

Gorbachev
and the German Question

**SOVIET-WEST GERMAN RELATIONS,
1985-1990**

David H. Shumaker

'''

PRAEGER

Westport, Connecticut
London

DK67
.5
.G3S48
1995



Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Shumaker, David H.

Gorbachev and the German question : Soviet-West German relations, 1985-1990 / David H. Shumaker.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-275-95028-X (alk. paper)

1. Soviet Union—Foreign relations—Germany. 2. Germany—Foreign relations—Soviet Union. 3. Soviet Union—Politics and government—1985-1991. 4. Germany—History—Unification, 1990.

I. Title.

DK67.5.G3S48 1995

327.47043—dc20 94-41795

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available.

Copyright © 1995 by David H. Shumaker

All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 94-41795

ISBN: 0-275-95028-X

First published in 1995

Praeger Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881

An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc.

Printed in the United States of America



The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48-1984).

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

To Amy

1601 9500032539 21603030

Contents

Acknowledgments	ix
Abbreviations	xi
1. Introduction	1
2. Continuity and Change	9
3. Charting a New Course	41
4. Building a Reserve of Trust	71
5. The Collapse of the GDR	101
6. Moscow's Acceptance of German Unification	123
7. Conclusion	143
Notes	151
Selected Bibliography	187
Index	195

pressure from real, objective circumstances. . . . The fact that we are changing is the result of a conscious decision made as a result of an interpretation of these circumstances."⁷⁹

Moscow's response to the revolutionary changes in Poland and Hungary illustrated the extent to which the Gorbachev leadership had transformed Soviet security concerns in Eastern Europe. The Soviet leader adhered to the precepts of new thinking. He continued to champion complete sovereignty even as the prospects of reform socialism grew dim. The collapse of the East German communist regime offered a further illustration of these points. Although the end came much more rapidly than most people could have dreamed, Gorbachev proved willing to witness the disappearance of one of Moscow's most important allies. He apparently even participated in the process in an attempt to prevent bloodshed and conflict. The Gorbachev leadership suffered severe domestic political criticism for this behavior, yet Gorbachev and Shevardnadze clung to their radically transformed vision of Soviet national interests. The tenacity of these new views became visible in the ensuing push toward German unification. The collapse of the SED government and the ensuing vacuum inevitably reopened this historically explosive question.

6

Moscow's Acceptance of German Unification

While the Gorbachev leadership was prepared conceptually for the changes in Eastern Europe and Germany, it was certainly caught off guard by the breakneck speed with which the question of German unification moved from a principled debate to the realm of practical politics. What began in the Soviet Union as a fairly cautious examination of options and obstacle soon became a fast-paced and fierce political struggle.

SOVIET CONCERNS OVER WEST GERMANY

For the population and leadership of the Soviet Union, the German question was not simply a political problem. While often overlooked, lingering Soviet concerns over the German propensity for aggression and expansion continued throughout this period to act as a break on significant change in the postwar settlement.¹ As Shevardnadze put it, "The Soviet people remember well the history and tragic lessons of World War II. Our public opinion is highly sensitive to things which affect its results. No one should forget that."² These bitter lessons also provided easy ammunition for officials opposed to Gorbachev's policy toward Bonn. The extent to which Soviet officials, including Gorbachev, experienced this same fear is difficult to measure. Certainly many in the West, including British Prime

Minister Thatcher and French President Mitterrand, remained cautious with regard to the rush toward unification.³ Even West Germany's political parties had difficulty remaining in front of events.

In Moscow, Gorbachev had gradually overcome the past Soviet distrust of West German intentions, yet Soviet confidence in West Germany was shaken by certain of Bonn's statements and actions in the critical period of 1989. In June, threatened by the surprising electoral success of the far-right Republic Party in local elections, the CDU-CSU attempted to shore up political support by championing traditional conservative issues. This campaign included hints that German borders to the east might be changed in the future. This stance would cause Kohl numerous political complications as he consistently refused to guarantee unequivocally Poland's borders until January 1990. Renewed references to Germany's 1937 borders sparked concern in Moscow, although commentators generally acknowledged the political context of the remarks.⁴

Throughout the mounting refugee crisis in the late summer and into the fall, more conservative mass media outlets such as *Pravda* and TASS criticized the FRG with increasing vehemence. This conservative coverage of the emigration problem came to resemble the Soviet reporting of the pre-Gorbachev era. By contrast, some publications avoided laying any blame on West Germany. *Izvestia's* coverage of the growing refugee problem generally limited itself to noting increasing tension between East and West Germany.⁵ Central Committee adviser Nikolai Shishlin denied that West Germany had created the crisis, citing instead economic and political discontent in the GDR. Falin stated only that the West German mass media had "partially exaggerated" the magnitude of the refugee problem for the GDR. *Pravda* immediately responded that "this situation has not come about through the fault of the GDR; the responsibility for it lies wholly with Bonn."⁶

Some of Bonn's behavior in late 1989 did spark official Soviet concerns. The wave of East German refugees had provoked vigorous debates within and among the Federal Republic's political parties concerning unification. Attempting to convince his party and the West German people that he had created opportunities for overcoming the division of Germany, Helmut Kohl pointed to the joint political statement signed in June. In a September speech to the CDU Congress in Bremen, Kohl declared that "in contrast to the Moscow Treaty, ways to peacefully overcome the status quo and the division of Europe are jointly designated in [the joint declaration]."⁷ Kohl's interpretation on the significance of the joint statement was not entirely unfounded, yet the chancellor's political exploitation of this agreement embarrassed the Soviet leader. During his October visit to the GDR, Gorbachev chastized politicians who sought to exploit changes in the Soviet bloc. He added, "Things have even reached the stage of dubious interpretations of the Soviet-West German statement."⁸ Kohl's remarks under-

mined the Soviet leader's efforts to convince the East German regime that liberalization was necessary and safe, and validated Soviet opponents of unification. But they also suggested that the German chancellor could not be trusted to act responsibly.

The vigorous Soviet reaction unleashed by the CDU's September party congress in Bremen involved more than Kohl's interpretation of the joint declaration. Other CDU members apparently made controversial remarks concerning Germany's eastern borders. Moscow reacted vigorously to these troubling statements. In a speech before the UN, Shevardnadze criticized revanchist forces seeking to revise Europe's postwar political order, and cautioned "those who willingly or unwillingly encourage these forces."⁹ For Kvitsinsky, the congress sent an "alarm signal" of a different sort. He seemed to realize that the CDU was beginning to consider that fundamental changes in the GDR were imminent, and that Moscow should learn from the West Germans' conclusions. According to Kvitsinsky, the Soviet leadership was not yet ready to accept his interpretation of events.¹⁰ The CDU congress provoked Soviet concern but did not alter Moscow's position on the German question.

Finally, Kohl's unexpected announcement of a ten-point unification plan on 28 November 1989 left Moscow uneasy. At a time when Gorbachev was facing vehement conservative criticism over the collapse of the East German communist regime, the unilateral West German proposal provided Soviet hard-liners with powerful ammunition. Throughout the long and difficult process of building trust between Gorbachev and Kohl, the Soviet leader had stressed the need for responsibility and carefully calculated steps with due consideration of the political interests of both sides. Unilateral actions constituted a personal betrayal and complicated any hope of progress. Thus for historic reasons, and as a response to West German actions, Gorbachev and his supporters faced an uphill battle in constructively addressing the issue of German unification.

GROWING EVIDENCE OF AN ALTERED SOVIET VISION

Simultaneously, growing evidence of an altered vision of the German question was emanating from Moscow. Already in April 1989, Dashichev warned the Soviet leadership that without reform in East Germany, the growing contrast between conditions in the FRG and GDR could give rise to demands for a reexamination of Germany's division. In addition, the Soviet academic observed that the complex USSR-GDR-FRG relationship no longer served Soviet national interests. In June, Portugalov also publicly addressed the potential for transforming German-German relations.¹¹ Such analyses by Moscow's leading German specialists were followed by more concrete signs of change.

Moscow gradually began to consider fundamental change in the postwar structure, including issues regarding a divided Germany. In August, the Soviet Union proposed four-power negotiations with representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and France to address "issues related to improvements in the situation in West Berlin, as far as they directly affect the city and do not touch on the GDR's sphere of sovereignty." Soviet sources denied that Moscow had proposed the meeting but expressed readiness to participate.¹² This may have been a Soviet ploy to warn the Honecker regime that, if it continued to reject reform, Moscow could undermine the very legitimacy of the East German state. The fact that the announcement came from the Soviet ambassador to East Berlin would be consistent with this argument.

Yet this incident fit into a greater recognition of quadripartite authority. A month later, a member of the Institute of Europe labeled the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin a demonstration that the founding documents of the postwar European order could be updated to fit prevailing conditions. The scholar implied that, just as the four powers had incorporated changing "political realities" in 1971, they could do the same in the future. These references to four-power authority at least suggested a desire for gradual and controlled change in postwar arrangements.¹³ Moreover, in early December, Moscow proposed a meeting of ambassadors from the four powers to discuss the West Berlin question. The participants also addressed Chancellor Kohl's ten-point plan.¹⁴ As the pace of change increased, so did Gorbachev's interest in quadripartite cooperation. Not only Gorbachev, but also Thatcher and Mitterrand, apparently hoped the four-power mechanism would slow the rush toward German unity. Such hopes proved illusory.

By November and December, Soviet commentary on the German problem began to exhibit characteristics of a rudimentary internal debate. Initially, many treatments rejected unification, claiming that the East German public overwhelmingly supported the rejuvenation of communism in the GDR.¹⁵ Interestingly, East German officials abandoned this line of argument much earlier than did the Soviets. Instead they emphasized the two German states' vital role in maintaining European stability.¹⁶ More reformist publications acknowledged the continued dissatisfaction of the East German population, despite the best efforts of Honecker's successors. *Moskovskiye novosti* even cited Jens Reich, a cofounder of the GDR's New Forum and a vocal proponent of rejuvenated socialism, to the effect that "today the question can be posed only as: our state—to be or not to be."¹⁷

Most Soviet accounts eventually abandoned the argument that the majority of the East German people did not desire unification. As early as November 1989, Zhurkin contended that "the main thing now is how rapidly, skillfully, and effectively the GDR brings reform policy into line with the processes developing spontaneously within the republic," adding "it is still very difficult at present to realistically assess how far the explosive

processes have developed in GDR society."¹⁸ Commentators stressed instead that two German states were integral to European stability. Particularly in the wake of Kohl's surprise announcement of his ten-point plan for eventual unification, Kremlin officials called for a long-term approach to the problem.¹⁹ The Soviet response repeatedly referred to the need to incorporate the German question into the broader process of overcoming Europe's division. This was in part a delaying tactic and a means of preventing Moscow from appearing to be the sole opponent to German unification.²⁰ Yet increasingly, Moscow focused on a broader European framework as its preferred forum for addressing the undeniable pressure to unify the two German states.

A further example of Moscow's changing evaluation of the German problem was the issue of military alliances. Since coming to power, Gorbachev had supported the traditional Soviet position of calling for the quickest possible dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. However, by December 1989, the Kremlin had backed off from this demand. According to Falin, the Soviets accepted that NATO and the Warsaw Pact had contributed to stability in Europe, and that "presently and in the nearest future there are no and will be no conditions for the disappearance of these institutions."²¹ Facing volatile and rapid change, Moscow saw the two alliances as a stabilizing force in Europe.

THREE DISTINCT APPROACHES

As unification emerged on the international scene, a debate arose in Moscow involving genuine disagreements and distinct policy stances relating to the German question. The Soviet dialogue changed from outright opposition to statements stressing the problems still surrounding unification.

Officially, Moscow continued its outright rejection of German unification as a subject of international diplomacy. According to Bundestag President Rita Süßmuth, Gorbachev declared that unification was "not on the agenda" of international relations.²² It is unclear to what extent this position reflected the Soviet leader's true convictions, the Kremlin's chosen bargaining strategy, or a concession to domestic opponents. In any event, the stance became more and more difficult to maintain. Following the announcement of Kohl's ten-point plan, Bovin noted some 87 percent of the West German population were in favor of unification, raising the question of how anyone could contend that the issue was "not on today's agenda."²³ In the wake of the Malta summit of 2–3 December, Falin was forced to contend that unification was "on the agenda" in discussions between Gorbachev and Bush, but was "not on the agenda of practical politics."²⁴

Three distinct positions began to emerge out the Soviet dialogue on unification. The first was a conservative defense of the status quo. Accord-

ing to many accounts, the question of overcoming Germany's division was a dangerous issue which "brings confusion, creates fears, and spreads distrust and suspicion. And that can have its negative impact on European stability."²⁵ Some form of improved cooperation between the two German states should emerge out of the GDR's new reformist government, but the sovereignty of the German people did not outweigh postwar political realities, including the existence of two German states.²⁶ Few Soviet officials publicly admitted to this view of the issue, but most conservatives surely subscribed to it.

A second view, attributed particularly to Nikolai Portugalov, envisioned a confederated structure that would link the two German states in policy areas such as the economy and environmental protection. This would preserve the existence of two German states, while accommodating the natural inclination of all Germans to institutionalize their common nationality.²⁷ This process must give precedence to the completion of the common European home, including the greater integration of all European economies, and the dissolution of military alliances. Portugalov also noted that in addition to the threat of instability in Europe, "socialism is not negotiable for most GDR citizens."²⁸

Third, some analysts came to accept the possibility of unification under specific circumstances. While it remained politically unwise to adhere openly to such a position, commentators merely stressed the need for gradual progress and responsibility.²⁹ As Zagladin observed, "I do not know to what extent this initiative [Kohl's ten-point plan] can be described as *realpolitik*, but in any case, it is necessary to display moderation at present." Kvitsinsky added that "no treaty exists which excludes the possibility of reunification and none which prescribes it."³⁰ The main obstacle presented to unification was the membership of the two German states in opposing military alliances. This stance became more prominent as the East German population came to view unification more favorably.³¹

Other Soviet officials stressed the sovereignty of the German people. Just days before Gorbachev's rejection of unity as an option, his foreign policy tsar, Aleksandr Yakovlev, claimed unification was entirely up to the Germans; the Soviet Union would not interfere. In addition, Deputy Defense Minister Valentin Varennikov declared that unification "is a matter for the German people, and how they decide their fate, the fate of the Germans, and the future of their states as they develop—that is their business. I personally consider that no other state is entitled to interfere in the solution of this problem."³² These individual views presaged the eventual decision to separate the internal and external aspects of German unity.

Shevardnadze emphasized that the process of German-German reconciliation was a "process [that] cannot be separated in some way from the general course of dealings between the East and West of Europe. The more dynamic the process of rapprochement among European states in general

and the formation of the structures of cooperation and good-neighborliness between them, the better the preconditions will develop for similar changes in FRG-GDR relations."³³ By late January 1990, Gorbachev had adopted this general position. He exhibited a distinctly more flexible attitude in his meetings with Modrow in January and Kohl in February.³⁴

In examining the Soviet debate on unification, the conservative option of defending the status quo has sometimes been overlooked.³⁵ Although the pace of events soon outran this alternative, the stance was politically important. Conservatives advocating such a view successfully played on popular fears of a reunified and revisionist Germany in the center of Europe. Gorbachev sought to avoid the impression that Moscow was acceding to such an outcome. He therefore delayed his acquiescence to Western proposals, and offered numerous counteroffers before he finally confronted the domestic political costs of accepting unification.

THE PROCESS OF UNIFICATION

The accelerating dissolution of the East German state, the overwhelming victory of parties favoring unification in the March 1990 GDR elections, and Gorbachev's growing domestic problems inspired world leaders to act quickly to keep up with events. Personal relations between the relevant diplomats and statements contributed mightily to the swift but controlled unification that resulted.³⁶ The process included eight meetings between Genscher and Shevardnadze, eleven by Shevardnadze and Baker, four Bush-Kohl meetings, as well as ten Two-Plus-Four gatherings at the expert and ministerial levels. West Germany benefited greatly from Washington's adept diplomacy in forging agreement among the NATO participants in unification talks.³⁷ But the ultimate Soviet acceptance of a unified Germany in NATO was made possible by Gorbachev's willingness to incur the wrath of Soviet conservative opposition. Most of the Western security guarantees that finally accompanied German membership in NATO had been in circulation since early 1990. Gorbachev was willing to make this sacrifice because of his trust in Western leaders, his fundamentally altered vision of international relations, and the multitude of domestic problems demanding immediate attention.

German Initiatives

Recognizing that Moscow had moved a considerable distance toward accepting some form of unified German state, Chancellor Kohl decided to seize the initiative. In late November 1989, he and a small circle of advisers began work on a plan for German unification. According to his chief foreign policy adviser, Horst Teltschik, the German chancellor demanded absolute secrecy during the development of the proposal in part to prevent Foreign

Minister Genscher from preempting his announcement.³⁸ The ten-point plan envisioned a step-by-step process moving from cooperation and free travel, to a change in the East German economic and political order, to the establishment of a contractual community, confederative structures, confederation, and finally the creation of a united German federation. A January 1990 poll of West Germans illustrated how politically significant the issue of unification had become for the Kohl administration. In October 1989, only 28 percent of respondents considered the end of Germany's division possible before 2000. Immediately following the opening of the Berlin Wall, this number had climbed to 48 percent, and by January 1990, it reached 68 percent.³⁹

Yet, by jumping out in front of the process, the German chancellor opened himself to considerable criticism from a number of the FRG's NATO allies, in particular France. Moscow also expressed its displeasure at the unilateral action. In a press conference following Kohl's announcement, Teltschik had referred to the remarks of Gorbachev adviser Andrei Grachev that "the German question is on the agenda, even if the ranks of politicians in the East and West do not wish to see it so." Grachev promptly reminded Bonn that "for the Soviet Union, for Russia, for the Russians, the German question remains a dramatic one." Portugalov was more colloquial in his criticism of Bonn's recklessness. He remarked of the West Germans, "Sometimes you remind me of lotto players who have got six numbers right and have nothing better to do than to lose their prize in Baden-Baden or Monte Carlo."⁴⁰

Despite Kohl's unilateral actions, he did not completely alienate Gorbachev. Two days after the ten-point plan was unveiled, the Soviet leader warned against "clumsy behavior and provocative declarations" that might damage looming "epochal changes." Yet by February 1990, while noting that a certain anxiety concerning German unification was understandable "historically and psychologically," he added that "one cannot deny that the German people have drawn lessons from the experience of Hitlerite domination and the Second World War. In both German states new generations have grown up to see Germany's role in the world in a different way." He counseled the Germans "to respect not only the interests, but also the feelings of other peoples."⁴¹ Learning from the lesson of 28 November, Kohl worked harder to assure Germany's neighbors, and especially the Soviet Union, that Bonn was to be trusted. This campaign included an effort to place the ten-point plan more visibly into a broader European framework.⁴²

In late January, the West German chancellor soothed one major Soviet concern by renouncing any intention of linking border issues with the unification process.⁴³ A high-ranking Soviet official later claimed that West German's respectful treatment of monuments to Soviet soldiers killed in World War II deprived conservatives in Moscow of another powerful objection to German unification.⁴⁴ Nonetheless, Gorbachev's opponents

played upon historic fears by warning against another "Munich" in dealing with the German people's desire to rewrite the postwar arrangement. Ligachev stated this possibility during the CC plenum in February and reiterated the call for precautions "so that there shouldn't be a Munich, no claims on Silesia or the Sudetenland, or many other places. I think you and I do have grounds for apprehension."⁴⁵ While numerous officials in Moscow noted the psychological fears of a unified Germany, the official view remained that the Germans had changed since 1945 and could be trusted to abide by international norms of behavior.

The East German leadership, naturally threatened by the prospect of the FRG seizing control of the future development of German-German relations, responded with its own proposal in January 1990. Modrow called for "a treaty-based community, in order to pursue, via this mechanism, the rapprochement of the GDR and FRG on their way to confederation." Kohl's plan incorporated similar ideas, but only as the fourth and sixth steps toward ultimate unity. While Modrow acknowledged that "the prospect of unification lies ahead for us," he refused to give any timetable.⁴⁶

Modrow's statement coincided with a significant shift in the Soviet political spectrum on German unification. As the situation in the GDR became more bleak and the pressure for unification grew, conservatives in Moscow came to accept confederation on the way to some distant unification, if in this way the Soviet Union could incorporate security restrictions in the founding documents of this process.⁴⁷ These individuals also emphasized Modrow's remarks on "a treaty-based community," without mentioning the possibility of a more closely integrated relationship.

Those formerly in favor of the confederation scheme came to realize that Germans would determine their own internal arrangements, abandoned talk of the united Germany's domestic structure, and stressed instead the need to lock German developments into an all-European process. By February, Falin acknowledged that "the balance of security is the main issue of the German question, not so much the state form of unification."⁴⁸ Analysts who accepted the inevitability of unification, and did not view the unavoidable West German domination of the united German state as threatening, showed increasing willingness to consider various solutions to the German problem that would keep pace with actual events rather than lag hopelessly behind. Daniel Proekter mentioned the need for unification to "take place within the framework of an overall European security program," but this meant merely that "the principles laid down in the Helsinki Final Act (i.e., the inviolability of border, the nonuse of force, human rights, broad European cooperation, etc.) must be observed by all without exception." He added, "Let us look as soberly and benevolently as possible at Germany's inevitable unification."⁴⁹ As Gorbachev acknowledged during Modrow's visit in Moscow, "There is a certain agreement among Germans in East and

West and among the representatives of the four powers that, in principle, German unification is not doubted by anyone."⁵⁰

Gorbachev's remarks glossed over the potentially explosive relationship between the internal and external elements of German unification. This fact was especially evident in the question of military neutrality institutionalized before unity. Soviet conservatives latched on to the East German leader's mention of military neutrality. They apparently hoped to incorporate German neutrality into any eventual arrangement. Gorbachev may have favored this idea, but realizing that Modrow was powerless to institute it, he stressed that Germans must determine the shape of the new Germany. In so doing he may have been trying to defuse the opposition of Soviet conservatives who favored such limitations.

The Agreement on Two-Plus-Four Talks

As East Germany's disintegration became more apparent, observers in the East and West accepted the need to act quickly before events raced out of control. Various statesmen proposed a four-power forum, an all-European summit, and even a European referendum to deal with the issues of German unification. The major powers finally agreed on an arrangement that included the two German states, as well as the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France. The so-called Two-Plus-Four talks eventually proved the most workable means to address the rapid pace of events. The question of a united Germany belonging to NATO rapidly emerged as the central issue in these proceedings.

The Soviet acceptance of the Two-Plus-Four arrangements was a direct result of the growing confidence in US-Soviet relations. As Shevardnadze noted, "We attach special significance to our mutual understanding with the Americans. Our current relations with that country permit us to work jointly in guaranteeing security in Europe."⁵¹ This improvement began at the Malta Summit in early December 1989. Both Gorbachev and Bush came away convinced of the other's sincerity and trustworthiness. In particular, the US guarantee that it would not exploit the instability in Eastern Europe reassured Gorbachev as to Washington's intentions. At this meeting, the Soviet side noted its anxieties concerning a united Germany. The two sides agreed to the need for a "prudent" policy toward Germany.⁵²

Building on the Soviet-US rapprochement, and spurred by the accelerating collapse of East Germany, Washington devised a plan to address the problem which incorporated both German states and the four powers responsible for postwar Germany. The plan acknowledged that the two German states would determine the domestic structure of a united German state. The FRG and GDR then would participate in the four powers' discussions of the external aspects of unification. This became known as the Two-Plus-Four formula. The idea was developed by the US State Depart-

ment, although both British and Soviet officials later claimed to have come up with the idea independently.⁵³ After discussions with NATO allies, Baker presented the idea to his Soviet hosts during a visit to Moscow in early February. The Soviet foreign minister formally accepted the proposal at the Ottawa Conference on 13 February.

Gorbachev's conditions for the announcement of the Two-Plus-Four approach revealed a great deal about Soviet thinking. The Soviet side demanded that no reference be made to the upcoming East German elections since, in Shevardnadze's words, it would look like Moscow had "effectively predetermined the fate of the current GDR leadership, proceeding on the assumption of its defeat in the elections, and preferring to do business with those forces which are now in the opposition."⁵⁴ In addition, Gorbachev emphasized that Poland's special concerns must be taken into account.⁵⁵ The objections centered on avoiding the perception that Moscow was abandoning its allies in Eastern Europe. Beyond the understandable unwillingness to undermine whatever East European goodwill for Moscow might remain, the Gorbachev leadership also feared the domestic consequences of such an impression. Shevardnadze, for instance, noted the increasing tendency of opponents of *perestroika* to use the German question and other foreign policy issues "to stop *perestroika* and discredit the country's leadership."⁵⁶

The Soviet willingness to work within this more limited forum represented a movement away from previous proposals. Gorbachev had earlier called for an all-European summit, labeled Helsinki II, to address the German problem. A day after Baker broached the Two-Plus-Four talks with Gorbachev, Gerasimov was still noting efforts to speed up preparations for Helsinki II.⁵⁷ Soviet accounts also constantly referred to the need to "synchronize" German developments with the process of uniting Europe. As late as 2 February, Shevardnadze discussed the idea of calling an "all-European referendum" since "not only politicians but also the people should decide the destiny and the future of Europe." Just days after the Ottawa foreign ministers conference, Falin contended that the idea of a European referendum was never a "practical proposal."⁵⁸

Gorbachev's domestic opponents clearly disapproved of the Two-Plus-Four approach. By excluding Poland and other victims of German aggression, Moscow lost potential allies in placing severe restrictions of a united Germany's military potential. In addition, France and Britain might be more willing to express openly misgivings on German unification in a forum of likeminded actors. In limiting outside participants to the four powers, Soviet conservative commentators expected London, Paris, and Bonn to follow the US lead, thus creating the potential for the NATO "four" to bully the Warsaw Pact "two." Gorbachev quickly went on the record to renounce advance agreements between the four Western participants.⁵⁹

Soviet supporters of the status quo may have hoped also that a CSCE forum would have involved more open debates, thus forcing Gorbachev to acknowledge publicly any Soviet concessions. Falin was explicit in noting that many in the Soviet Central Committee "consider postwar Europe as a trophy of the Soviet Union." He added that "if the West tried to neglect our interests, the advocates of the trophy philosophy would say: as long as we advocated our positions in a hard way, they did not dare to use such language in dealing with us, to make such demands on us; this is the beginning of a chain of demands which will end finally in capitulation."⁶⁰ And the cumbersome all-European process would have served the conservatives precisely because it was so unwieldy. The sheer bureaucratic bulk of such an arrangement would have drastically slowed the drive toward German unification. Faced with Gorbachev's acceptance of the Two-Plus-Four scenario, conservative commentators pushed for a greater role by the four powers in the domestic aspect of establishing a unified German state: in effect a "Four-Plus-Two" approach.⁶¹

Accelerating Collapse and Soviet Posturing

The results of the March GDR elections came as a major surprise to many in the Soviet Union. Modrow had admitted in December 1989 that if elections were held at that time, the SED could expect only 19 to 20 percent of the vote.⁶² In the event, the Party of Democratic Socialism (or PDS; the former SED) garnered just 16.3 percent. The CDU of East Germany gained 40.9 percent, and the SPD, 21.8 percent. Along with its alliance partners, the CDU had an absolute majority in the East German Volkskammer. The defeat of the SED/PDS removed the last hope of Soviet conservatives.

Gorbachev and Shevardnadze had reason to bemoan the election results for another reason. The SPD's poor showing relative to the CDU removed the possibility that the Social Democrats could play a central role in defining unification terms. Various West German SPD officials had declared that a unified Germany need not remain in NATO.⁶³ With the SED/PDS's stunning electoral defeat, Moscow now faced the danger of a "Five Against One" breakdown in discussions on unification. Various Soviet officials and commentators responded quickly by hinting that movement might be possible on the question of NATO membership.⁶⁴

Yet officially, Gorbachev continued to reject full German membership in NATO. The Two-Plus-Four negotiations witnessed the further consolidation of a unified Western stance. In March the first meeting of experts under the auspices of the Two-Plus-Four talks met in Bonn. Another Two-Plus-Four meeting, this time involving foreign ministers, addressed numerous security and military issues, but failed to make any concrete progress. During Gorbachev's discussions with Bush at the US-Soviet summit in June, the Soviet leader finally conceded that the German people could

determine their own alliance commitments. Shevardnadze backpedaled at the Two-Plus-Four meeting on 22 June. He called for the removal in stages of all foreign troops on German territory.⁶⁵ Gorbachev clearly refused to commit himself to German membership in NATO until after the 28th Party Congress scheduled for early July. Shevardnadze reportedly admitted as much to Baker.⁶⁶ Further progress was delayed until Kohl's trip to the Soviet Union in mid-July.

The barrage of Soviet counterproposals throughout this period demonstrated, not Moscow's bargaining strength, but its vulnerability. At various times, and in multiple forums, Soviet officials called for:

- (1) the dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and their replacement by permanent all-European security structures
- (2) a European-wide referendum on the international and security aspects of German unification
- (3) the neutralization and demilitarization of Germany
- (4) a military-political status for Germany in NATO similar to that of France
- (5) continued, though modified, exercise of four-power occupation rights in Germany
- (6) the formation of a center in Berlin to control all military forces in Germany
- (7) membership of Germany in both NATO and the Warsaw Pact
- (8) membership of the Soviet Union in NATO
- (9) membership of the FRG in NATO and associate status for the eastern part of Germany in the Warsaw Pact⁶⁷

Gorbachev was apparently searching for ways to advance the German unification process without appearing to give in to Western demands. While Moscow eventually acceded to these very conditions, the Soviet leader was able to do so on his own timetable, that is, after the conclusion of the 28th CPSU Party Congress.

THE 28TH CPSU CONGRESS, JULY 1990

The question of German unification emerged as a central issue during the 28th Party Congress in July. Gorbachev, Yakovlev, and especially Shevardnadze endured often intense criticism over Soviet foreign policy in Europe. Shevardnadze later admitted that German unification was a source of "especially heated discussions." Over half of the questions he fielded concerned this issue. Many of these contained harsh criticisms of Soviet policy.⁶⁸ Although Moscow had not yet accepted the Western condition of German membership in NATO, critics blasted the leadership for giving away Eastern Europe and selling the GDR to the West. Despite the sustained assaults, neither Shevardnadze nor Gorbachev backed away from their positive assessments of developments.

It came as no surprise that conservatives latched on to the issue of German unification in their efforts to discredit the entirety of Gorbachev's policies. Portugalov remarked in advance of the party congress, "The settlement of the foreign policy aspects of German unification has a strong domestic policy component in our country. The conservatives in the CPSU are trying to forge an anti-*perestroika* appeal from this."⁶⁹ Though most of the vehement criticism remained unpublished, the embattled foreign minister addressed many of the charges in his response to various questions from the floor. Gorbachev himself responded to critics railing against the "collapse of socialism" in Eastern Europe and "leaving there without a fight."⁷⁰

But the fiercest attacks centered on Soviet policy toward German unification. Shevardnadze reported being "cursed" for undermining Soviet security. He labeled such thinking "a throwback to complete chauvinism."⁷¹ His assurances that German unification would not damage the security of the USSR fell on deaf ears.⁷² The Soviet foreign minister also declared that "there is no connection between credit agreements and talks on other questions—the German question and the question of arms reductions." He rejected suggestions that "some kind of 'deal' is in progress on the German question and the hints that anyone has 'given' the German Democratic Republic to Bonn and has thus decided its fate."⁷³ This last remark implicated not only Soviet hard-liners. At the party congress, criticism of Moscow's German policy was not limited to conservatives.

Valentin Falin, the noted *Germanist* and head of the International Department, also pointed out shortcomings in the Soviet handling of German unification. He recalled that Moscow initially demanded a peace treaty with Germany as an integral part of the unification process. According to many Soviet commentators, this approach would have allowed the Soviet Union to incorporate certain restrictions on German behavior, including Germany's military status, into the founding documents of the new German state. Falin added, "Then, all of a sudden, we changed our position for another, where the notions 'peace treaty' and 'peace settlement' are not mentioned at all."⁷⁴

Falin's attack on the "sudden" inexplicable change in Soviet policy supported later contentions that Shevardnadze and Gorbachev alone formulated Moscow's approach to German unification. Not only Falin, but also Portugalov and Kvitsinsky, were closed out of the decision-making process as early as February 1990.⁷⁵ Drawing on remarkable access to the participants, Beschloss and Talbott related the opposition of these individuals as Gorbachev began to consider German membership in NATO at the June US-Soviet summit. The Soviet leader and his foreign minister apparently wished to prevent deadlock within the foreign policy circle by centralizing policy in their hands.⁷⁶ Thus Gorbachev and Shevardnadze faced not only conservative opposition to and political manipulation of the

process of German unification. They also confronted a number of prominent and moderate foreign policy officials who remained convinced that the Soviet Union could prevent, or at least dilute, Germany's inclusion in NATO.

Shevardnadze remained undaunted by the fierce and often personal attacks advanced by many delegates. He elaborated his controversial vision of German unification succinctly. He told the congress, "I want you to understand the possible options here, comrades. These are not our wishes, but the feasible options." Reaching an agreement within the Two-Plus-Four framework consistent with Soviet security was "feasible." The use of Moscow's "500,000 troops in the GDR to block unification" meant "disaster."⁷⁷ After all, he asked, "Can there be such a reliable guarantee which is based on the artificial and unnatural division of a great nation? And how long can this last?"⁷⁸ He pointed to a number of measures designed to protect Soviet security interests, including restrictions in the size of the German military. Nowhere in his discussions did he address the issue of German membership in NATO. This silence was audible to both his domestic and Western audience.

NATO's July summit in London had certainly strengthened Shevardnadze's position. He had earlier informed Baker that the outcome of that meeting would be very important to further progress on German unification.⁷⁹ The summit provided a series of assurances for the Soviet Union, including a transitional period in which NATO would not position forces in eastern Germany, a transitional period before the USSR must remove its forces from the former GDR, reductions in conventional arms in Europe, acceleration of talks on short-range nuclear forces, a NATO strategic review, and a firm German pledge to honor present borders. Shevardnadze praised the results at the party congress, calling the final declaration "an important political act." Gorbachev also evaluated it as "a significant step" in the right direction.⁸⁰ Although neither Gorbachev nor Shevardnadze would admit it at the party congress, their official acceptance of Germany's inclusion in NATO was only days away.

THE JULY GORBACHEV-KOHL SUMMIT

This meeting between the two leaders represented Moscow's final acceptance of a united German state integrated into the Atlantic alliance. In committing the USSR to the prospect of German membership in NATO, Gorbachev acknowledged the end of Europe's political and military division.⁸¹ While the final agreement involved compromises by both sides, the Soviet Union surely gave up more than the FRG. The visible chemistry between the two men played a significant role in bringing their divergent positions together. While Moscow's decision-making process remained

unclear, the surprise nature of Gorbachev's acceptance implied a great deal about Soviet reasoning.

Commentaries before Kohl's arrival made much of the personal rapport that the two leaders had developed over the years. Both Kohl and Gorbachev confirmed the importance of this phenomenon.⁸² The image of an extremely centralized foreign policy process, perhaps involving only Shevardnadze and Gorbachev, enhanced the relevance of such a subjective factor. From the beginning, Kohl's visit was unconventional. Side trips to Gorbachev's old office in Stavropol and various unscheduled stops led finally to his hunting lodge in Arkhiz. The visit to Gorbachev's birthplace was greeted with excitement in Bonn. Rather than viewing this gesture as style over substance, West German officials concluded that Gorbachev planned some significant gesture.⁸³

Even as Gorbachev prepared to take this historic step, evidence of continued Soviet conservative opposition emerged. A *Pravda* article on the day of Kohl's arrival questioned West Germany's motives in offering financial support to the Soviet Union.⁸⁴ The implicit suggestion that Moscow was consenting to a "deal" with Bonn over the fate of the GDR echoed criticisms voiced at the recent party congress. One day earlier an unnamed Central Committee expert on Germany chastised the FRG for obstructing progress at the Two-Plus-Four talks and accused Bonn of disregarding Soviet security interests.⁸⁵ These examples reflected an undercurrent of disapproval among many Soviet conservatives. Moscow's public relations corps attempted to placate such concerns. A number of the stops on the itinerary included what must have been carefully arranged encounters with Soviet veterans of World War II.⁸⁶ The veterans greeted the West German leader and expressed support for improved German-Soviet relations.

Given the magnitude of the meetings results, the actual proceedings were almost anticlimactic. The West German delegation expected prolonged bargaining and intense politicking. Yet according to West German participants, Gorbachev stated his compromise position rather quickly.⁸⁷ The two sides agreed that a united Germany would decide for itself which alliance it might join. Germany's choice was not left to doubt since Kohl declared that the new state "would like to become a member of the Atlantic alliance and I am certain that this also conforms with the opinion of the GDR government."⁸⁸

In addition, four-power authority would end at the time of unification; the united Germany and the USSR would conclude a bilateral treaty to negotiate the removal of Soviet troops in the former GDR over a period of three to four years; NATO structures would not extend into eastern Germany as long as Soviet forces remained there; Bonn promised to reduce the united Germany's armed forces to 370,000 in three to four years; and Germany would renounce the production, possession, and siting of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and would remain a member of the

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. While at that time no mention was made of financial considerations, Bonn had earlier promised \$3 billion in trade credits and \$730 million to assist in the withdrawal of Soviet troops.⁸⁹

Gorbachev's reasons for dropping the Soviet rejection of NATO membership received various explanations. Some analysts have stressed the importance of Kohl's willingness to reduce unilaterally the unified Germany's armed forces.⁹⁰ Agreeing to consider such reductions outside of the Vienna Conventional Forces in Europe framework represented a significant concession for the FRG and United States. The move also corresponded to Shevardnadze's remarks at the 28th Party Congress on the security benefits of a united Germany with imposed force levels.⁹¹ Another argument involved other recent Western actions designed to assuage Soviet concerns. The London NATO summit in early July, for instance, impressed Gorbachev.⁹² Yet neither of these factors alone could have motivated such a profound reevaluation.

The Soviet leader provided a further possible explanation when he emphasized the atmosphere of genuine trust that had developed between Moscow and Bonn. In explaining the Soviet decision, Gorbachev noted the intense cooperation between the two states in the past year. He emphasized that a powerful reserve of trust had developed *before* the 1989 crises in Eastern Europe, a "safety margin" that "helped us to act responsibly and constructively" in 1990. The Soviet president also repeated his belief that the Germans "have proved by their entire postwar history that they are open to processes of democracy. . . . That is an important precondition. Without that nothing could take place."⁹³

A series of domestic forces also affected the final outcome. The massive opposition by Soviet conservatives to concessions on German unification profoundly influenced the timing of Gorbachev's announcement. The unexpected move came just days after the party congress that roundly attacked the Soviet approach to the German question. Critics of Gorbachev's German policy did not suddenly appear at the party congress. Public expression of their disapproval was simply a visible manifestation of the continuous and powerful conservative presence that had inhibited Gorbachev's actions throughout this period.

The plethora of potentially explosive problems at home also had an undeniable impact on Soviet thinking. Various economic, social, and political crises demanded immediate attention. Removal of a contentious international problem would allow Gorbachev to turn his focus inward. Moreover, the tendency of Soviet officials to make numerous, sometimes contradictory, proposals in German unification negotiations suggested that Moscow was distracted by internal problems. While not necessarily in disarray, certainly the beleaguered resources of the Gorbachev leadership were stretched to the limit.

Finally, both Gorbachev and Shevardnadze appeared genuine in their defense of new political thinking. Their actions demonstrated a fundamentally altered vision of international relations and the nature of Soviet security interests. According to the logic of this doctrine, Germany's unification and inclusion in NATO did not represent an inherent threat to Moscow's interests. Moreover, since these two individuals almost single-handedly formulated Moscow's response to the German question, they had isolated themselves from any opinions at odds with new thinking's precepts.⁹⁴

In fact, all these factors contributed to Gorbachev's decision. The favorable international environment, the strictures of domestic politics, Gorbachev's compounding internal crisis, and the conceptual logic of new thinking were integral to the outcome. Rather than any single decisive point, the change proceeded from the interaction of internal and external forces acting simultaneously on Soviet foreign policy.

CONCLUSION

The period from August 1989 to July 1990 incorporated changes in Soviet foreign policy that proceeded with dizzying speed. Drawing on the conceptual and political advances of the preceding phases, the Gorbachev leadership effectively redefined Moscow's position in the world. The culmination of this process was the conditioned Soviet acceptance of united German membership in the Atlantic alliance.

The latter half of 1989 witnessed the accelerating collapse of several socialist regimes in Eastern Europe. Disproving the predictions of most contemporary observers, Moscow remained true to the principles of new thinking. What influence Gorbachev did exert was limited to encouraging the notion of popular sovereignty and dissuading embattled communist leaders from using force to retain power. The absence of large-scale Soviet interference did not stem from Moscow's unwillingness to accept the costs of military intervention or from complete unpreparedness for the eventual outcomes. Instead, the Gorbachev leadership had considered the possibility of communism's demise in one or more Eastern European countries and deemed such a result to be consistent with the current conception of Soviet national interests.

East Germany was unique in traditional Soviet thinking since it represented the linchpin in the entire East European security system. Yet in this instance as well, the Kremlin proved willing to accept the collapse of the GDR's socialist regime. Even after Honecker's ouster, Gorbachev continued to receive reliable accounts of the SED's crumbling legitimacy. The evidence suggested that Moscow at least tacitly approved, and perhaps even encouraged, the opening of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. In effect, the Soviet leadership had acknowledged the East German population's right to choose their own government. Moscow finally reconciled itself to the

bankruptcy of Eastern Europe's existing socialist regimes because it no longer equated socialist rule with Soviet security in central Europe.

Soon after this the two German states demonstrated that unification was "on the international agenda." Three distinct Soviet assessments of this emerged, ranging from rejection of unification, to support for a confederal solution, to a willingness to accept conditional unification. In the first quarter of 1990, internal German dynamics threatened to outrun the international mechanism created to manage the external aspects of German unity. Following the March elections in the GDR, Moscow was faced with the simple fact that the FRG and GDR had already made some form of German unification inevitable.

A visible shift in the Soviet debate on unity emerged by the spring of 1990. Defenders of the status quo moved to accept some form of confederation as long as various political and security restrictions were sewn into the stitching of the new German state. While the center evaporated, those considering unification a viable option focussed on the remaining obstacles, most notably the West's demand that the new state be a full NATO member. Despite their political posturing, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze consistently denied that unification would damage Soviet security. Having weathered the stormy July party congress, and reassured by constructive Western behavior, Gorbachev unexpectedly removed the final obstacle to Germany's merger by acceding to a united Germany integrated in the Atlantic Alliance. In this way, Gorbachev dramatically capped off a five-year process of redefining Soviet relations with West Germany.

Conclusion

This study confirms the contention that "[b]efore behavioral revolutions come conceptual revolutions."¹ Soviet actions and reactions in Europe, and especially those relating to West Germany, were remarkably consistent with the principles of new thinking. Many studies of Soviet–West German relations in this period failed to incorporate this fact. In particular, interpretations of the Soviet response to the changing parameters of the German question suffer from an inadequate appreciation of the evident conceptual changes that predated these crises.² As a result, they explain Soviet policy in 1989–1990 as merely imposed on an unwilling or immobilized Moscow. The flawed conclusions arise mainly from two incorrect assumptions: first, that Moscow remained blindly convinced of the eventual success of reform communism in Eastern Europe, and second, that Gorbachev did not act to prevent the collapse of the Eastern bloc and the unification of Germany only because he feared the consequences of military intervention.

The question of Gorbachev's understanding of East European processes had attracted considerable attention. Various scholars have argued that right up until its final defeat, Gorbachev remained convinced of the SED's eventual success.³ But the evidence I have presented proves that the Soviet leadership was aware of the rapid disintegration of the SED, and received from reliable sources pessimistic evaluations of the party's prospects. Many

analysts pointed to Moscow's continued backing of political forces favoring the rejuvenation of socialism as proof that the Soviet leadership did not envision the collapse of socialism in the GDR. This conclusion does not logically follow from the evidence presented. After acknowledging the possibility of the SED's total disintegration, Moscow had no viable option but to continue support. This response indicated Gorbachev's preference for socialist rule, but not his inability to assess its prospects accurately.

The second support for the prevailing explanation of Gorbachev's response to the disintegration of the GDR are the numerous Soviet statements supporting the new SED leadership. Such an interpretation misreads the political context within which Gorbachev operated. His view of East European events differed markedly from that of his domestic opponents. It was not surprising that the embattled Soviet leader chose to disguise his true opinions. In fact, most accounts of this period agree that Gorbachev disapproved of Honecker's continued rule. These analyses interpret the Soviet leader's remarks complimenting the stubborn Honecker as disingenuous. There is every reason to believe that Gorbachev would similarly conceal his innermost thoughts in dealing with Honecker's successors.

Another component of the flawed interpretation of Soviet thinking toward the collapse of the GDR involves the use of military force. Many scholars contend that Moscow's only recourse in 1989 was military intervention. They add that the Gorbachev leadership rejected this option because such action would damage domestic reform efforts and relations with the West.⁴ As the examination of Soviet 1989 actions in Eastern Europe indicates, Moscow did have a number of powerful tools to influence events in the region. It simply chose not to use them. Fear of alienating the West was not sufficient to explain Moscow's lack of action. If the Soviet leadership had still considered the traditional Eastern bloc as integral to Soviet national interests, it would surely have used any means possible to prevent its disintegration. In the event, Gorbachev concluded that the "loss" of East Germany did not in principle threaten Soviet national security.

Similar problems undermine most accounts of the Soviet decision to accept the terms of German unification. The most common explanation is that Moscow simply "caved in" to Western demands because it had no other recourse. Certainly the pace of events pressured the Soviet leadership to respond to the new circumstances,⁵ but this was not a condition exclusive to the USSR. Britain and France ultimately agreed to unification terms that bore little resemblance to the gradual process they initially favored. Moreover, Moscow did retain significant influence in the process. The presence of 500,000 troops on East German soil gave weight to their position. The Soviet Union could also have vetoed any Two-Plus-Four proposal on rescinding four-power authority in Germany. If Gorbachev rejected this option for fear of damaging economic relations with a future united Germany, this justification clearly demonstrated an altered vision of Soviet

interests. In the end, Moscow evaluated specific economic opportunities as more important than the potential threat of a unified Germany. As with the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe, the final result was remarkably consistent with the Gorbachev leadership's earlier statements and actions. Thus, the "caving in" was conceived as being in line with Soviet interests.⁶

Again the preceding examination of Moscow's relations with Bonn suggests that principles such as the renunciation of force, the interdependent nature of international relations, mutual security, the nonthreatening nature of capitalism, and the sovereignty of the popular will motivated the Gorbachev leadership even as domestic reform foundered. This altered vision of the external arena was not merely a by-product of altered thinking on domestic economic reform, but constituted a fundamental redefinition of Moscow's approach to international relations.

Scholars who underemphasize the importance of politics also seriously misinterpret the basics of Soviet-West German relations. A number of analysts, taking at face value Gorbachev's repeated rejection of NATO membership for a united Germany, place inordinate importance on the FRG concessions at the July 1990 meeting in Arkhiz.⁷ Yet an eyewitness account suggests that the Soviet leader was prepared in advance to accept NATO membership.⁸ While West German security and financial guarantees did contribute to Gorbachev's decision, these scholars mistook coincidence for causation. The convening of the 28th Party Congress in early July ensured that Gorbachev would not announce any major decision on unification until after the meeting. Thus the specifics of the deal in Arkhiz made easier a decision that had been arrived at before Kohl even arrived in the USSR.

The preceding example illustrates a broader problem with accounts of Soviet-West German relations. Many accounts operated on the assumption that the domestic political constraints on Gorbachev dramatically eased following his consolidation of power in 1986. In fact, the Soviet leader faced serious political pressure throughout the period. Change in the pre-Gorbachev policy toward West Germany emerged only after the 27th Party Congress in February 1986. The Soviet leader announced unilateral cuts in Moscow's European conventional forces only after the successful 19th Party Conference in mid-1988. In July 1989, Gorbachev criticized the Soviet military in a speech to the Supreme Soviet. Even at that late date, the remarks were still considered too politically dangerous to be carried by the mass media.⁹

These constraining forces actually gained strength in 1989-1990 as the Soviet Union experienced mounting domestic problems and as Gorbachev's foreign policy altered international arrangements still considered sacrosanct by Soviet conservatives. The 28th Party Congress proceedings included fierce criticism of Moscow's German policy. Such tactics represented not only an attack on Gorbachev's foreign policy, but also a serious challenge to the political authority of the Soviet leader.¹⁰ Thus Gorbachev's

statements before and after the party congress must be evaluated in the context of the acute political struggle that was in progress.

EXPLAINING GORBACHEV'S GERMAN POLICY

Moscow's German policy cannot be satisfactorily explained by internal or external factors alone. Comprehensive international characteristics such as the impact of nuclear weapons on security, the global scientific and technological revolution, and the dictates of economic interdependence predated Gorbachev's rise to power. This atmosphere had imposed costs on the Soviet Union throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The differing interpretations of these factors by the Soviet elite proved that Gorbachev's foreign policy was not dictated by the structure of the international system.

External pressures such as US military spending, increasing costs of support to Third World satellites, growing Eastern European instability, and finally the internal dynamism of Germany's drive for unification also constrained Soviet actions. But these factors cannot account for Gorbachev's specific responses, particularly the decision not to utilize Moscow's remaining resources in the region to disrupt the process of change. In the past, Soviet leaders had responded to similar pressures in fundamentally different ways. Furthermore, Gorbachev himself played a central role in initiating the transformation of the postwar European structure. The Soviet Union had undergone a profound change in the years preceding the dramatic events in Europe.

Likewise, Moscow's international behavior was not merely a derivative of domestic imperatives. Undoubtedly, economic problems, new leadership values, and crises of legitimacy fundamentally influenced the state's external behavior, yet such phenomena alone cannot illuminate the process by which change was initiated, developed, and implemented. Exclusive emphasis on these unit-level variables would take Soviet foreign policy out of its international context. The view that Soviet acceptance of German unification was simply the result of a political system paralyzed by internal conflict excluded crucial elements of the story. To add to the complexity, the interaction of domestic and external factors was not static, but instead was in constant flux. The difficulty of any rigorous theory incorporating all these threads is apparent.

From 1985 to 1990, the Soviet leadership completed a fundamental redefinition of its national interests. Correspondingly, Moscow's foreign relations underwent a revolution that transformed the USSR's position in the international system. This gradual process involved both a conceptual and a political component. Intellectually, Gorbachev and the proponents of new thinking viewed international relations in a profoundly different way from the worldview of their predecessors. Politically, the Soviet leader had to

define and promote specific foreign policy principles, and struggle constantly to translate these ideas into specific and often unpopular policies.

Rather than a gradual learning process, Gorbachev and his supporters brought with them many of their new ideas. The new thinking was in part a result of a generational change in the Soviet leadership from those who lived through the Stalinist era and participated in World War II to those who were too young to have served in the war and whose formative political experiences were the Khrushchev thaw and the 20th Party Congress. The education and professional paths of new thinking advocates also differed markedly from those of their predecessors. These views took hold in Soviet society because of the apparent inability of the traditional thinking to cope with mounting political and economic problems.

The Gorbachev leadership accepted the asymmetrical cuts of the 1987 INF agreement and the unilateral reductions announced in December 1988 because they genuinely believed that reducing international tensions and perceptions of a Soviet threat increased the USSR's security. Although the pace of German unification forced Moscow to move more quickly than it might have liked, the re-creation of a united German state was no longer viewed as inherently threatening. Moscow acknowledged the existence of economic interdependence and accepted the constraints this placed on its autonomy because it considered this a requirement of the modern age. Gorbachev's encouragement of a broader economic role for Bonn in promoting Soviet economic reform illustrated this belief. Ideas motivated Gorbachev's policies toward West Germany, up to and including unification.

Yet this was only part of the story. Ideas motivated the Gorbachev leadership, but they also placed it at odds with a politically powerful bloc of Soviet conservatives. The institutionalization of new thinking was an intensely political process. In transforming his vision of international relations into a policy toward West Germany, Gorbachev had to work within the constraints of the Soviet political system. His skills as a politician, his personnel policy to remove opponents and empower allies, his use of information policy to create pressures for reform, his mobilization of the Soviet intelligentsia, all contributed to changes in Soviet policy.¹¹ As any successful reformer, Gorbachev was also forced to use a delicate and complex mix of posturing, persuasion, and compromise. In the process, the Gorbachev leadership often had to conceal its true intentions. As Huntington has observed, "It is of the essence of the reformer that he must employ ambiguity, concealment, and deception concerning his goals."¹²

On coming to power, the new Soviet general secretary continued the existing policy toward West Germany. Until he had successfully consolidated power, he limited himself to subtle signals of his desire for change and embryonic efforts to transform the foreign policy arena. Once his position had solidified, he initiated a broad reevaluation of relations with West Germany. The threat of domestic opposition forced Gorbachev to

conceal his attitude toward East Germany's collapse and German unification. Yet his actions before and during these foreign policy crises demonstrated that he viewed these events as consistent with the new thinking.

This political game, moreover, was not played on a single level, but instead proceeded on the domestic and international stage simultaneously. My study has unearthed a number of ways in which internal and external forces interact, intervening variables that are often overlooked by analyses focusing exclusively on one or the other level of analysis. These linkages most often arose during the process of political bargaining at the domestic and international level. The frequency with which these interactions are expressed in negotiations suggests the extent to which politicians universally recognize these relationships between internal and external factors in their daily actions. Many of these examples emerged from a close examination of public diplomacy and summits between Gorbachev and Kohl, an area often overlooked by other scholars.

One of the main internal-external linkages involves the role of international actors in aiding and inhibiting Gorbachev's domestic efforts. First, the actions of West Germany sometimes impeded the Soviet leader's struggle with domestic conservatives. In 1986, when Kohl compared Gorbachev to Nazi Germany's Goebbels, Gorbachev was frustrated in his efforts to convince Soviet conservatives that West Germany was a trustworthy international partner. Likewise, Kohl's November 1989 unilateral announcement of a ten-point unification plan strengthened Soviet critics in the unfolding debate on German unity.

At other times, forces external to the Soviet political struggle assisted Gorbachev in changing Soviet foreign policy. In mid-1990, for instance, Shevardnadze openly pressed US Secretary of State Baker for results at the upcoming NATO summit that would strengthen Gorbachev in his struggle with Soviet conservatives.¹³ After the NATO meeting in London, the Gorbachev leadership used this international resource to argue that German membership in the Atlantic alliance would not damage Soviet interests.¹⁴ On another occasion, Shevardnadze threatened his opponents that failure to support *perestroika* would damage Western perceptions of the Soviet Union. A highly visible attack on this line of thinking by a Soviet conservative suggested that this tactic was used fairly frequently.¹⁵

A second major linkage between the Soviet domestic arena and the international stage centered on the role of Gorbachev's domestic reforms in aiding his international negotiating position. This involved suggestions that if Western actions did not satisfactorily protect Moscow's legitimate interests, Gorbachev's domestic opponents would be strengthened.¹⁶ More common were Gorbachev's calls for financial support predicated on the assumption that the West stood to benefit greatly from *perestroika*'s success.¹⁷

Driven by new thinking, Gorbachev and his supporters came to perceive German unification in a fundamentally different way from their predeces-

sors. Clearly events forced Moscow to move more quickly than it preferred, yet Shevardnadze and Gorbachev considered the final outcome consistent with their new vision of Soviet interests. Soviet acceptance of this event required Gorbachev to promote an unpopular policy in the face of mounting domestic criticism. The Soviet leader was aided by constructive Western signals, such as the results of the NATO summit and West German security and financial guarantees. Yet these external factors were themselves made possible by the West's heightened trust in Moscow, which derived from Gorbachev's reform policies. The interaction of new ideas, external influences, and political conflict played itself out at the domestic and international level. For Gorbachev, his acceptance of the terms of German unification was a victory of his conception of international relations, aided by constructive Western inputs, and achieved within the demanding arena of Soviet politics.

and Talbott, *At the Highest Levels*, 182. For Shevardnadze's response, see *Pravda*, 8 February 1990, 3. In referring to German unification, he used the Russian word *obyedineniye* which suggested an association or union. Ligachev's use of *vossoyedeniye*, or reunification, was politically loaded, intended to imply that West Germany sought to remake the German state within its prewar borders. See *Pravda*, 7 February 1990, 6. See Shevardnadze's similarly pejorative use of *vossoyedeniye* in *Pravda*, 15 November 1989, 6.

78. Sodaro, *Moscow, Germany and the West*, 365.

79. Yakovlev, "Evropeiskaya tsivilizatsia i sovremennoye politicheskoye myshleniye," *Pravda*, 21 March 1989, 4.

CHAPTER 6

1. In an otherwise very thoughtful treatment of the Soviet approach to the German question, Gregory Treverton disregards Moscow's anxiety, while arguing that such concerns were a primary determinant in French foreign policy. *America, Germany, and the Future of Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), ch. 5.

2. Shevardnadze, "Peregovory v MID SSSR," *Izvestia*, 6 December 1989, 4.

3. See the discussion in Pond, *Beyond the Wall*, 156-161.

4. See Grigoryev's critical remarks in "Obstrukzia," *Pravda*, 24 June 1989, 5; and "Opasnye virazhi," *Pravda*, 6 July 1989, 5. For an analysis of Kohl's problems with the German right, see Ash, *In Europe's Name*, 229-230; McAdams, *Germany Divided*, 200-201; and Thomas O'Boyle and Terence Roth, *Wall Street Journal*, 31 January 1989, A14.

5. See, for example, "Spory vokrug problemy vyezdov," *Izvestia*, 9 August 1989, 4. The article sarcastically noted that "Bonn must know how humanely the GDR resolves the question of reuniting families in accordance with its laws." Another article praised Bonn for working constructively with East Berlin and Budapest to resolve the refugee problem. F. Lukyanov, "Razreshili pereiti granitsy," *Izvestia*, 11 September 1989, 4.

6. Shishlin interviewed in *Liberation* (Paris), 22 September 1989, 4, in FBIS-SOV, 29 September 1989, 29; Falin interviewed by H. Karutz, "Die DDR entschied richtig," *Die Welt*, 2 October 1989, 4; and Podklyuchnikov, "Kto oslozhnyaet ot-nosheniya," *Pravda*, 3 October 1989, 5.

7. Cited in Grigoryev, "Reading the 'Script,' or Something About Bonn's Predictability," *Pravda* (first edition), 23 September 1989, 5, in FBIS-SOV, 29 September 1989, 31. An angry *Pravda* article responded, "No, the joint statement of 13 June this year is not concerned with overcoming the existing status quo in Europe—and certainly not in the sense that some circles in the CDU would now like to impart to it." A. Pavlov, "Ne po toi kolee," *Pravda*, 23 September 1989, 5.

8. Gorbachev, "Prazdnik sozidania na nemetskoj zemle," *Pravda*, 7 October 1989, 5.

9. Shevardnadze, *Pravda*, 27 September 1989, 4. See also Kiessler and Elbe, *Ein runder Tisch*, 25-27; and Pond, *Beyond the Wall*, 155-156, 313, note 10.

10. Kvitsinsky, *Vor dem Sturm*, 14.

11. See Dashichev's report, reprinted as "Enormer Schaden für Moskau," *Der Spiegel*, 5 February 1990, 148, 150; and Portugalov, "Perestroika im Bewußtsein der Deutschen," *Der Spiegel*, 5 June 1989, 171-172.

12. See "Die Sowjetunion dementiert Meldungen über eine Entsendung von Unterhändlern," *FAZ*, 5 August 1989, 2.

13. Vladimir Shinayev, deputy director the Institute of Europe, TASS, 2 September 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 5 September 1989, 14. See also Greenwald, *Berlin Witness*, 192; and Gorbachev's defense of four-power authority at a press conference following his speech to the Council of Europe. Moscow Domestic Service, 5 July 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 6 July 1989, 34. Falin also referred to the centrality of four-power authority with regard to German unification in "Verhaltene Glückwünsche aus Moskau," *SZ*, 20 October 1989, 4.

14. Cited in DPA, 11 December 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 11 December 1989, 17; and TASS, 12 December 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 13 December 1989, 38.

15. See Portugalov interviewed by W. Markov, "Zwei Systeme, eine Nation," *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 17 November 1989, 2. See also Moscow Domestic Service, 18 November 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 21 November 1989, 21.

16. See Krenz, "In großer Offenheit haben wir über alles gesprochen," *Neues Deutschland*, 2 November 1989, 2; and Modrow, "Existenz zweier deutscher Staaten—Grundlage der Stabilität in Europa," *Neues Deutschland*, 13 November 1989, 2.

17. Reich interviewed by Yu. Shpatov, "Perestroika, sotsializm, dve Germanii," *Moskovskije novosti*, 19 November 1989, 6.

18. Zhurkin, "Evropejskiye gorizonty," *Izvestia*, 24 November 1989, 5.

19. See Zagladin and Portugalov, ANSA (Rome), 29 November 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 30 November 1989, 54. Portugalov: "I do not rule out the possibility of developing a confederal structure. . . . But given the geopolitical picture today, I do not think Europe is ready for a united Germany." See also Portugalov in *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 17 November 1989, 2, in FBIS-SOV, 20 November 1989, 34: Reunification is "incompatible with the geopolitical and geostrategic requirements of stability." Petrovsky labeled such proposals "premature." AFP (Paris), 29 November 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 30 November 1989, 2.

20. See the remarks of MID spokesman Gremitskikh on DPA, 29 November 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 30 November 1989, 31.

21. Falin, "Studio 9," Moscow Television Service, 10 December 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 13 December 1989, 7.

22. Yet he envisioned changes in intra-German relations following the transformation of the GDR. DPA, 17 November 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 20 November 1989, 34. Krenz and Modrow repeated Gorbachev's position. See Krenz in *Neues Deutschland*, 13 November 1989, 1; and Modrow, *Neues Deutschland*, 12 January 1990, 1.

23. Bovin, "V tsentre Evropy," *Izvestia*, 28 November 1989, 7.

24. Falin interviewed by Wolfgang Kenntemich, "Falin: The Development Is Normal," *Bild*, 4 December 1989, 3, in FBIS-SOV, 4 December 1989, 94.

25. Commentator Viktor Glazunov, Moscow World Service, 6 December 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 7 December 1989, 48.

26. See Yuri Kornilov, TASS, 29 November 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 30 November 1989, 32.

27. See Portugalov, ANSA (Rome), 29 November 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 29 November 1989, 54; and "The Soviet View: Two Germans, in Confederation," *New York Times*, 15 December 1989, A43.

28. Portugalov interviewed by Eberhard Laib, "Portugalov: Germans on Both Sides," *Bild*, 15 November 1989, 2, in FBIS-SOV, 15 November 1989, 25. Portugalov even made a similar claim in late January. "Zwei sind besser als eins," *Die Zeit*, 26 January 1990, 31.

29. The exception appeared to be Dashichev, who vocally expressed his opinions that Germany should be unified promptly. See his interviews, "Die deutsche Einheit kommt—wir haben es nur nicht rechtzeitig genug gesehen," *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 8 February 1990, 6; and "Vereinigung vielleicht schon bis Anfang nächsten Jahres," *Die Welt*, 20 March 1990, 9. Both Kvitsinsky and Falin have refuted his claim to be an adviser to Gorbachev. See Kvitsinsky, *Vor dem Sturm*, 13; and Falin, "Ruck ins Tendenzlose," *Der Spiegel*, 13 May 1990, 12–14. Dashichev responded in "Deprimierende Bilanz," *Der Spiegel*, 19 August 1990, 10.

30. "Zagladin: 'Wrong to Force the Pace,'" *L'Unita*, 29 November 1989, 5, in FBIS-SOV, 7 December 1989, 49; and Kvitsinsky, DPA, 17 January 1990, in FBIS-SOV, 18 January 1990, 40.

31. One poll in TASS indicated that 23 percent of the East German people rejected unification, 29 percent were more opposed than in favor, and 32 percent were more in favor than opposed, and 16 percent favored unification. TASS, 8 December 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 11 December 1989, 19.

32. Yakovlev, *Kyodo* (Tokyo), 15 November 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 15 November 1989, 24. This had been Yakovlev's position as far back as January 1989. See "Jakowlew nennt Moskauer Verabredungen 'in vollem Umfang' gültig," *FAZ*, 10 January 1989, 2. Varennikov interviewed by E. Powell, BBC Television Network, 3 July 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 12 July 1989, 46.

33. Shevardnadze, "Evropa—ot raskola k edinstvu," *Izvestia*, 18 January 1990, 5.

34. See "Gorbatschow: Vereinigung der Deutschen wird nicht prinzipiell in Zweifel gezogen," *SZ*, 31 January 1990, 1; and "Kohl erzieht Durchbruch in Moskau: Der Weg zur Einheit ist jetzt frei," *FAZ*, 12 February 1990, 1.

35. See, for example, Boris Meissner, "Das 'neue Denken' Gorbatschows und die Wende in der sowjetischen Deutschlandpolitik," in *Die Deutschen und die Architektur des Europäischen Hauses* (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1990), 75–76.

36. Beschloss and Talbott offer invaluable illustrations of these personal ties, particularly the bond between Shevardnadze and Baker. *At the Highest Levels*.

37. See Alexander Moens, "American Diplomacy and German Unification," *Survival* 33 (November–December 1991): 531–545.

38. Teltschik, *329 Tage: Innenansichten der Einigung* (Berlin: Siedler, 1991), 49. A transcript of Kohl's speech to the Bundestag in which he announced his ten-point plan appears in *Deutschland Archiv* 23 (January 1990): 149–152.

39. "In Erwartung der Einheit," *SZ*, 23 January 1990, 10.

40. Teltschik, *329 Tage*, 55. Grachev's response appeared in AFP (Paris), 29 November 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 30 November 1989, 3. See also the MID spokesman Gremitskikh in TASS, 29 November 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 30 November 1989, 2.

Portugalov interviewed by Eberhard Laib, "If People Want Unity, It Will Come About," *Bild*, 24 January 1990, 4, in FBIS-SOV, 2 February 1990, 39.

41. Gorbachev, Moscow Domestic Service, 20 February 1990, in FBIS-SOV, 21 February 1990, 52.

42. See Ye. Grigoryev, "Uvertura v 'Akvariume,'" *Pravda*, 12 January 1990, 7.

43. "Kohl gibt politische Garantie für Oder-Neiße-Linie," *SZ*, 18 January 1990, 1. For a Soviet response, see A. Blinov and V. Ganshin, "Posle vstrechi v Kemp-Devide," *Izvestia*, 26 February 1990, 4. See also Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name*, 230.

44. Author's interview with former Deputy Prime Minister Leonid Abalkin, Charlottesville, Virginia, 27 October 1992. See, for example, the fierce criticism of vandalism of Soviet war memorials in East Germany. "Fashisty—von!," *Pravda*, 5 January 1990, 7; and S. Baygarov, "Neofashisti v GDR," *Pravda*, 21 January 1990, 5. See also Kvitsinsky, *Vor dem Sturm*, 21.

45. Yakovlev interviewed by Jonathon Dimpleby, BBC Television Network, 15 February 1990, in FBIS-SOV, 27 February 1990, 6.

46. Modrow, ADN, 30 January 1990, in FBIS-SOV, 30 January 1990, 22–23.

47. See commentator Aleksandr Zholkver, Moscow Domestic Service, 1 March 1990, in FBIS-SOV, 5 March 1990, 9; Captain M. Zheglov, "Voprosov bolshe, chem otvetov," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 4 March 1990, 3.

48. Falin's interview, "Sicherheitsbalance—Kern der deutschen Frage," *Neues Deutschland*, 9 February 1990, 6.

49. Proekter interviewed by A. Bogomolov, "'Za' i 'protiv' edinoi Germanii," *Sovetskaya Rossia*, 28 February 1990. See also Bovin, Moscow Television Service, 3 March 1990, in FBIS-SOV, 5 March 1990, 4.

50. Gorbachev, ADN, 30 January 1990, in FBIS-SOV, 30 January 1990, 17.

51. Shevardnadze interviewed by G. Sidorova, "The Arithmetic of Open Skies," *New Times*, 27 February–5 March 1990, 9. For a detailed account of the Two-Plus-Four process, see Stephen Szabo, *The Diplomacy of German Unification* (New York: St. Martin's, 1992).

52. Gorbachev used this familiar Bush term to describe his own German policy. See Beschloss and Talbott, *At the Highest Levels*, 157.

53. See Moens, "American Diplomacy and German Unification," 534–535; and Gorbachev on Moscow Domestic Service, 9 February 1990, in FBIS-SOV, 21 February 1990, 51.

54. Shevardnadze interviewed by M. Yusin, "V mire vse menyaetsya s golovokruzhitelnoi bystrotoi," *Izvestia*, 19 February 1990, 5.

55. See Gorbachev on Moscow Domestic Service, 20 February 1990, in FBIS-SOV, 21 February 1990, 52. Shevardnadze noted Poland's "moral and juridical right" to participate in those talks addressing the security of neighboring states. TASS, 23 February 1990, in FBIS-SOV, 26 February 1990, 29.

56. Shevardnadze interviewed by M. Yusin, "V mire vse menyaetsya s golovokruzhitelnoi bystrotoi," *Izvestia*, 19 February 1990, 5. See also Falin's interview, "Für militärische Neutralität," *Der Spiegel*, 19 February 1990, 168–172; and the Europe Institute's Sergei Karaganov, "Top Priority," Moscow International Service, 23 February 1990, in FBIS-SOV, 26 February 1990, 7.

57. Gerasimov on TASS, 10 February 1990, in FBIS-SOV, 12 February 1990, 46.

58. Shevardnadze in TASS, 2 February 1990, in FBIS-SOV, 5 February 1990, 34; and Falin in "Für militärische Neutralität," 171.

59. Gorbachev on Moscow Domestic Service, 20 February 1990, in FBIS-SOV, 21 February 1990, 51. For conservative opposition to the Two-Plus-Four approach, see Yevgeni Babenko, TASS, 21 February 1990, in FBIS-SOV, 22 February 1990, 1.

60. Falin, "Für militärische Neutralität," 171.

61. See, for instance, V. Korionov, "Zanaves podnyat . . .," *Pravda*, 2 March 1990, 5.

62. Modrow interview, "Nur in den Grenzen von heute," *Der Spiegel*, 4 December 1989, 46.

63. See the remarks of the SPD's Egon Bahr and Manfred Opel in "SPD-Politiker: Einheit kommt vor Bündistreu," *SZ*, 26 January 1990, 2; and Horst Ehmke, in Weymouth, "Germany's Urge to Merge," *Washington Post*, 4 March 1990, C4.

64. See, for example, Portugalov on Vienna Television Service, 20 March 1990, in FBIS-SOV, 21 March 1990, 26. Also Dashichev, interviewed by Manfred Schell, "A United Germany Must Be Bound Within the Framework of NATO," *Die Welt*, 20 March 1990, 9, in FBIS-SOV, 22 March 1990, 29. Daniel Proekter, an IMEMO scholar, had already admitted that German membership in NATO would "create certain difficulties, primarily of a moral and psychological nature." But he still advocated German participation similar to that of France. *Sovetskaya Rossia*, 28 February 1990, 5. Bovin had consistently called for Germany's inclusion in NATO. See "Evropa, Germania, my," *Izvestia*, 23 March 1990, 5.

65. Moens, "American Diplomacy and German Unification," 540.

66. See Beschloss and Talbott, *At the Highest Levels*, 233.

67. Listed in Adomeit, "Gorbachev and German Unification," 11.

68. Shevardnadze interviewed by F. Wechbach-Mara, "We Have Full Confidence in the German People," *Bild am Sonntag*, 8 July 1990, 4, in FBIS-SOV, 10 July 1990, 3.

69. Portugalov interviewed by K. Guensche, "Germany: Russians Are Looking for a Compromise," *Bild*, 2 July 1990, 4, in FBIS-SOV, 5 July 1990, 4. In March, Shevardnadze made a similar claim to Hungarian Foreign Minister Gyula Horn. Horn, *Die Freiheit, die ich meine*, 332.

70. Gorbachev, "Idti dalshe putem perestroiki," *Pravda*, 3 July 1990, 3.

71. Shevardnadze, *Pravda*, 5 July 1990, 2.

72. See, for instance, General Anatoli Martovitsky, DPA, 3 July 1990, in FBIS-SOV-S, 3 July 1990, 46. Major General Ivan Mikulin charged that "the European military balance has been seriously disturbed, a balance that has for long years served as a reliable basis for security on the continent." Moscow Television Service, 5 July 1990, in FBIS-SOV-S, 6 July 1990, 10.

73. Shevardnadze, *Pravda*, 11 July 1990, 6.

74. Falin, TASS, 12 July 1990, in FBIS-SOV-S, 13 July 1990, 42. Falin later charged that Shevardnadze had received "some sort of financial payoff," and blamed him for convincing Gorbachev to accept full German membership in NATO. See Beschloss and Talbott, *At the Highest Levels*, 240.

75. Falin, *Politische Erinnerungen*, 492-494; Kvitsinsky, *Vor dem Sturm*, 24; Portugalov, "Der Dornenweg zur Weltmacht," *Der Spiegel*, 8 October 1990, 186; and Beschloss and Talbott, *At the Highest Levels*, 186-187.

76. Beschloss and Talbott, *At the Highest Levels*, 220, 239-240. Falin validated this assumption. During a break in the party congress proceedings, he reiterated

his position that German membership in NATO was unacceptable. Cited in Teltschik, 329 *Tage*, 297-298.

77. Shevardnadze, *Pravda*, 11 July 1990, 6. Soviet conservatives remained unalterably opposed to Shevardnadze's position. Years later, Ligachev still contended that, "We could have used political and economic levers and our military presence in East Germany" to control the process of unification. Cited in Gabriel Partos, *The World That Came in from the Cold* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1993), 248.

78. Shevardnadze, *Pravda*, 5 July 1990, 2.

79. Beschloss and Talbott, *At the Highest Levels*, 232-233; and Teltschik, 329 *Tage*, 300.

80. Shevardnadze, *Pravda*, 11 July 1990, 6. Gorbachev spoke on London ITV Television Network, 6 June 1990, in FBIS-SOV, 10 July 1990, 4. See also Bovin's favorable assessment. "Signal iz Londona," *Izvestia*, 9 July 1990, 1, 4.

81. Beschloss and Talbott, for instance, labeled this moment the end of the Cold War. *At the Highest Levels*, 238.

82. Kohl referred to Gorbachev as a "good partner." DPA, 15 July 1990. Gorbachev used their first news conference to confirm that their good personal relationship was "facilitating the discussion of all issues." Moscow Television Service, 15 July 1990. Both in FBIS-SOV, 16 July 1990, 32-33.

83. See Teltschik, 329 *Tage*, 310.

84. Ye. Grigoryev, "C chem edet kantsler?," *Pravda*, 14 July 1990, 5.

85. Valentin Kopeltsev on ADN (East Berlin), 13 July 1990, in FBIS-SOV, 16 July 1990, 10.

86. See Moscow Domestic Service, 16 July 1990, in FBIS-SOV, 16 July 1990, 30.

87. See Teltschik, 329 *Tage*, 323-324; and Adomeit, "Gorbachev and German Unification," 10.

88. Kohl, *Pravda*, 18 July 1990, 5.

89. See Claus Gennrich, "Ein Gefühl, als könnte man Berge versetzen," *FAZ*, 18 July 1990, 3.

90. See Moens, "American Diplomacy and German Unification," 541.

91. Shevardnadze, *Pravda*, 5 July 1990, 2.

92. Beschloss and Talbott stressed this point. Given their focus on US-Soviet relations, they understandably emphasized Washington's decisive role in overcoming Gorbachev's reservations. *At the Highest Levels*, 232, 239.

93. Gorbachev, *Pravda*, 18 July 1990, 5.

94. For a contemporaneous example of moderate individuals critical of new thinking, see A. Kortunov and A. Izyumov, "Chto ponimat pod gosudarstvennymi interesami vo vneshney politike," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 11 July 1990, 14.

CHAPTER 7

1. Robert Legvold, "The Revolution in Soviet Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 68 (1988-1989): 83.

2. Hannes Adomeit was one of the few analysts to appreciate the importance of the conceptual changes. "Gorbachev and German Unification," *Problems of Communism* (July-August 1990): 7.

3. See John Keep, "Zheleznovodsk and After: Towards a New Russo-German Relationship," *East European Quarterly* 26 (January 1993): 435; Jeffrey Gedmin, *The Hidden Hand* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1992), 112-114; and Ronald Asmus, J. F. Brown, and Keith Crane, *Soviet Foreign Policy and the Revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1991), vi-vii.

4. See Keep, "Zheleznovosk and After," 436; Sodaro, *Moscow, Germany, and the West*, 365.

5. Yakovlev argued in early 1989 that although Soviet actions often came "under pressure from real, objective circumstances," the changes were "the result of a conscious decision made as a result of an interpretation of these circumstances." "Evropeiskaya tsivilizatsia i sovremennoye politicheskoye myshleniye," *Pravda*, 21 March, 1989, 4.

6. As Kvitsinsky later observed, German unification was "a defeat for the former Soviet policy in Europe, but it was the optimum solution for the Soviet Union under the new circumstances." Cited in Partos, *The World That Came in from the Cold*, 249. See also Nikolai Portugalov, "Der Dornenweg zur Weltmacht," *Der Spiegel*, 8 October 1990, 184.

7. See Keep, 431; and Laird, 173.

8. Horst Teltschik, 329 *Tage: Innenansichten der Einigung* (Berlin: Siedler, 1991), 323-324.

9. See Paul Quinn-Judge, "Gorbachev Hints at Troubles in Military," *Christian Science Monitor*, 19 July, 1989, 1-2.

10. In advance of the congress, Portugalov noted, "The settlement of the foreign policy aspects of German unification has a strong domestic policy component in our country. The conservatives in the CPSU are trying to forge an anti-perestroika appeal from this." Interviewed by Karl-Ludwig Guensche, "Germany: Russians Are Looking for a Compromise," *Bild*, 2 July 1990, 4, in FBIS-SOV-90-132, 10 July 1990, 3.

11. For a similar argument, see Mendelson, "Internal Battles and External Wars," 328-329.

12. Huntington, "Reform and Stability in South Africa," *International Security* 6 (Spring 1982): 14.

13. See Beschloss and Talbott, *At the Highest Levels*, 232-233. For a similar instance in US-Israeli relations, see Janice Gross Stein, "Domestic Politics and International Conflict Management," *International Security* 12 (Spring 1988): 205.

14. See Shevardnadze's favorable portrayal of NATO at the 28th Party Congress in July 1990. *Pravda*, 11 July 1990, 6.

15. See Shevardnadze, "Foreign Policy and Perestroika," *Pravda*, 24 October 1989, 2-4. The conservative attack came from V. I. Brovikov, the Soviet ambassador to Poland, at a central committee plenum. *Pravda*, 7 February 1990, 2.

16. See Falin's remarks concerning the process of German unification. "Für militärische Neutralität," *Der Spiegel*, 19 February 1990, 168-172.

17. See, for example, Gorbachev's remarks to West German business leaders. "Weitsichtig handelt, wer vorausschaut und ein gerechtfertigtes Risiko eingeht," in *Gorbatschow in Bonn: Die Zukunft der deutsch-sowjetischen Beziehungen* (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1989), 38-47.

Selected Bibliography

NEWSPAPERS AND TRANSLATION SERVICES: 1985-1994

Soviet newspapers: *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, *Izvestia*, *Krasnaya zvezda*, *Literaturnaya gazeta*, *Moskovskiy novosti*, *Pravda*, *Sovetskaya Rossia*.

US newspapers: *Christian Science Monitor*, *New York Times*, *Wall Street Journal*, *Washington Post*.

West German newspapers: *Bild*, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Frankfurter Rundschau*, *General Anzeiger*, *Kölnische Rundschau*, *Rheinischer Merkur*, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, *Die Welt*.

Translation services: Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS): daily Reports for the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Western Europe. Joint Publications Research Service.

MAJOR BOOKS AND ARTICLES

Adomeit, Hannes. "Gorbachev and German Unification: Revision of Thinking, Realignment of Power." *Problems of Communism* (July-August 1990): 1-23.

_____. "Soviet Policy Toward the United States and Western Europe: 'Atlanticism' Versus the 'Common Home'." In *Gorbachev and the Soviet Future*, edited by Lawrence Lerner and Donald Treadgold, 188-206. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988.