unification. The French did show their concern over the clarification of the Polish border question, however, this being a symbolic act, underlining the non-aggressive status of the united Germany. Like the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, France argued in favour of Polish participation in the "2+4" negotiations. France never doubted the united Germany's membership of NATO, nor indeed did any of the Western nations.

During the months leading up to the "2+4" negotiations, the United Kingdom, like France, was sceptical about the united Germany's future role in Europe. As regards the "2+4" negotiations themselves, however, the United Kingdom, again like France, showed its concern for the recognition of the Polish border. The united Germany's membership of NATO was not disputed, and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was confident at the beginning of the negotiations that the Soviet position would soon change.<sup>20</sup> The economic strength of West Germany and its close partnership with the United States should not be underrated in this context.

The United States was possibly the most positive and congenial delegation of all as far as unification was concerned. Baker's close partnership with Genscher before and during the negotiation process was evident, and indicated full confidence in the West German delegation's ability to negotiate successfully. The American conditions for a successful completion of the negotiations amounted to the united Germany becoming a member of NATO and finally acknowledging the Polish Western border. In May, West German Chancellor Kohl declared that one could rely on the Americans completely and that nobody could wish for better

19 Horst Teltschik, *329 Tage. Innenansichten der Einigung*, Goldmann Verlag, Berlin 1991, p. 220. Even at the beginning of the "2+4" negotiations two differing Soviet positions existed concerning German unification and conditions the Soviet Union ought to express. See Document I on details.

20 Teltschik, 1991, p. 203.

support; he would never forget that.<sup>21</sup> As the American position in Western Europe had declined remarkably over the previous years and disagreements within NATO were increasing, the Americans might have seen this as a new chance for the two nations becoming "partners in leadership".

The West German position was based on a united Germany's NATO membership, and their main task during the negotiation process was seen to be convincing the Soviet Union to relinquish its position on demilitarisation and neutrality. In addition, they argued against any special status, discrimination or singularity. The West Germans were not in favour of anything resembling a peace treaty. Furthermore, they argued for the institutionalisation of CSCE structures in connection with disarmament agreements as an outcome of German unification. Additionally, they argued for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from GDR soil during a regulated period of time. Concerning the Polish border, the West German Chancellor believed that "only an all-German Government can provide a signature which is binding under international law on behalf of a future united Germany."<sup>22</sup> A member of the West German delegation later mentioned that West Germany achieved 95% of its aims.<sup>23</sup> The West German delegation clearly negotiated in terms of a sole representation of German interests.<sup>24</sup> The then Foreign Minister Genscher was renowned for his confident negotiating which he indicated himself when saying: "It is wonderful to be right in politics and to experience that while one is still in office. Where I go that is so. And it is always the same people who have to change themselves."<sup>25</sup>

The GDR position entailed recognition of the Polish border in accordance with international law; the embedding of a united Germany in CSCE security structures; membership of a modified NATO; no production, trade or ownership of ABC weapons.<sup>26</sup> The discussion of the option of demilitarisation and neutrality, and the necessity of a Polish border treaty were the two main issues of concern to

21 "Auf die amerikanischen Freunde sei absoluter Verlaß. Eine stärkere Unterstützung könne man sich nicht wünschen, er werde das nie vergessen." In: Teltschik, 1991, p. 221.

22 Policy Statement in the German Bundestag by West German Chancellor Kohl on the Treaty of May 18, 1990 on the external aspects of German Unity, and on German-Polish Relations, Bonn, June 21, 1990 in: *The Unification of Germany, 1991*, p. 50.

23 Interview with member of the West German delegation.

24 For references to these issues see *Vertrag über die abschließende Regelung in bezug auf Deutschland, 1990*, p. 10/11; Peter Schlotter, *Die 2+4-Verhandlungen und der KSZE Prozeß* in: Beate Kohler-Koch (Hrsg.), *Die politischen Konturen eines neuen Europa*, Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden 1991; Ulrich Albrecht, 1992; Richard Kiessler/ Frank Elbe, *Ein runder Tisch mit scharfen Ecken*, Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden 1993.

25 "Es ist etwas Wunderschönes in der Politik recht zu kriegen und das noch im Amt zu erleben. Wo ich hingehe, ist das so. Und die sich ändern müssen, sind immer dieselben." In: Kiessler/ Elbe, 1993, p. 15.

26 A detailed account is given in the Coalition Agreement of the GDR government parties: *Koalitionsvereinbarung der DDR-Regierungsparteien vom 12. April 1990*, see Document III.

the GDR delegation. Various other side issues, such as the maintenance of trade agreements and lifting of the Cocom embargo were mentioned. By and large, it first appeared that, in substance, the position of both German delegations did not differ to any great extent. The GDR delegation believed itself capable of acting as mediator between the West German and Soviet positions, and openly supported Soviet interests.

The various rounds of talks were divided into two main negotiation levels; the administrative level and the Foreign Minister level.

The administrative level included the Political Directors of the six delegations (or their respective national equivalents) and their staff, and was to meet alternately in Bonn and East Berlin. These administrative meetings were to pre-discuss and prepare basic issues and to work out the wording of the final treaty. A West German diplomat stresses that the alternation of meeting places but further holding the meetings around a round table, everybody being given the possibility to speak in their respective language and the rotation of the chairmen according to the German alphabet, were all indications to how important equality of all participants was to the West German delegation.<sup>27</sup>

Due to the varying subjects under negotiation, sub-groups were set up for legal issues, military issues and so on. These groups were mainly led by the West German delegation which, due to its brilliant organisation in the Foreign Office and its great interest in a positive outcome of the negotiation process, involved its best diplomats and experts. Each administrative delegation reported back to its respective Foreign Minister, and the resulting feedback was then incorporated into the next round of planning.

During the seven months of negotiations, eight administrative meetings were convened (and four Foreign Minister Conferences held), to which each participating nation sent a permanent delegation. Each delegation consisted of between four and six participants.

Only the delegation of the GDR changed twice. The first change came after the elections to the Volkskammer on March 18, 1990, when the resulting coalition of Christian Democrats (CDU) and Social Democrats (SPD) agreed on a Social Democratic Foreign Minister, Markus Meckel, who took office on April 17, 1990. The delegation changed for the second time in August 1990 due to Meckel's resignation and the consequent resignation of his Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Hans Misselwitz, who had led the GDR delegation at the administrative level.

In accordance with the Ottawa agreement, a preparatory meeting in East Berlin on March 9, 1990 had already been arranged between the Political Director

<sup>27</sup> Kiessler/ Elbe, 1993, p. 121.

of the West German Foreign Office, Dr. Dieter Kastrup, and his East German counterpart, Ernst Krabatsch. Consequently, it had taken place, before the new GDR Foreign Minister took office.

On March 14, the first meeting was held at an administrative level, with all six Political Directors and their staff participating in the negotiations (the so-called group of experts).<sup>28</sup> A follow-up meeting was arranged in East Berlin on April 30, 1990, with a different GDR delegation. The membership of the GDR delegation changed during the following two administrative meetings, with both former and new GDR Foreign Office staff participating. Thereafter, only one former GDR diplomat stayed on as part of the delegation.

Due to the political changes in the GDR; continuing mass demonstrations, grass-roots organisations such as the Neue Forum<sup>29</sup> taking political leadership, and a revolutionary atmosphere which Christa Wolf described thus: "We hardly sleep these days, some of us don't sleep at all; never before have we talked with each other so much, read the papers so intensively, all this as well as going to work",<sup>30</sup> the Foreign Office in East Berlin was, obviously in all respects, in a position different from that of the other delegations.

The last Foreign Minister of the GDR had moved into his office on April 17, 1990,<sup>31</sup> two weeks before the second administrative meeting (April 30) and three weeks before the first Foreign Ministers' meeting (May 5). In contrast to the West German Foreign Minister, Meckel could not rely on a workable organisation or trustworthy staff. Meckel had decided that the group of experts who would represent the GDR in the administrative meetings would be composed of a combination of former GDR peace movement activists and priests, as well as peace researchers and activists from West Germany. Only one member of the old system remained; the above-mentioned Ernst Krabatsch. Although Meckel entered the Foreign Office as the last ever GDR Foreign Minister, he and his advisers, nevertheless, intended to establish themselves in the Foreign Office and to contribute their own strategies and positions, despite, or maybe particularly

<sup>28</sup> Vertrag über die abschließende Regelung in bezug auf Deutschland, 1990, p. 13.

<sup>29</sup> The Neue Forum was one of the more prominent GDR opposition groups of the GDR taking part in the "Round Table" discussions. These discussions among representatives of the East German Government and opposition groups in the GDR began on December 7, 1989 in East Berlin. Twelve parties and groups had been invited to participate. Similar Round Table discussions were subsequently held in most cities in the GDR.

<sup>30</sup> "Wir schlafen nicht oder wenig. Noch nie ist soviel miteinander geredet worden. Und dazu noch intensiv Zeitung lesen und das alles neben der Arbeit." Christa Wolf during a mass demonstration in East Berlin, November 4, 1989.

<sup>31</sup> On April 12, 1990 the Coalition Government of the GDR had stated that German unification ought to proceed according to Article 23 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany. See Document III.

because of, the fact that they were now assisting in the elimination of the socialist state system.

In April, Meckel went to Poland on his first state visit. Subsequent to this, the idea of a security zone (Sicherheitszone) between Czechoslovakia, Poland and the GDR emerged. The relationship with Poland constituted a central theme of the GDR's contributions to the "2+4" negotiations, and was repeatedly emphasized.

In May, the first "2+4" Foreign Ministers' Conference, which had been prepared during an administrative meeting on April 30, was held in Bonn. Each Foreign Minister declared his view on German unification, the relevance of a positive CSCE process and agreed to further meetings in Berlin, Paris and Moscow. The Soviet statement received specific attention, as Eduard Shevardnadze stressed the independence of two German states in deciding on unification and accepted the idea of separating the external from internal aspects of unification. This Soviet openness indicated the possibility of a rapid negotiation development. The Soviet refusal to accept a united Germany's NATO membership remained as a stumbling block. In order to reach a satisfactory agreement on the Polish border binding under international law, it was decided to invite the Polish Foreign Minister to the third conference, which was to be held in Paris.

In June, the second Foreign Ministers' conference was held; this had again been prepared by the administrative delegations. The conference itself did not contain any surprises. A list of issues to be included in the final document was introduced by the Soviet and American delegations. At the beginning of that month, West German Chancellor Kohl had held talks with leading West German bankers over the possibility of a loan to the Soviet Union. American President George Bush had tried to influence the Soviet position on NATO membership during Gorbachev's visit to Washington.

In July, the monetary, economic and social union between West and East Germany was established. A few days later, the NATO summit was held in London. The most spectacular event was the Caucasus meeting between West German Chancellor Kohl and Soviet President Gorbachev, three days before the third Foreign Ministers' conference, where Gorbachev agreed to a united Germany's sole membership of NATO.

During a press conference, West German Chancellor Kohl elaborated on ten points of agreement which resulted from the Caucasus meeting, indicating that all principle differences between the Western and the Soviet delegations had ceased to exist, and that the signing of the "2+4" treaty was in sight.<sup>32</sup> The third Foreign Ministers' Conference in Paris was thus dominated by these events. During the

32 Bulletin Presse-und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Nr.93, 18.7.1990, p. 802/803.

conference, the issue of an agreement binding under international law concerning Poland was finally agreed upon in the presence of the Polish Foreign Minister, who accepted the West German proposal for the united Germany making a statement on the border issue at a later date, rather than in anticipation of unification.

At Geneva in August, West German Foreign Minister Genscher declared West and East Germany's renunciation of the stationing and production of ABC weapons. In agreement with the East German government, Genscher announced the reduction of a united German army by 45% to 370,000 men at the conference on the Conventional Arms Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE Treaty) in Vienna.

Negotiations between the Soviets and West Germany which had begun in July were continued in August and finally completed in time for the Moscow conference in September. These by-negotiations included economic, social and cultural agreements; circumstances of Soviet troop withdrawals from GDR soil; the establishment of friendly, cooperative, good-neighbourly relations.

In September, the "2+4" treaty was signed in Moscow.<sup>33</sup>

To draw attention to the main focus of this study, I shall now briefly introduce the individual participants in the East and West German delegations. The constant participants in the GDR delegation were:<sup>34</sup>

*Hans-Jürgen Misselwitz*, 44 years old, GDR citizen, priest by profession, active in the GDR oppositional peace movement. He participated in the delegation from April to July 1990 and acted as Parliamentary Under-Secretary, heading the GDR delegation during the negotiations.

*Carlchristian von Braunnühl*, 50 years old, West German citizen, psychologist by profession, active in the West German peace movement, with long-standing contacts to the GDR oppositional peace movement. He participated in the delegation from April to September 1990 and acted as Political Director in the East Berlin Foreign Office.

*Ulrich Albrecht*, 53 years old, West German citizen with roots in the GDR, Professor of International Politics and Peace and Conflict Studies, with long-standing contacts to the oppositional movement in the GDR. He participated in the delegation from April to September 1990 as Head of the Policy Planning Staff for the negotiations.

*Ernst Krabatsch*, 54 years old, GDR citizen, diplomat in the former GDR Foreign Office, particularly in Grundsatzfragen (questions of general principle),

33 For the wording of the treaty, see Document II.

34 For detailed biographies, see Document IV.

and Vice Foreign Minister. He participated in the delegation from March to September 1990 as a political adviser.

*Wolfgang Wiemer*, 43 years old, West German citizen, adviser to the SPD parliamentary fraction in Bonn. He participated in the delegation from April to August 1990 as a political adviser.

Also present were:

*Wolfram von Fritsch*, 33 years old, West German citizen and law student, was present as an office clerk at some stages of the negotiations, in the beginning for Meckel and then for Helmut Domke. Prior to his involvement in the GDR delegation, he had worked as office clerk for the West German Foreign Minister Genscher

*Peter Schlotter*, 49 years old, West German citizen, peace researcher, adviser to the GDR delegation on CSCE issues.

*Helmut Domke*, 51 years old, GDR citizen, Professor of Physics at the GDR Academy of Sciences. He had been active in the Protestant church, with long-standing contacts to the oppositional movement and the government in the GDR.

*Markus Meckel*, GDR Foreign Minister, was not a participant in the GDR administrative delegation. Nevertheless, his contacts with his administrative advisers and experts were clearly relevant to the administrative negotiations. Meckel is 42 years old, a GDR citizen and priest by profession. He had been active in the GDR oppositional movement and co-founded the SPD in the GDR.

The West and East German participants involved in the peace movement or in peace research knew each other from various seminars and meetings which had taken place since 1983. The diplomat in the GDR delegation had already met the participants in the West German and Soviet delegations.

Likewise, some members of the West German, French and Soviet delegations knew each other from previous negotiations. They had negotiated the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin in the 1970's, when the three main participants in the West German delegation had already worked as a team. The participants in the West German delegation were<sup>35</sup>:

*Dieter Kastrup*, 57 years old, studied law in Cologne and entered the diplomatic service in 1965. He was posted to various countries including Brazil and Iran, and assisted in the 1970's negotiations over the Quadripartite Agreement on the status of Berlin. He specialized in Eastern European issues and German-German relations, and became Director of the Foreign Office's Political Section

<sup>35</sup> It has not been possible to attain any information on the participants Hartmut Hillgenberg, Friedrich Gröning, Georg Luy and Martin Ney.

"D two" in 1988. In this capacity, he often accompanied Foreign Minister Genscher.

*Frank Elbe*, 53 years old, legation councillor first class, ministerial director and Genscher's special envoy with ambassadorial rank. He received the title "ambassador" as a personal honour. After the "2+4" negotiations he became Director of the Policy Planning Staff at the Foreign Office, beforehand he had been Director of the Minister's Office. He has particularly good contacts to Moscow and Washington, and was repeatedly active as a negotiator. Due to differences with the present Foreign Minister, Kinkel, Elbe asked for a transfer to another embassy and was consequently made German ambassador to India.

*Peter Hartmann*, 58 years old, was born in Aachen. He studied in Kiel, Frankfurt, Rome and Freiburg (CH), and entered the diplomatic service in 1965, with a posting to the German embassy in Washington. From 1968 to 1974, he was posted to the consulate general in Karachi, Pakistan, and to the EEC, in Brussels. From 1974 to 1977, he worked together with Kastrup in the Department for German and Berlin Affairs at the Foreign Office in Bonn. He was then ambassador at Buenos Aires, Argentina, before being transferred to the Federal Chancellery in Bonn. From 1981 to 1984, he was head of the Foreign Affairs Office of the CDU; in 1984 he became head of the European Department, and then Horst Teltschik's successor as director of the Foreign and Defence Department. Hartmann was announced German ambassador to London in 1993.

*Christian Pauls*, 50 years old, was born in Buckow, in the former GDR. He comes from a well-known diplomatic family, studied law in Hamburg and Freiburg. He was posted to New Delhi, Rome, Athens and Bonn. After the "2+4" negotiations, he transferred to the German Embassy in Washington, USA.

*Hans-Dietrich Genscher*, 67 years old, was born near Halle. He studied law in Leipzig and Hamburg and joined the Liberal youth organisation and Liberal Party in 1954/55. In 1968, he was elected Chairman of the Liberal Party (FDP), and in 1969 became Minister of the Interior. In 1974, he became Foreign Minister under the Schmidt government. He resigned from this post in April 1992.

I shall now refer briefly to the methodological and theoretical structure of this study.

#### Method of Analysis and Theoretical Framework

The study was originally intended to present a comparative analysis of the two German delegations with regard to their perceptions of Self and of Other. This proved to be impossible, due to the differing amounts of material available.

Whereas the GDR delegation agreed to the necessary procedures of pilot interviews and full interviews, as well as answering the questionnaire, the West German delegation agreed only to pilot interviews, under the condition that these interviews were not taped. Two participants in the West German delegation did not agree to being interviewed at all,<sup>36</sup> and one explained his refusal as follows: "I did not direct the negotiations and was only occasionally present. Apart from that, these negotiations were subject to confidentiality, and are therefore not suited for the interview you require."<sup>37</sup>

Therefore, the focus of this study became the GDR delegation. In order to investigate the issue of power and domination in this negotiation process, it was decided to use "perception" as the central category in order to explore the way power and domination unfold in such a negotiation setting.<sup>38</sup> Also, it is argued that power and domination are, at least partly, subjective categories, and need to be expressed and confirmed by the individuals experiencing them.

The literature on perception analysis in international negotiations (Cottam 1986;<sup>39</sup> Jervis 1970, 1976;<sup>40</sup> Saunders 1985;<sup>41</sup> Frei 1984, 1986<sup>42</sup>) is widespread, but is primarily concerned with the analysis of political structures and political world views (see Chapter 1), and to a lesser degree with the analysis of the negotiation interaction between individual participants or delegations.<sup>43</sup>

Daniel Frei (1984), however, developed a methodology for assessing what he calls the Image of Self and the Image of the Other during talks between American

36 Dr. Dieter Kastrop and Hartmut Hillgenberg.

37 "Ich habe die Verhandlungen nicht geführt und bin auch nur gelegentlich beteiligt gewesen. Abgesehen davon, handelt es sich um vertrauliche Vorgänge, die sich nicht für das von Ihnen gewünschte Gespräch über das Verhalten der Beteiligten eignen." Letter from a member of the West German delegation.

38 The term "perception" is not defined in Jervis' work (see Footnote 40), on which I focus where perception analysis is concerned. Frei (see Footnote 42), however, provides a rather general definition which will have to suffice for this study: Perception is the selection and reception of sensory inputs and the transmission of these inputs to various centers in the brain. In: Bennett, 1981, p. 145f. quoted in: Frei, 1984, p. 8.

39 Martha L. Cottam, *Foreign Policy Decision Making - the Influence of Cognition*, Westview Special Studies in International Relations, Boulder 1986.

40 Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey 1970; idem, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey 1976.

41 Harold H. Saunders, *We Need a Larger Theory of Negotiation: The Importance of Pre-negotiating Phases in: Negotiation Journal*, Vol.7, July 1985, p. 249-263.

42 Daniel Frei, *Assumptions and Perceptions in Disarmament*, UNIDIR, New York 1984; idem, "Fehlwahrnehmungen" und internationale Verständigung in: *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, Heft 1, 1986, p. 159-175.

43 This goes more for the analysis of international negotiations than for specific group negotiations, i.e. wage, trade union or general business negotiations. As far as these more internal negotiations are concerned, a wide range of research on psychological interaction is in existence.

and Soviet disarmament negotiators.<sup>44</sup> This offers both a theoretical and an operational framework, and this methodology, explained in detail in Chapter 2, will be applied to the "2+4" negotiation process. In addition, a questionnaire developed by Horst-Eberhard Richter and Elmar Brähler,<sup>45</sup> the so-called Gießen-Test, is employed. In fact, this study attempts to combine the two approaches.

Further, the analysis of the Image of Self and the Image of Other is embedded in a wider theoretical framework of feminist and psychoanalytical analysis.

In the theoretical approach, Harding's and Benjamin's feminist approaches are used to present different ideas on what constitutes a Self and an Other. Hence, a detour on rationality and gender will be taken. By going back to the theorists of the Enlightenment, it is my intention to show to which extent rationality has influenced what men and women perceive as the Self and the Other, and to question the consequent construct of "male/female". This leads to the introduction of Gender Theory, and the perception of "male/female" categories as social constructs linked to categories of power and domination. In addition, Benjamin's psychoanalytical work based on the Theory of Object Relations is introduced and I will establish the extent to which such a view could be relevant in negotiation analysis. This includes considering what constitutes "male/female" and related conceptions of domination and submission.

Hence, these approaches will clarify why the analysis of power and domination could be strengthened through a gender-stereotypical characterization of "male/female" with regard to the two German delegations.

Through this, the study will show that power and domination constitute relevant categories in negotiation analysis, and that in the particular context of the "2+4" negotiation process, the interaction between the two German delegations reflects a stereotypical "above/below" interaction process.

In the following chapter, the theoretical approach of this study will be explained in depth. The second chapter comprises an examination of Frei's methodological framework and of the design of interview questions, as well as an introduction to the so-called Gießen-Test. In the third and fourth chapters, the interviews with the two German delegations are analysed. The concluding chapter will bring together the theoretical and analytical findings, and provide suggestions for future research.

44 Daniel Frei, *Assumptions and Perceptions in Disarmament*, UNIDIR, New York 1984.

45 Dieter Beckmann/ Elmar Brähler/ Horst-Eberhard Richter, *Der Gießen-Test (GT). Ein Test für Individual-und Gruppendiagnostik*. Verlag Hans Huber, Stuttgart 1991.

Nevertheless, he mentions the group's weaknesses and ineffectiveness. Analytically, he presents in-depth ideas on external aspects which influenced the negotiation process. His remarks seem to show a degree of emotional involvement, although his language indicates a more peripheral participation in internal discussions. Furthermore, he balances an operational approach with emotional language and metaphors.

*Interviewee 8 (West German):* A highly reflective perception of both his own delegation and the West German delegation is revealed. He perceives shortcomings within the GDR delegation, but does not revert to "blaming" his own delegation. He does not perceive the attitude of the West German delegation as being "normal" within the framework of their diplomatic codex of conduct, and criticises the weaknesses and intrigues of both delegations. Similar to Interviewee 1, he stresses the legitimacy of the GDR delegation, and condemns the fact that the GDR identity was ignored, as does Interviewee 3. He repeatedly expresses feeling demoralized whenever the denial of independent GDR positions is concerned.

*Interviewee 9 (West German):* A rather detached perception of Self and of the Other is presented. Nevertheless, criticism is voiced with regard to his own delegation, whereas the West German delegation is perceived as "normal". He stresses the need for an operational approach in negotiations, and does not express any form of resignation or demoralization.

### 3.4 Conclusion

This conclusion will provide a summary of Résumés I and II, and will attempt to explain some of the phenomena shown.

An extensive analysis combined with the perceptions of the West German delegation and with the theoretical framework of this study will be undertaken in Chapter 5.

Four main points are discussed here:

*Firstly*, the set-up of the GDR delegation brought together an unusual mixture of personalities. Superficially, one can establish three groups:

1. Representatives of the former GDR, who had worked within the GDR apparatus.

2. "New" GDR representatives who had taken part in the GDR opposition, active particularly within the GDR church, and who now filled government offices.
3. The "Wessis", the West Germans who had been asked to support the GDR delegation in its attempt to translate the Coalition Agreement into practice during the "2+4" negotiations.

Four West German participants, the Foreign Minister and the Parliamentary Under-Secretary had been in touch with each other previously through the peace movement. Hence, six of the nine participants had known each other, before they entered the negotiation process. Two of the four East German participants have a theological background; another has an academic background and long-standing contacts with the GDR protestant church and acted, amongst others, as a representative at international conferences. This background may have influenced perception of communication and interaction between the two German delegations and may have influenced individual behaviour. Two of the East Germans repeatedly point to the legitimacy of a GDR identity and to the moral justification of participating in this negotiation process. It is mere speculation, however, as to whether or not these views are based on their particular background.

The West German participants brought a distinct view into the delegation. This was emphasised through their language. As was outlined in Résumé I, the West German participants distinguished themselves through the use of more direct and aggressive language. Further, they were praised for their differentiated argumentation (6) and criticized for introducing peace movement aims (1/2/4/6).

The two participants in the delegation who consistently acted in an operational way (one East German, one West) indicate through their language that they did not belong to the delegation's in-group, but to the periphery.

These differing backgrounds differing in political experience and political interests show that an undifferentiated view of the three groups does not suffice. Internal friction was generated through discussions on strategy and decision-making, rather than through the national origin of the participants. The political backgrounds of the participants and, in particular, their understanding of political involvement, turned into obstacles, hence hindering the unfolding of a process of creative communication. This is indicated through their willingness to voice dissatisfaction with other members of the delegation, and their speculation that information was withheld.

One interviewee stresses the dilemma of entering the Foreign Ministry as friends and then having to establish a hierarchical division of labour (6). Indeed, it

seems that this uncharacteristic setting brought to light facets of power interests which the participants had not experienced in dealing with one another before.

In addition, communication with former staff of the East Berlin Foreign Ministry proved to be more of a stumbling block than expected. There were gaps in information; some members of the former staff complained about a lack of information, the GDR delegation complained about possible "black holes". One member of the GDR delegation described it as not knowing what lay below the ground under one's feet (7). Therefore, the working conditions for the GDR delegation were difficult, within the Foreign Office in general as well as their own group.

*Secondly*, political experience was rare amongst the participants in the GDR delegation. This may have affected communication. In addition, the interviewees imply and stress their untypical attitude towards such diplomatic routine (some mention their outfits - no ties, walking around in jumpers and with bare feet; others mention calling each other by their first names or sitting in a circle during discussions).<sup>27</sup> Hence, their self-perception includes an awareness of the degree to which they irritated the other delegation and possibly also the former staff in the East Berlin Foreign Office.

At the same time, this perceived non-conformist attitude did not correspond with the development of a non-conformist strategy. Some interviewees underline the consensus of the two German positions, whilst none of them mentions speculating on or questioning the power structures within which they had to move. Some interviewees are critical about the margin which the West German delegation appeared to define for the East German delegation, and argue that the fact that they included the former GDR diplomat showed one signal of non-conformism and showed that they were acting independent of the West German Foreign Office.

This is an aspect which will reoccur in the concluding chapter, when the West German delegation's perception has been contrasted with that of the GDR delegation. It is one element in the hypothesis on the GDR delegation's fascination with power.

*Thirdly*, various dichotomies in perception can be discerned from the interviews; being patronized/intimidated versus respect/friendliness; professional versus amateur; operational versus moral/emotional; homogeneous versus heterogeneous. These interviewees who acted operationally tend not to experience

<sup>27</sup> These references are made by several interviewees (3/5/6/9) during the interviews, but were not necessarily quoted explicitly in this chapter.

arrogance or intimidation to the same extent as the interviewees who argue more "morally". The phenomenon might be explained by different ways of rationalizing one's situation. Although the operationally acting interviewees perceived the diplomatic routine more "realistically", they tended to aspire to be integrated into this code or routine, and argued that it was necessary to conform to existing rules - although they realized that they belonged to a minority group within the delegation.

On the other hand, some of the more "morally" arguing interviewees tended to be very explicit about the intimidation and arrogance they experienced, and tended to reject the idea of conforming to existing norms. However, they still expressed the hope of being involved in a participatory process of communication and information. This indicates that the awareness of being outsiders with an external perception of such diplomatic routines was largely ignored, due to what Benjamin calls the paradox of recognition.<sup>28</sup> It implies an expectation of perceptiveness and susceptibility from the Other which the Other will not provide, in this case because the existing power structures did not require it.

This argument constitutes a further element in support of the hypothesis on the GDR delegation's fascination with power and ignorance of it, and will hence be referred to again in the concluding chapter.

*Fourthly*, two further phenomena seem to be of particular interest here as far as power and domination analysis is concerned:

1. Some interviewees explain that they perceived themselves as the reason for the behaviour and attitude of the Other. The behaviour of the Other is thus referred back to oneself. Sympathy is expressed ("they probably did not have it too easy with us either") and the difficult situation of the Other is explained ("external political pressures"). In other words, the degree of empathy developed by some participants in the GDR delegation was relatively high. This is especially striking considering that the GDR delegation was in such a significantly inferior position that even Hegel's association of servant and master might be a metaphor.<sup>29</sup> Some members of the GDR delegation expected being treated as equals but at the same time negated an equal relationship by accepting the existing power structures in the negotiation process.

2. A second phenomena is connected with this, and refers to the margin perceived to have been set by the West German delegation. The existence of such a margin is repeatedly mentioned and criticized. Some interviewees argue that

<sup>28</sup> This is elaborated on in 1.4.3.

<sup>29</sup> Introduction, p. 1.

some measure of divergence was tolerated by the West German delegation, but that a limit to this was defined. In other words, some members of the GDR delegation perceived the West German delegation as paternal, with a tendency to say "as long as you eat at my table, you do as I say". Only the West German delegation did not have to worry about the fact that the table stood in the GDR half of the time.

Interviewees mention the fact that they considered putting up resistance to this margin, and give examples (appearances by the GDR Foreign Minister, contemplations about the Polish border, insisting on being listened to during rounds of negotiations). However, the impact of these activities was not enough to succeed in extending the margin - possibly due to the prevailing power structure. Thus, the question remains as to whether the attempts to put up resistance to the margin were merely half-hearted, possibly due to the fascination with power they were themselves experiencing. On the other hand, I suggest that the idea needs to be considered that any participation in an existing power structure with the intent of changing or overruling it contains the latent identification with the power structure. Hence, oneself becoming a representative of it and needing to question one's role in terms of to whom one is accountable and in whose interests one exercises power.

A further question to pose when discussing power and domination in such a negotiation process to which extent empathy is a positive criterion in a negotiation process, if the result is that only one delegation actually exercises empathy, and hence the result is not a win-win outcome but an even more extreme win-lose one.

I shall refer to this in the concluding chapter.

#### CHAPTER 4: IN CONTRAST: THE WEST GERMAN DELEGATION

Pilot interviews were conducted with five members of the West German delegation.

These were: Dr. Peter Hartmann (representing the Federal Chancellery); Frank Elbe (Legation Councillor First Class); Christian Pauls (acting as Chef de protocol); Friedrich Gröning (expert on legal and security issues); Dr. Martin Ney (expert on legal and security issues, Legation Councillor and personal assistant to Dr. Dieter Kastrup, the Head of the West German delegation).

In addition, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the then Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, granted an interview.<sup>1</sup>

##### 4.1 Analysis according to Image of Self - Image of Other

The participants in the West German delegation did not allow the pilot interviews to be recorded. A comparison of the respective perceptions of the two German delegations is therefore not possible, due to the lack of material available. The pilot interviews with the West German delegation were recorded through handwritten notes, and lasted between 30 and 60 minutes.

Four out of five participants refused a second round of interviews. One diplomat agreed to a second interview which was held four months later. The interviewees were assured anonymity. Each was thus given a number (1 - 5; not in the above mentioned order) and will be referred to in this way.

The following chapter includes extracts from these pilot interviews, translated from German into English. The problem of misreading of emphasis or meaning does not occur here, as little original material exists from which one could quote. Hence, although some excerpts will be presented in the first person, suggesting that the interviewee himself is speaking, it must be emphasized that these are not quotes which I can evidence, but quotes from my own notes.

The questions posed were identical to the ones used in the pilot interviews with the GDR delegation. Hence, they were to elicit general views on:

- 1) images of, and attitudes towards, the other delegation
- 2) the role of the West Germans working for the GDR delegation

<sup>1</sup> The Head of the West German delegation, Dr. Kastrup, did not agree to an interview, equally to Hartmut Hillgenberg. An interview with Georg Luy could not be arranged; he is working at the German Embassy in Moscow.

contemplation, neither was this to be expected. Of course, the West German Foreign Minister was even less involved in the communication structures of the two German administrative delegations than the Foreign Minister of the GDR, due to the routine of West German professional diplomacy.

Therefore, the answers will here be summarized without comment:

The former Foreign Minister is not of the opinion that it might have been possible, or better, to have taken more time over the negotiation process. He names it a "window of opportunity" and expresses understanding with regard to the fact that the participants from the previous GDR brought in their own thoughts. He is confident that this did not influence communication between the two delegations and acknowledges that the GDR delegation contributed what they were able to.

Therefore, he would say that it is unjust to attribute any lack of concept to that delegation as they were complete newcomers to Foreign Politics.

He admired the feeling of self-worth and the self-confidence of the then GDR Foreign Minister Meckel and mentions the legitimation that the peaceful revolution in the then GDR gave all activists to do what they had a duty to do. As far as possible differences with the GDR Foreign Minister are concerned, he denies that Meckel's positions constituted a stumbling-block at any time, stating that their personal relationship had been a good one, and had not been influenced.

As far as the change in the Soviet position is concerned, he had been expecting it, but not before the Soviet Communist Party Conference, and had therefore argued for German general elections in the spring. Overall, he refers to the Soviet position as being the central concern in the negotiation process, rather than that of the GDR. He admits that he had generally pushed things ahead.

He claims that the GDR delegation was kept continuously informed of West German directions, and that to him it is a logical result of West German diplomacy that they achieved their goals by 95%.

He denies that he was affected by the party affiliations of the GDR Foreign Minister (SPD) and himself (FDP), or that this had motivated his cooperation with Markus Meckel.

As far as troop reductions and the Polish border were concerned, the former West German Foreign Minister argues that the negotiations were primarily about mutual give and take. The upper margin for troop reductions had been 400,000, and hence 370,000 was a good result. The Polish border treaty had been a compromise; no other border issue had to be dealt with, and hence no other country had to be integrated into the negotiations to a similar degree.

### 4.3 Conclusion

These pilot interviews show different aspects of a) the perception of the negotiation process and b) the Image of Self and of Other.

Two facets are most outstanding in the study of the pilot interviews. One is the emotionality with which the participants answer the questions. The other is the concern they express with regard to the West German participants in the GDR delegation who they distinguish from the rest of the delegation.

Both facets are interlinked, as emotionality is expressed in most cases with regard to the West German participants in the GDR delegation, even in those cases where it is stressed that the West German delegation was rather disinterested in the activities of the GDR delegation. Such is the case, for example, with Interviewee 1, who first argues that the West German delegation, himself included, did not care what the GDR delegation was up to, but later on declares that the West Germans participating in the GDR delegation were clearly on a different plane. The description "on a different plane" (*dezidiert auf einem anderen Trip*) contains at least an element of contempt.

Depreciation can be deduced from various statements, usually in connection with remarks on the refusal of the GDR delegation to accept their insignificance. Some interviewees describe this as "irritating", others find more emotional characterizations. However, the attempt of the GDR delegation to introduce independent ideas which, as some interviewees argue, went beyond the scope of the "2+4" negotiations, wasted precious negotiation time, and was thus an element of annoyance.

In the context of diplomatic routine, one might see this as logical reasoning; in the context of power and domination, however, it outlines the dilemma of communication and perception of the two German delegations. The West German delegation found it irritating that the GDR delegation was not prepared to comply to the insignificant role assigned to it by the West German delegation. In contrast, the GDR delegation expressed their intention to introduce an independent position, and expected the West German delegation to show willingness to cooperate.

Hence, the fact that the Other is different to some degree is regarded as non-threatening or, as stressed by a number of interviewees, even as something to be proud of, but only as long as this "being different" does not influence the Self to any degree. It is possible to be proud of the "Other" for as long as one can keep a safe distance from it; if that condition is not met, the sympathy for the Other being different fades.

Furthermore, however, the participants in the West German delegation attribute the inadequacy of the GDR delegation to their obvious unprofessionalism, but also to the West German advisers. Here, a distinction is made between the West German advisers who contributed in a constructive manner - the operationally acting members of the GDR delegation, and the emotional, destructive West German advisers, the descriptions of whom involve emotive language.

It is important to point out here that a distinction is made between the content of the GDR position and the way the GDR delegation put its interests across. The content of the GDR position was ignored, or labelled as "fantastic". The way the position was put across was "irritating". Again, in diplomatic routine, it would have been possible to deal with the differing interests in terms of bargaining or mediation. The West German delegation participants could, however, exert only little influence on the way the GDR delegation was perceived to put its position across. On the other hand, the interviewees voice respect for the East German participants in the GDR delegation. This respect is based on the conviction and idealism these people appeared to possess, and one interviewee also expresses sympathy for their peace movement orientated aims. Two interviewees are self-critical in that context, arguing that they, the members of the West German delegation, possibly appeared inflexible themselves, that they perhaps made mistakes, that a lack of human warmth was detectable. Both these interviewees express their emotional involvement, and did not regard this as an irrelevant factor in the negotiations, while the others preferred to stress an operational view, stressing the international context of the negotiations and the prime goal of agreement with the Soviet Union.

The diplomat from the previous GDR Foreign Office who stayed involved as a member of the GDR delegation is acknowledged as an equal professional who did not have any influence on the GDR delegation due to his past involvement. No irritation over his presence is voiced.

The West German delegation can be seen as a homogeneous delegation which worked according to a routine hierarchical division of labour. Confidence in Self and in possessing the strength necessary is expressed in various ways. One interviewee mentions explicitly that they, as a delegation, were aware of their strength, while the others leave no doubt as to their confidence with expressions such as "it was obvious which Germany was to negotiate" or "they were going to dissolve within us".

## CHAPTER 5: CONCLUDING CHAPTER

The master's tool will never dismantle the master's house.  
(Audre Lorde, 1984)

In this final chapter, I shall draw together the main arguments of this study and hence combine the theoretical approach with the analysis of the interviews conducted with the two German negotiation delegations in the so-called "2+4" negotiations.

The hypotheses of this study are:

Firstly, that the attitude of the GDR delegation was based on a fascination with political power, and on a desire for identification with the power elite.

Secondly, that the GDR delegation was faced with the arrogance of power which may be termed "above" and which, in turn, lead the GDR delegation to submission; to develop characteristics which may be termed "below".

The assumption was postulated that power and domination were categories relevant to the relationship between the two negotiation delegations. Thus, the interplay of power and domination as categories within a communicative interaction, such as the interaction between the two German negotiation delegations in the "2+4" negotiations, was the focus of this study.

First of all, I would like to stress that this negotiation process occurred within an extremely short period of time. This fact must always be kept continuously in mind when discussing events. The short time span is important in this study because it meant that the GDR delegation had hardly any time to rethink its positions or develop new, ad hoc strategies.

In addition, the retrospective view of the interviewees has to be acknowledged. This was particularly obvious with regard to the interviewees from the GDR delegation, as they presented rather reflective views, indicating that they had given the negotiation process and their role in it serious thought. Some interviewees explicitly said after the interview that they valued the opportunity to talk retrospectively about the negotiations, to reflect on the whole process once again.

This impression may also have been conveyed to the reader by the interview excerpts; the interviewees from both delegations still contemplate on that period of history, and on how they behaved and made decisions during that time.

In the following chapter, I shall firstly clarify again the results of the interview analysis, and secondly review the theoretical framework of this study. This will lead me to the evidential discussion of my arguments and the final remarks.

## 5.1 Results of Interview Analysis

### 5.1.1 The GDR delegation

Five main aspects were established in the analysis of the interviews with the GDR delegation.

*One*; the set-up of the GDR delegation brought together people with differing backgrounds in terms of political experience and political interests, making an in-depth and more differentiated view of the delegation necessary.

- Internal friction within the delegation, generated by discussions on strategy and decision-making, appeared to be related to the differing political backgrounds and previous political involvement of the participants. These different experiences became obstacles during the negotiation process and hindered creative communicative interaction. Evidence of this finding was deduced from *Résumé I* (3.1.1.6), in which it was established that the participants in the GDR delegation viewed unity and divergence within the group differently:
- Suspicion was mentioned with regard to various members of the delegation, the previous GDR diplomat was seen as a concern.
- In addition, responsibility for decision-making was handed either up or down by the GDR delegation, but generally not personally accepted, and only one interviewee admits to personal carelessness during decision-making. Overall, however, personal involvement was highly valued by most interviewees, and was based on a high degree of motivation from each member of the GDR delegation.
- Working as a group proved to be a disappointing experience for most participants, as they learnt about the various power interests of those involved in the delegation.
- The strategy of the delegation was not always transparent to everybody involved and the assumption was formulated by some interviewees that, with more information at hand, they could have developed a better strategy. They did not perceive themselves as a homogeneous delegation and did not work as one.
- Hence, the uncharacteristic situation in which the participants found themselves brought to light facets of power interests which they had not experienced in interaction with each other before.

*Two*; the participants in the GDR delegation were not experienced in international diplomacy, except for one former GDR diplomat. The majority of interviewees voice self-criticism over their lack of skills and experience (3.1.1.3). The lack of skills and experience, in combination with communication difficulties, hindered quick reaction to changing political constellations.

- The interviewees stress their untypical attitude towards diplomatic routine as something that set them apart from the West German delegation (3.1.1.3). This non-conformist attitude did not cause the development of a non-conformist strategy, however. None of the interviewees questioned the power structures within which they had to move. Rather, some interviewees emphasize the agreement between the two German delegations. Others are critical about the margin the West German delegation appeared to define for the GDR delegation.

*Three*; there is a difference in language between the East and West German participants in the GDR delegation. The West German participants used more assertive and aggressive language, while the East German participants used more group-orientated language (3.1.1.6). The West German participants talked more in terms of personal feelings or views, using "I", whereas the East German participants more often used the pronoun "we" or "one".

*Four*; dichotomies in perception were distinguished, for example, patronization/intimidation versus respect/friendliness and operational (in terms of providing Realpolitik-type arguments) versus moral/emotional (in terms of valuing the personal dimension of communication and interaction highly). The interviewees who argued with greater concern about operational matters had been involved in political affairs in some form. The interviewees who argued with greater concern about moral issues had a church/peace movement orientated background. There is no clear-cut division between East and West Germans here.

- Those interviewees who argued more operationally in the interviews did not experience arrogance or intimidation from the West German delegation to the same extent as the more "morally" arguing interviewees, but instead aspired to be integrated into this diplomatic codex of conduct or routine and "Realpolitik". The more morally arguing interviewees reject ideas on conforming to those norms.

- Regardless of whether the interviewees argue more operationally or morally, all voice the expectation of being involved in a process of participatory communication and information with the West German delegation.

*Five*; some participants in the GDR delegation display a considerable degree of empathy concerning the West German delegation. They perceive the West

German delegation as a homogeneous group, in contrast to their own delegation. No distinction in perception is made between the East and West German participants in the GDR delegation. This might be because the whole GDR delegation was treated as representing the dying GDR, and patronizing and arrogant attitudes were thus assumed towards everybody belonging to that group.

- Some interviewees explain, however, that they perceived themselves (either personally or as a group) as the stumbling-block in communicating with the West German delegation, or argue that they perceived others within the GDR delegation as the stumbling-block. Comments about wanting to appease the West German delegation through putting the predecessor into the second row, stating that one could have tried harder to communicate with the West German delegation and that the West German delegation might not have been aware of the difficult situation the GDR delegation was in, attest to the first perception. These comments are made by the more morally arguing participants in the GDR delegation (two West Germans, one East German). The latter perception is described by the more operationally arguing participants (also two West Germans, one East German).

- There was the predicament of being faced with the arrogance of power and yet desiring communicative interaction with the powerful. Some solved this predicament through internalization and conceding that the members of the West German delegation might not have noticed their arrogant behaviour themselves, others through contextual explanations.

### 5.1.2 The West German delegation

Two points were established in the analysis of the pilot interviews with the West German delegation.<sup>1</sup>

*One* is the emotionality with which the participants in the West German delegation talked about their interaction with the GDR delegation.

The *second* is the amount of attention paid to the West German members of the GDR delegation in the statements made by members of the West German delegation.

- These two phenomena are linked, as the emotionality is usually expressed, when talking about West German participants in the GDR delegation. The West German participants are viewed as the more "difficult" participants. The interviewees from the West German delegation describe their irritation at the fact

<sup>1</sup> In contrast to the GDR delegation, only pilot interviews had been possible.

that the GDR delegation was not prepared to comply to the insignificant role which the West German delegation had assigned to them, insisting instead on participatory communication and independent positions.

- However, some interviewees mention their respect for the East German participants in the GDR delegation in particular, this being based on the strong convictions and idealism that the East Germans displayed.

- They do not question their own position of strength during this negotiation process, although two interviewees continuously voice self-criticism, questioning whether the way the GDR delegation was dealt with was morally correct. They refer to the "Realpolitik" which prevailed at the time, and which left no time for (diplomatically unnecessary) friendly relations.

## 5.2 Theoretical Approach

For the investigation of the above-mentioned hypotheses, the categories of power and domination were explored extensively, and hence, two aspects were introduced.

- One; the relevance of feminist thinking and research.

- Two; psychoanalytic theories and their potential application to negotiation processes.

Starting with traditional negotiation analysis, I described the model of the Operational Code and the influence of perception on negotiation analysis. I argued that perception constitutes one central focus for the understanding of negotiation processes and suggested that two further aspects ought to receive more attention; the categories of power and domination as well as the aspect of gender.

Referring back to the theorists of the Enlightenment, the assumption was formulated that there is a relationship between power and domination on the one hand, and perception on the other. This was specified by looking at what is understood as rational, and strengthened through the example of "hearing" as one form of the reproduction of inequality; the choice of what to hear and what not to hear.

Gender, I argued, could be useful in contrasting the two German negotiation delegations in terms of "male"/"female". My assumption was that it would be useful to explore such an approach as it contains the dichotomy of assertion and dependency as opposites to power and domination. This was outlined in detail through the Theory of Object Relations as developed by Benjamin.

The idea of the "servant's identification with the master" or of the desire of the oppressed to be loved by the oppressor was to be a point of reference for the

analysis of the two German negotiation delegations and their perception of Self and of Other.

### 5.3 Evidential Discussion

#### 5.3.1 Hypothesis I:

To clarify, the discussion of the GDR delegation possibly being fascinated by power is to a lesser extent concerned with a fascination with the people representing power, i.e., the participants in the West German delegation, than with the atmosphere of power; its temptation and image of security. I argue that minor atmospheric details could, in sum, be crucial, as they might form the substructure which creates the illusion of participation. The experience of seemingly receiving equal diplomatic treatment eventually leads to the illusory impression of being in a position of power and of being taken seriously.

This also applies to the pride at being asked to contribute one's own skills and ideas to an international setting, especially ideas which were usually regarded as peripheral issues within the West German debate on defense and security. Further, this is true for the attraction of being in contact with one of the most influential politicians in West German Foreign Politics, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, using the VIP lounge at an airport, attending international conferences with Foreign Ministers and hence having the opportunity to express views to the international press. Being offered a chauffeur - even if he only drives a Wartburg.<sup>2</sup>

The fact that they were involved in such a substructure of aspects, directs attention to the question of whether the participants in the GDR delegation then adapted to such a substructure or not.

With regard to the GDR delegation, it is possible to uncover evidence of such changes taking place when looking at the analysis of Image of Self, summed up in *Résumé I* (3.1.1.6). There, I elaborated on differences among the participants in the GDR delegation in view of various association sequences. One example is the internal communicative dilemma based on different power interests (3.1.1.4), another example is the misuse or abuse of information by members of the GDR delegation (3.1.1.5) and a third the controversy over the inclusion of the previous GDR diplomat who remained in the GDR delegation (3.1.1.1). These elements influenced the internal communicative dilemma, and consequently affected their homogeneity as a group, their mistrust of each other, and eventually their appearance during the negotiation process.

<sup>2</sup> The Trabant and the Wartburg were the two most common cars in the GDR.

The increasing fascination with power based on the substructure outlined, evolves as follows:

1. Most interviewees expressed the hope that their common political background in the peace movement could serve as an integrative factor (3.1.1.3, 3.1.1.4). Hence, the fact of experiencing different power interests within the group was commented upon critically and disappointedly, whilst at the same time it was stressed that a sense of a group identity had been important to most.

Here, it is possible to detect one main dilemma in the fascination with the power structure the participants had to confront. On the one hand, some interviewees experienced disappointment regarding their influence on decision-making and information processes, on the other hand, they knew about the importance of appearing to be a homogenous group to the outside (either to the West German delegation or the press or in international environment at large). This awareness of depending on their unity probably hindered critical discussions among the members of the delegation, so as not to experience the assumption "we can talk together so well" to be unreal and so as to avoid the experience of being let down by the group. In addition, the speedy course of the negotiation process and the intention of contributing a GDR position (such as the concept of a security zone) left little room for critical discussions on the "workings of the group"; in contrast, the common denominators, such as having to support Polish interests with regards to a binding agreement under international law, could have concealed existing power-interests and diverse opinions.

This shows a concern with the in-group and out-group dimension as outlined by Tajfel (1.3): the GDR delegation felt "protective" about the in-group and hence, each individual participant felt "protective" of himself so as not to lose one's integrity and the legitimacy of one's action. As Jervis points out, it is the dimension of cognitive consistency that leads to information being consistently assimilated according to pre-existing images, so that one sees what one wants to see.

Moreover, the change in relationships within the delegation is interesting here, in terms of the initial unity as friends undergoing a process during which conflicting interests and coalitions (within the group as well as with the West German delegation) became evident.

2. Indications for orientation according to the values of the West German delegation can be distinguished, primarily with regard to the discussion about the inclusion of the "predecessor". Some interviewees explain their debate about the predecessor with the "visual problem" he meant to the West German delegation. And furthermore, the West German delegation did suggest not to include this

former GDR diplomat at all. Such advice being passed between two formally equal negotiation delegations is certainly improper, as it is generally considered to be a concern of national sovereignty how to set-up a negotiation delegation. Nevertheless, in this case, the West German delegation commented upon the set-up of the GDR delegation and, moreover, the GDR delegation discussed this criticism, not wanting to appear to be an impediment.

Furthermore, it is important in this respect, that the discussion occurred at the beginning of the negotiation process (April, May); in other words the GDR delegation began its involvement in the negotiation process with an orientation patterned by the values of the West German delegation. This is also interesting, because the arrogance of power by the West German delegation was not perceived at the beginning of the negotiation process but at a later stage - when the GDR delegation insisted on representing its own position (May, June), and when the West German delegation made good progress in negotiations with the Soviet Union (June, July) (see Hypothesis II).

3. Apart from being exposed to the substructure, the GDR delegation did not reject the personification of power by the West German delegation or through the West German Foreign Minister. It is a double-edged situation. The GDR delegation announces its intent of adopting an independent position and begins to work accordingly, while at the same time stressing the need for a consensus with the West German delegation and working towards German unification according to Article 23. At this point, the internal dilemma and the external direction are thus interrelated.

In addition, the GDR delegation experiences being called to order during negotiations and its members realise that it is essential to assert the Self during negotiations. Some interviewees refer repeatedly to situations where they had to assert themselves in order to receive attention during negotiations, otherwise their position as a GDR delegation would have been undermined or ignored.

This shows how the participants in both delegations perceived the way communication worked. This again highlights the example of "hearing" as outlined by Albrecht-Heide where the relationship of power and perception are concerned (1.3): The West German delegation was in the position to "overhear", it was not necessary to listen to, to hear the other delegation, whereas the GDR delegation saw itself in a constant struggle to have its position acknowledged, to be listened to. One is the position of passive power, the other of active powerlessness.

4. Under these circumstances, submission occurs in terms of Benjamin's understanding: submission might be pursued as a strategy to reduce the fear of

seperateness and abandonment (1.4.3). Submission might thus be a consequence of the illusion of participating in the exercising of power.

An illusion of participation is kept alive by the powerful so that the "powerless" will devote themselves to the aims of the "powerful" in the belief that these are still in accordance with their own interests. This can be made out, for example, in the debate on the Polish border, the GDR delegation being of the opinion (and some participants still are of the opinion) that they contributed essentially to the final text of the binding agreement under international law, although the West German Foreign Minister had reached an agreement with the Polish Foreign Minister without consulting either the GDR Foreign Minister or the GDR delegation.

Referring to Hegel's association of servant and master (Introduction, p.1), keeping the illusion of participation alive is the main factor making the "powerful" stay in power. In other words, submission to a lesser extent constitutes an explicit rejection of previously held positions, but rather the slow, possibly barely noticeable process of being "illuded" (for example by the substructure of power) and consequently ceasing to be threatening or to obtain a share of power. This applies to the change in the attitude of the West German delegation towards the GDR delegation, as the West German delegation indicated interest and respect in the early phase of the negotiation process, when the "illusion of participation" constituted an important component of their strategy of staying in a position of power. Once its position was secured, the style of interaction could be altered. The securing of the position of power did not primarily depend on the GDR delegation, however, but on the foreign policy dimension of the negotiations in terms of the submission of the Soviet Union and, similarly, Poland to the economic strength of the Federal Republic, and on the support of the Western Allies for the West German position.

5. Particularly interesting was the disclosure that experiences and feelings were shared by the participants in the GDR delegation, thus indicating the existence of some common ground without this leading to greater unity among the group members, instead to their separation and downfall. The interviewees share perceptions of different situations, of highly motivated and of critical attitudes towards them, but every individual member of the delegation kept this impression to himself and did not share it with others. Hence, the retrospective feeling "if they had only listened to me" developed, as described in Chapter 4, Résumé I, indicating a feeling of helplessness, resignation and inability to exert any creative influence.

The members of the GDR delegation might not have wanted to appear too critical of their own group, as they knew about the importance of the external representation of unity. Most participants stress the issue of having known each other previously, which created the illusion of also knowing each others' political interests and motivations. This goes especially for the West German participants in the GDR delegation.

Here, we again detect signs of the Theory of Object Relations as outlined by Benjamin, in which she refers to the dilemma between assertion and dependency (1.4.3). Those participating in the GDR delegation experienced the dilemma of assertion and dependency not only where their interaction with the West German delegation was concerned but with regard to their own delegation as well, and, importantly, they sensed failure as the unity they had assumed to exist within the group turned into internal friction and mistrust. It was therefore difficult for the participants to assert the Self within the group, which might, above all, be explained by the fact that they had not anticipated this to be necessary.

6. As far as their interaction with the West German delegation is concerned, the analysis of the interviews with the GDR delegation revealed the phenomenon of interviewees expressing the hope and expectation of participatory communicative interaction with the West German delegation. Hence, perceiving themselves as an assertive Self, they expected to be treated accordingly by the Other.

This is a significant observation because the retrospective statements made by the participants in the GDR delegation claim that they were aware of the relative strengths of the parties to the negotiations. Nevertheless, their interest at that time was twofold: One, to introduce independent positions from those of the West German delegation and, to point to the existence of a GDR identity - i.e. they wanted to influence the negotiation process. And two, to expect participatory communication with the West German delegation - in other words, they perceived themselves as a sovereign actor. On the other hand, the basic agreement with the West German position is stressed repeatedly by participants in the GDR delegation, in particular by the more operationally-orientated ones.

This is the predicament of being faced with the arrogance of power (see Hypothesis II), while believing (as most participants in the GDR delegation did) that moral legitimacy was on their side, this entitling them to complete information on the negotiation process.

Related to this idea is the phenomenon of what Benjamin calls the "paradox of recognition"; that in order to be independent, the Self seeks recognition from the Other to define its own identity. Hence, the participants in the GDR

delegation expected perceptiveness and receptivity from the West German delegation, the Other, which the Other did not and would not want to provide. In Benjamin's terms, this is categorized as the fascination with powerful others who personify the fantasy of omnipotence - only if his acts have meaning for the Other do they have meaning for him. Further, however, the paradox of recognition is also necessary for the Other in order to connect it to a whole, because if one part stops fulfilling the ascribed role (for example, that of submission), the other part has to redefine its position as well. Thus, their relationship is one of asymmetrical interdependence.

7. Having argued that a fascination with power existed among the members of the GDR delegation, a differentiation must be made between the West and East German participants in the GDR delegation in terms of their identification with the "GDR" they represented. That the West German participants in the GDR delegation tried to be more East German than the East Germans themselves was pointed out by various interviewees, by the more operationally arguing GDR participants as well as by members of the West German delegation. This indicates a degree of split-identity among the West German members of the GDR delegation. The impression was confirmed by the analysis that the West German participants in the GDR delegation with a peace movement orientated background tended, in particular, to be in two minds about their actual identity; whether they were in fact arguing as East or West Germans. This is indicated further in remarks on the inclusion of the former GDR diplomat, when the West German participants elaborate more on the problems involved for the West German delegation than do the East German participants.

This might reveal an interdependence between "knowing" the Other as opponent because one comes from the same national context, but being on "the other side", that is, an unfamiliar national context, to which one merely desires to belong to.

Similarly, the more operationally arguing West German member of the GDR delegation portrays some element of ambiguous identity. He continuously disassociates himself from the more morally arguing West German participants in the GDR delegation, and expresses sympathy with the lack of confidence the West German delegation had in the GDR delegation. At the same time, he belonged to the GDR delegation himself, as a West German.

Therefore, I argue that the internal communicative dilemma with which the GDR delegation had to deal, was partly also an East-West communication dilemma. A fascinating aspect would have been to study how the delegation

managed to overcome such communication difficulties. Such a mixture of East-West does, however, necessitate an acknowledgment of differences, and the readiness to work with these differences rather than pretending that they do not exist and that one collaborates as equals.

To sum up, the above-mentioned arguments show that the substructure laid the ground for a fascination with power. Some participants in the GDR delegation felt more at ease with this than others. The experience of being confronted with the substructure of power seemed a negative one to most participants, as it resulted in the disunity of the delegation. Some participants in the GDR delegation were prepared to accept the power structures, the people representing them, and the requirement to conform. There was no consensus within the delegation on how to deal with such power structures and no awareness of this substructure of power. Therefore, the fascination with power ended in disunity.

I argue that the fascination with power goes hand in hand with an illusion of participation as was experienced by the participants in the GDR delegation. This illusion was fostered through the attitude of the West German delegation in the early stages of the negotiation process, for as long as the indefinite course of negotiations required it.

For the "powerless" - in this case the GDR delegation - to surrender to the illusion of participation, a fascination with power must exist in the first place. Otherwise, such surrender would not be possible.

Finally, it might appear more precise to argue that elements of feelings of being inferior and over-exertion can be distinguished, rather than an actual fascination with power. Nevertheless, my argument is that these elements should then be reflected upon in terms of how feelings of inferiority and over-exertion are dealt with, and whether or not they are acknowledged in a negotiation process. This leads us directly to the issues of power and domination, and a possible fascination with them.

In fact, reviewing the arguments above, we detect that the interaction amongst the participants in the GDR delegation underwent a process of change, similar to the change in the way the two German delegations interacted. Both changes developed in parallel (see Hypothesis II).

### 5.3.2 Hypothesis II:

Complementary to Hypothesis I is the assumption of Hypothesis II that the GDR delegation was faced with an arrogance of power, and thus developed strategies of "submission".

In the discussion on arrogance of power, I will contrast the two German delegations' perception of it. Arguments for this hypothesis run as follows:

1. At the beginning of the negotiation process, most members of the GDR delegation experienced some form of respect, some call it "more curiosity", from the West German delegation. This perception changed during the negotiation process into one of arrogance, a term agreed on by the members of the GDR delegation. As was mentioned in Hypothesis I, the change in perception experienced by the participants in the GDR delegation is connected with the progress of the negotiations. The more the GDR delegation tried to introduce an independent position (or rather, what they believed to be an independent position), the more they felt arrogance and intimidation. Hence, the more they tried to be an independent Self, as Benjamin argues, the more the Other denied them recognition.

In addition, the attempts to introduce an independent position coincided with the speeding up of the negotiation process and a lack of information on up-to-date bargaining positions which resulted in ridicule (as with the idea of a security zone with Czechoslovakia and Poland).

This arrogance was perceived in different ways, however, ranging from an arrogance displayed equally to all delegations in the negotiation process, not just the GDR delegation, to the impression of a "latent civil war" situation between the two German delegations (3.1.2.2):

Some interviewees try to explain this arrogance and "understand" it, some even justify it in the context of the negotiation process.

On the one hand, there is the aspect of internalization, as some members of the GDR delegation express concern that they caused this arrogance in the first place, excusing the behaviour of the members of the West German delegation with statements such as "they did not have it easy with us either".

On the other hand, an interesting aspect in this context is the element of empathy for the West German delegation which is displayed in acknowledging the impact of diplomatic routine. This code resulted, according to members of the GDR delegation, in the diplomats of the West German delegation not being able to behave differently ("they couldn't help it").

Both aspects give indications to the Meta-Image, the image that one believes the other to have of oneself (3.2), as the Other's view is internalized so that one becomes and behaves in exactly the same way as one is perceived by the Other. It is a vicious circle that the GDR delegation did not manage to break out of, as was argued in Hypothesis I, primarily because there was little awareness that such a cycle existed.

However, in retrospect, the West German delegation is criticized for its patronizing, prejudgemental treatment of the GDR delegation; this goes equally for the more operationally arguing participants in the GDR delegation as for the more morally arguing ones.

The statements of the West German delegation members support the GDR perception of arrogance, as all interviewees refer to their initial respect for the GDR delegation, and the way in which this changed into irritation because the members of the GDR delegation and, in particular, the West German participants in the GDR delegation, were unwilling to comply to the inferior role which had been assigned to them by the West German delegation. This is evidently revealed by some through statements such as "We just smiled at it", "You can't do things like that" or characterisations such as "irritating" and "disruptive".

2. The statements made by the West German delegation leave no doubt that they were aware of their position of strength, although two interviewees mention doubts about whether the interaction with the GDR delegation was morally correct. They do not, however, question the West German delegation's position of strength in the first place. One interviewee from the GDR delegation terms this attitude Realpolitik. The attitudes displayed by the participants in the West German delegation support Jervis' assumption that decision-makers are often ignorant of the idea that their actions could create legitimate grievances (1.4.2). The intent of the GDR delegation to introduce independent positions and retain some form of GDR identity is judged by the West German delegation members as hostile opposition with aggressive intentions. Yet, as Bauriedl points out, these interpretations were not fully satisfying the members of the West German delegation, as their lively debate on the GDR delegation shows. In other words, a certain amount of uneasiness about the arrogance of power which they accepted as a given can be discerned, but is generally excused by references to the duties of an administrator, by resigning oneself to the execution of orders. "I did my duty as a

civil servant and tried to contribute to the result best possible. Everything else could amount to an over-estimation of one's role."<sup>3</sup>

3. The GDR delegation perceived the West German delegation as a homogeneous group representing a position of strength, not only with regard to its interaction with the GDR, but also with the other delegations attending.

In retrospect, all interviewees, regardless of whether they belong to the more operationally or more morally arguing participants in the GDR delegation, say that this negotiation process was a disappointing experience for them. This refers, on the one hand, to the hope of participatory communicative interaction with the West German delegation and, on the other hand, to the initial belief of entering the GDR Foreign Office as a group of like-minded advisers and negotiators. The more operationally arguing participants stress the internal friction and diversities and explain them by unprofessionalism, whereas the more morally arguing participants reflect on both facets, and voice a higher degree of resignation, one interviewee even referring to the period as a "traumatic experience".

4. Thus, both German delegations had to cope with the two forms of rationality portrayed by Harding, namely objectifying rationality and relationship-orientated rationality (1.4.1). The first form of rationality, termed the rationality "norm" in Chapter 1, is what was used as a yardstick by the West German delegation during the negotiation process, and meant with their continuous references to the pressures of "Realpolitik". They were being assertive in their feeling of omnipotence. The fact that they were in a position of strength, that they were the "powerful", gave them the opportunity to use the "norm" rationality in terms of "power over". This refers to Arendt's definition of power again, that power does not unavoidably have to imply an asymmetrical relationship, but that it will, if one party involved perceives power as a form of hegemony (1.4.1).

The West German delegation could offer the GDR delegation some room for manoeuvre but if the GDR delegation rejected such a margin, the West German delegation would not need to develop empathy, or to alter the margin. The GDR delegation was unable or unwilling to assent to this form of rationality, but as this form of rationality is the one conforming with the existing power structures, the fact that the GDR delegation does not comply is at most "irritating"; not substantially threatening or destructive.

<sup>3</sup> "Ich habe meine Pflicht als Beamter getan und versucht, zu einem bestmöglichen Ergebnis beizutragen. Alles andere könnte als Überschätzung der eigenen Rolle erscheinen." Letter from one participant in the West German delegation.

My argument is, as outlined in Hypothesis I, that the GDR delegation did not comply rather because of their internal difficulties than because they consistently followed a strategy of "resistance".

The GDR delegation was initially interested in a relationship-orientated rationality in terms of "having power with" - because they were in the position of the "powerless".

On the other hand, some participants in the GDR delegation tried to "persuade" the West German delegation to adopt a more relationship-orientated rationality, with the moral argument that they, as representatives of the "new" GDR, had provided the ground for the "2+4" negotiations in the first place, and therefore deserved respect and to be taken seriously in communicative interaction.

This, however, is praised as an "idealistic" attitude by the West German delegation, through which they are in a position to illude, at the beginning of the negotiation process at least, and consequently to ignore, because their power position was confirmed by the change in the official Soviet position. This guaranteed a successful completion of the negotiation process for the West German delegation, and hence any form of empathy for moral reasons became obsolete, as the Soviet Union, the supposed source of orientation for the GDR delegation, had turned its aspirations into submission to West German power interests.

The disappointment about the lack of receptivity and perceptiveness from the West German delegation can be put into the context of what Benjamin terms the paradox of recognition; expecting the Other to manifest the same degree of empathy and interest to that which the Self is providing.

5. These arguments show that the GDR delegation was in the position of what I termed at the beginning of this study "female or below", in contrast to the West German delegation who represented the opposite; "male or above".

The discussion of the perceptions by the two German negotiation delegations has shown that the two delegations were dependent on each other, but not to the same extent.

The West German delegation needed the GDR delegation as the representatives of the state which was to be absorbed by the Federal Republic of Germany and, in addition, the moral sensitivity which the issue of German unification carried also had to be considered. Therefore, the West German delegation could not per se ignore the GDR delegation as an irrelevant participator, although in international terms that is what it was.

The GDR delegation, on the other hand, needed the West German delegation at a more basic level, they needed information on negotiation processes, they needed to be recognized by the West German delegation in order to "exist".

Therefore, a certain degree of mutual dependence existed between the two, where one could not fulfill his role without the other also keeping to his role (1.4.3). The GDR delegation finally ascended to being dominated, possibly in hoping to be "loved and accepted" in return. "The masochist gains her identity through the master's power, even as he actively negates his identity with her."<sup>4</sup>

In the beginning of the negotiation process, however, the GDR delegation did provide some form of "potentia" (1.4.1) in terms of disorder and chaos it could cause, but the West German delegation kept "potestas" (as strict control) throughout the situation and did not allow the tension between assertion and domination to surface (1.4.1).

6. It is interesting, that the GDR delegation was faced with a situation where they could not take on their "male" part, but where they were pushed into a submissive role, the "female" part, although they regarded their attempt at a relationship-orientated interaction as assertive. Due to reasons outlined in discussing Hypothesis I, they were not able to deal with this dilemma constructively.

In fact, the nucleus of analysis of power and domination along the lines of the GDR delegation shows the strategies of power by the "powerful" rather well. Part of such strategy is to weaken potential resistance to one's power by giving the illusion of participation and attempting to divide the opposing group (as did the members of the West German delegation when arguing that the West German members of the GDR delegation ought to be "on their side, really").

To sum up, the GDR delegation did not constitute a significant delegation during the negotiation process, having fulfilled its role through its presence alone, but was not prepared to accept the insignificance assigned to it by the West German delegation, which additionally, was accepted by all other delegations involved, including the Soviet delegation as the sole representative of German interests. The resulting dilemma of assertion and dependency for the GDR delegation was not solved creatively, but led to disunity amongst members of the group and, in retrospect, made them critically evaluate the GDR delegation's record and its impact on the negotiation process.

<sup>4</sup> Benjamin, 1990, p. 29.

#### 5.4 Final Conclusion

In this study, I have attempted to make a case for a combination of socio-political and psychoanalytic theories when approaching political phenomena such as an international negotiation process. I argue that it was possible to elucidate interesting reasons:

Both hypotheses have been substantiated by my arguments, although my first hypothesis has to be qualified in the sense that identification, or rather the desire for identification with the elite in power could not be discerned, neither in the context of the interviews nor from my personal impressions.

It is evident that the course of the negotiation process influenced the interaction between the two German delegations and the perceived arrogance of power. In particular, the change of the Soviet position during the negotiation process is of importance here, as the Soviet submission to West German interests resulted in the elimination of any moral, and equally political, necessity for the West German delegation to "recognize" or "hear" the GDR delegation. The GDR delegation was unable to develop the homogeneity necessary for any form of resistance, mainly because it complied to the illusion of participation (and hence a fascination with power), and because a positive perception of its in-group constituted a high moral value.

Refusing the necessary tension between asserting the Self and recognizing the Other results in domination, according to Benjamin. Similarly, domination can thus be distinguished as the tension between the two forms of power and, equally, the two forms of rationality that have been portrayed in this study. The existence of this tension was denied - through the arrogance of power of the West German delegation. "Potestas" and "potentia", as argued in Chapter 1, are interdependent if phrased in terms of submission and domination, because they constitute a whole.

In order for this asymmetrical form of interdependence to be overcome, the Self would have to acquire assertion, and the Other empathy.

Put differently, creative communicative interaction might be possible in situations where the focus is not on persuading the powerful to change their perspective, but on realizing the "powerless" position of the Self, and on strengthening the Self through assertion.

With reference to future negotiation analysis, I believe that the methodology developed by Frei, in focusing on the Image of Self, the Other and the Meta-Image, works well as adapted to the concern of this study. Hence, it seems that there is a methodology which could be applied to various negotiation processes, it being flexible in its research design and enabling the analyst and reader alike to combine the content of a political process or situation with a perception analysis.

In view of the increasing number of conflict-ridden negotiations, both dealing with inter-states and intra-states processes, and in view of the growing tendency, particularly in Europe, to accept right-wing and neo-conservative ideologies, it is necessary to give thought to interactive processes and the issues of empathy and assertion rather than remaining solely within the vicious circle of "Realpolitik", which is often linked to objectifying rationality. This is not to say, however, that atmospheric details should be concentrated on at the expense of the contents of negotiations. Instead, I argue that atmospheric details are crucial for an understanding of, or a willingness to understand, contents.

#### 5.5 Outlook

It has not been possible to include all interesting facets which the interview analysis revealed, in this final discussion. The reader surely is aware of the fact that to focus on power and domination means that a number of interesting details receive little attention; aspects which bear more relation to the issue of German unification, or finer details of the negotiation process. The interviews with both German delegations provided highly interesting material, particularly in terms of documentary value. It has been beyond the scope of this study to evaluate it completely; it might therefore be worthwhile working with these or similar interviews in a follow-up study.

During the process of research, I had to alter assumptions repeatedly (Hopf, 1979). For one, the degree of complexity of such communication dilemmas the GDR delegation had to confront both within and in its interaction with the West German delegation, had not been anticipated by myself. Further, the West German delegation was more open during the pilot interviews than I had expected. And although the usage of "male"/"female" imagery was a useful aid to illustrate my assumptions drastically, I do see its limits, because of the complexity of stereotyping. Still, this might be an interesting area for future research.

For future research it would also be fascinating to go more "behind the scenes" of negotiation processes and to pay more attention to the negotiators' support-network, to partners, wives or husbands, to get some insight into how their objectifying-rationality is being maintained. In addition, focusing more on the contrast between amateurs and professionals in negotiation settings could provide some new perspectives on negotiations, particularly with regard to the increasing role of NGO's in international relations and in terms of their compliance to a fascination with power.