

Toward a New Transatlantic Compact

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Introduction and Overview

Toward a Dual-Path Agenda

A New Strategic Concept. NATO's strategic concept is the Alliance's capstone document for determining goals, requirements, and priorities—but the current strategic concept, produced in 1999, is outdated. It should be replaced by a clear and compelling statement of how NATO is to evolve in future years in its security policies, defense strategy, and military forces.

Historically, NATO strategic concepts have been difficult to write, but once completed they became vital focal points. NATO has successfully produced such a document on the average of once every decade. The time has come for another.

There has been resistance to writing a new strategic concept, particularly in Europe. This reflects both the complexity of the issues to be addressed and the upcoming change in administration in the United States. The Bucharest Summit took a step in the direction of a new strategic concept by calling for a “Declaration of Alliance Security” to be drafted at the April 2009 Summit. The Declaration would update NATO's vision of its strategic roles and preparedness standards in the early 21st century. Most observers see this Declaration as a precursor to the new strategic concept. This paper takes the view that a new strategic concept is required as an engine to help propel NATO into actually making the changes and reforms in its policies and capabilities that will be necessary if it is to effectively meet new-era challenges.

A Transatlantic Compact. Writing a new strategic concept, however, cannot be the only key step that the Atlantic Alliance takes to reform and revitalize itself while also solidifying its unity and public support. Because of its internal role in NATO's planning process, the strategic concept focuses mainly on military and defense issues. Today, the challenges facing the transatlantic partners go beyond these issues. They include wide-ranging political and security challenges that must be addressed by a larger agreement that goes beyond the traditional province of NATO's strategic concept. Indeed, the United States and its European allies will be hard-pressed to reach consensus on a new, sufficiently comprehensive NATO strategic concept unless they pursue a wider dialogue on these broader challenges. Equally important, the task facing the United States and its European allies is not only to energize and focus NATO, but also to energize and focus other key institutions, including the European Union (EU), and to determine how NATO is to work more closely in partnership with them.

For these reasons, efforts to write a new NATO strategic concept need to be embedded in parallel efforts to forge a new transatlantic compact, a solid political agreement, and broad-gauged understanding between the United States and its European allies regarding how they are to collaborate closely, especially politically, in future security affairs. Such a compact is needed to create the widespread consensus that makes a new NATO strategic concept not only possible, but also effective. In addition, it is needed to help the United States and Europe cooperate in larger ways that lie outside NATO and that employ the multiple additional instruments and activities at their disposal.

Delivering Both. Reaching agreement on a new transatlantic compact, along with a new NATO strategic concept, will require efforts to address three baskets of issues:

Basket 1: The need for agreement on new strategic missions facing the transatlantic community, to include homeland security, protection against the new challenges of political intimidation using energy cutoffs or cyber attacks, continued European unification and NATO enlargement, and performance of new expeditionary missions to deal with challenges to transatlantic peace that originate in distant areas.

Basket 2: The need for a set of processes and procedures for decisionmaking and policy implementation that take advantage of the full scope of transatlantic strengths, and include reaffirmation and strengthening of commitments to reciprocal multilateralism—close consultation, consensual decisionmaking, acceptance of responsibility, implementation of combined policies—as well as improved NATO-EU relations.

Basket 3: The need for improved U.S. and European capabilities for military expeditionary missions and comprehensive approaches that employ military and civilian instruments outside Europe.

If agreement on these complex issues can be reached, the payoffs could be substantial. These payoffs include common approaches toward a wide set of future strategic missions coupled with an improved capacity to carry out these missions through effective decisionmaking and policy implementation anchored in enhanced multilateral political collaboration and closer NATO-EU relations, as well as stronger capabilities for expeditionary missions, stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operations, and comprehensive approaches. These improvements, in turn, could help bring greater unity and effectiveness to NATO and the U.S.-European security partnership as a whole, while also benefiting NATO-EU relations and other areas of collaboration.

The combination of a new NATO strategic concept and a new transatlantic compact would not be a cure-all. But if they are well-prepared and purposefully acted on, they could help the United States, the European Union, and the Atlantic Alliance do a better job of performing key security and defense missions, protecting their interests in Europe and beyond, fostering peace and progress globally, and otherwise meeting their future strategic requirements.

Is Success Possible?

Can an effort to pursue this dual-path agenda succeed? Over the course of its long history, the Atlantic Alliance has handled many similar challenges and has guided dual-path agendas to successful outcomes. A good example is the dual-path process that was pursued in 1967 to write a new strategic concept (MC 14/3, the strategy of flexible response) and to issue the Harmel Report,¹ which addressed future political and strategic tasks of the Alliance, including simultaneous pursuit of enhanced defense preparedness and détente with the Soviet Union. The United States and its European allies collaborated closely in producing both key documents, and together they were instrumental in guiding the Alliance's political and military evolution in following years. Comparable success is possible again, if both sides of the Atlantic are similarly committed to the enterprise.

How can this dual-path agenda best be pursued today? A step-by-step process could begin with initial U.S.-European consultations on the basics of a new transatlantic compact, and then turn to an effort to write a new NATO strategic concept with a widely focused political and military framework, and then gradually expand the compact to other areas of U.S.-European collaboration in security affairs.

Alternatively, a grand summit process involving the United States, European countries, NATO, and the EU could be launched at the onset with the goal of forging a fully articulated transatlantic compact and related agreements. Afterward, NATO could write a new strategic concept that reflects this compact. Of these two alternatives, the former is more pragmatic and evolutionary,

¹ For more on the Harmel Report, see Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler, *Dual-Track Transformation for NATO*, Defense Horizons 35 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2003), 11.

and perhaps more flexible; the latter is more ambitious and front-loaded, and perhaps harder to carry out successfully.

This paper's dual-path agenda rejects the argument that NATO and the entire Atlantic Alliance are doomed to a future of indecision, drift, and strategic ineffectiveness. Instead, it judges that the United States and its European allies can pursue a renewed NATO and a revitalized Euro-Atlantic partnership at the same time. The key to success is to employ wisdom and vision as both paths are pursued, with the purposes and actions of each path influenced by those of the other.

Organization

This paper calls for a new NATO strategic concept and a new transatlantic compact, and envisions crafting them in tandem. Both are needed because they are intended to perform separate but interdependent functions. Whereas a new strategic concept would help energize NATO, a new transatlantic compact would help energize the overall U.S.-European partnership. Together, they would have a compounding effect, because each would reinforce and amplify the other.

Part I examines the idea of writing a new NATO strategic concept. It begins with a historical appraisal aimed at drawing lessons from how NATO successfully wrote and implemented six strategic concepts during the Cold War and afterward. It then examines reasons why the current strategic concept of 1999 is outdated and needs replacement. It concludes with observations on the organizational and political mechanisms that can be employed for writing a new strategic concept.

Part II examines the idea of preparing a transatlantic compact, and is entirely forward-looking. It begins by discussing the nature of such a compact, and then examines at some length the three baskets of issues that must be addressed by this compact. It concludes by discussing how the process of crafting such a transatlantic compact, along with a new NATO strategic concept, might unfold.

Both parts examine issues, options, and controversies in ways intended to help identify and evaluate the challenges and opportunities facing NATO and the U.S.-European security partnership in the years ahead. They conclude that the idea of pursuing this ambitious dual-path agenda offers considerable promise, if the United States and Europe work closely and intently on making the final product successful and worthwhile. To be sure, this is a demanding agenda, but it is one that is required by the challenges and imperatives ahead.

Part I: Writing a New NATO Strategic Concept

Writing a new NATO strategic concept is a longstanding approach to updating the security policies of the Atlantic Alliance in ways that help set the stage for concrete actions and improvements. The decision on whether to do so again is an important one. NATO's strategic concept serves as a capstone document for identifying key threats and dangers ahead as well as the Alliance's core requirements, goals, principles, and tasks. It plays an instrumental role in shaping not only the Alliance's overall security policy, but also its defense planning priorities. NATO cannot function effectively without a sound strategic concept.

Critics of the idea of writing a new concept argue that the effort will be too divisive and that the Alliance should instead focus on improving its daily practices rather than debating its strategic theories. Our argument is that marginal changes are inadequate; a new strategic concept is needed to address a new strategic situation, one that has changed radically since the 1999 Washington summit and will continue to change for years to come. Moreover, NATO's history of adopting new strategic concepts is encouraging and should give us the confidence to continue adapting the Alliance to changing circumstances.

Since its inception in 1949, NATO has negotiated and written six strategic concepts, four of them under great stress during the Cold War, and two since the end of the Cold War. In each case, NATO encountered tough debates among its members but was able to use its analytical talents, institutional mechanisms, and consensus-building procedures to forge widespread agreement for new strategic concepts that provided sound visions for the years ahead. Once these new strategic concepts were adopted, they played critical roles in enhancing NATO's performance in security policy and defense planning. To no small degree, NATO owes its success to its ability to formulate strategic concepts adapted to changing security conditions.

Those positive experiences can be repeated, if NATO decides to write a new strategic concept aimed at putting forth a coherent vision of how the Alliance should act in the coming years in such critical areas as establishing core goals and requirements, reaffirming the transatlantic link, unifying Europe and enlarging NATO, countering new threats, creating new cooperative relationships and comprehensive approaches, dealing with the Middle East, guiding NATO's growing operations in distant areas, and transforming NATO's military forces. NATO's upcoming summit of 2009 provides an opportunity to initiate the review process for preparing a new strategic concept, which could be adopted at a special summit shortly afterward, or at the next regularly scheduled summit in 2011. Regardless of the timing of its adoption, a new NATO strategic concept is needed soon, both to equip NATO with the strategic theories that will be needed in the challenging times ahead, and to help guide its growing missions and activities in multiple new areas.

Pros and Cons of Writing a New Strategic Concept

Writing and adopting a new strategic concept would be a laborious endeavor requiring the building of consensus among NATO's many members, including new members. There are arguments for and against this step, all of which merit consideration. Proponents of this idea marshal several arguments for it:

1. The existing strategic concept has been overtaken by events to the point where it allegedly can no longer guide the Alliance's policies and activities in future years.
2. Today, NATO suffers from inadequate strategic vision and is pursuing multiple activities that badly stretch the boundaries of the existing strategic concept, and

additional new activities lie ahead, all of which must be blended to form a coherent whole.

3. Currently, NATO suffers from a serious lack of support in public opinion on both sides of the Atlantic, a gap that reflects lack of widespread support for common security policies. A new strategic concept could help shore up support for the Alliance.

4. Achieving Alliance-wide cooperation on NATO's future security policies and defense plans will require agreement on a new, updated strategic concept that reflects the tumultuous changes of recent years, as well as developments that lie ahead.

5. An effort to write a new and better strategic concept can be carried out successfully, and the final product can be expected to fulfill its purpose of providing NATO the strategic guidance that is needed in an international era of change, complexity, and danger.

6. A new strategic concept presumably will help enhance NATO's performance, especially in carrying out new tasks and missions, by enabling the Alliance to create new capabilities and resolve.

7. Although deep political divisions emerged over the invasion of Iraq in 2003—pitting the United States and Britain against France and Germany—these disputes reportedly have healed among participating governments to the point where cooperation among these and other countries in writing a new strategic concept is becoming possible.

Critics of the idea marshal several arguments against it:

1. NATO is still too divided internally and uncertain of its strategic priorities to take this step.

2. The act of trying to write a new strategic concept will generate so much political controversy and infighting that it cannot successfully produce a worthy product.

3. The effort will cause so much political fragmentation among members that it will do more harm than good to NATO's cohesion and its ability to act with unity and coherence.

4. A new strategic concept is not needed because the existing concept still suffices, when augmented by recent summit communiqués and related documents, as a guide to NATO's priorities and plans.

5. In recent years NATO has demonstrated a capacity to pursue new capabilities and operations without the benefit of an updated strategic concept.

6. Even if a strategic concept is adopted, it will not produce significant improvements through normal mechanisms, such as summit declarations and NATO's internal planning processes.

7. NATO can strengthen its performance by focusing on practical steps, rather than debating about its strategic theory in ways that potentially could stretch NATO's internal consensus beyond its limits.

8. This is not a good time to write a new strategic concept, because the Bush Administration is nearing the end of its tenure, and a new administration will not have defined its own strategic priorities for a year or more.

The central issue is not the need for a new strategic concept, but whether NATO currently is up to the task of producing it. The arguments against taking this step have practical impediments on their side and raise valid points about the tradeoffs that must be addressed and the troubles and pitfalls that can be encountered when a new strategic concept is written. As critics suggest, success is not a foregone conclusion, tough negotiations and compromising could be required, and if the process is mishandled, the result could be frustrating and even do more harm than good.

Throughout its long history, NATO has written new strategic concepts six times, as new security and defense conditions mandated change. On each occasion, NATO encountered strong objections to change. Each effort produced political controversies about the issues and options at stake. Each time, NATO was able to employ its analytical talents, institutional mechanisms, and consensus-building procedures to produce widespread agreement on a fresh strategic concept that met the requirements of the times and produced favorable consequences that were instrumental to NATO's evolution as an effective alliance during the Cold War and afterward. This history shows that, while writing new strategic concepts often has been difficult and contentious, it normally turned out to be a salutary exercise of renewal and innovation in which the benefits achieved surpassed the costs borne along the way. This history does not guarantee that NATO will succeed again, but it does suggest that NATO should not be frightened by the prospect, or doubt its capacity to produce a worthy product if its members work constructively together.

NATO's Historical Experiences with New Strategic Concepts

NATO's experiences with writing new strategic concepts provide a rich legacy from which insights can be drawn about the analytical, institutional, and political dynamics of the process. The first four strategic concepts were written during the Cold War (1949–1991), and the final two afterward.

- DC 6/1 Initial Strategy of Deterrence and Defense Specialization (1949–1951) called on NATO members to cooperate to develop adequate forces for defending Europe and to create coordinated plans for employing these forces in the event deterrence failed but did not produce an integrated plan for achieving these goals. Instead, it crafted a loose collection of principles for coordinating efforts by member nations. In essence, it called for an alliance based on national specialization and a division of labor rather than a uniform distribution of military missions.
- MC 14/1 NATO Defense Buildup and Collective Defense (1951–1957) abandoned the old precept of defense specialization in favor of collective defense, integrated military formations under NATO commanders, and a theater-wide perspective. It relied on American strategic nuclear bombardment and Alliance-wide mobilization to achieve ultimate victory in a war, but it also included plans for strengthening NATO's in-being continental forces.
- MC 14/2 Strategy of Massive Retaliation (1957–1967) responded to Soviet assertiveness and military buildup, particularly in nuclear weapons, by anchoring NATO defense plans on a large-scale theater nuclear operation backed by a massive nuclear blow against the Soviet Union in event of war with the aim of deterring any form of aggression.
- MC 14/3 Strategy of Flexible Response (1967–1991) was prepared out of concern that over-reliance on deterrence by strategic nuclear forces might invite Soviet conventional attack on much weaker NATO conventional forces; it embraced strengthened forward defenses and an escalatory ladder to massive retaliation.
- The strategic concept of Rome Summit (1991–1999) focused on the post-Cold War risks facing the alliance, the importance of “soft power” to deal with those risks, and the continuing importance of the alliance.
- The strategic concept of Washington Summit (1999–present) made clear that NATO defense planning had shifted away from traditional preoccupation with border defense missions and toward multiple new missions, many conducted under Article 4.

The current strategic concept is addressed below. The first five strategic concepts are discussed in detail in the appendix. For each strategic concept, the narrative briefly describes the security

conditions that gave rise to it, the principal participants and associated Alliance politics that helped shape it, its main contents, and the strategic consequences that flowed from it.

What enduring lessons can be derived from NATO's historical experiences with its strategic concepts? The first is that NATO strategic concepts face both outward and inward. They face outward by defining new threats, dangers, challenges, and opportunities, and by providing guidance on how NATO should act. They face inward by mobilizing widespread, Alliance-wide consensus among NATO's members regarding mutual obligations, multinational priorities, national roles and missions, and fair burden-sharing.

In addition to re-establishing the transatlantic link on new terms, a NATO strategic concept helps forge an all-important coherent relationship between NATO's overall security policy, defense strategy, and military forces. It provides the rationale for new departures and methods for incorporating them. By establishing key principles, tasks, requirements, and responsibilities, it also helps determine how NATO members are to act together so that Alliance borders are protected and common goals, interests, and values are advanced. A strategic concept helps build the core theories from which multifaceted Alliance practices can be determined and coordinated.

A second lesson is that NATO has had favorable experiences with its previous strategic concepts. These concepts had varying life spans and impacts, all of them were transient, and none of them were perfect, but each contributed materially to NATO's effectiveness and its ability to achieve core security goals. Successive strategic concepts built on each other in ways that enabled NATO gradually to acquire growing focus, strength, and resolve, while shifting gears and directions as the emerging situations warranted. NATO began slowly early in the Cold War, but steadily gained momentum to eventually become the world's most effective alliance. In no small measure, this positive outcome owes to the legacy of NATO's strategic concepts.

A third lesson is that no strategic concept is timeless. Each is written in response to existing and forecasted conditions in security and defense affairs, all serve for a period of time, and all become outmoded when conditions change. Normally NATO waited until the existing strategic concept was reaching the end of its natural life span in the eyes of most NATO members, and after concrete activities suggesting the basic contents of a new strategic concept were already being pursued. This was the case for MC 14/3; NATO already had been pursuing practical steps to bolster its conventional forces and broaden its options for a few years before MC 14/3 was written. A new strategic concept was written when improved strategic guidance was needed to carry out major decisions that had to be made in the near future—and when NATO members were willing to support it.

A fourth lesson is that although the intra-Alliance politics of writing new strategic concepts can be difficult, they are not only manageable, but also potentially healthy. Each time that NATO set out to write new strategic concepts, it faced a plethora of disagreements and conflicts among its members, coupled with understandable worries that the act of debating alternative strategic theories would rupture the Alliance's allegedly fragile cohesion. Yet, NATO chose to act anyway, and although plenty of debates regularly erupted, such fracturing never occurred. Indeed, NATO always emerged with a fresh consensus and a stronger sense of solidarity than before. The act of writing new strategic concepts set aside old, outmoded theories that themselves would likely have eroded NATO's cohesion had they been allowed to remain in force. In their place came an effort to erect new strategic theories that met the demands of changing times. The subsequent debates often were stressful, but they became engines of renewal and innovation that allowed a new consensus to form around new policies, strategies, and plans. Had NATO not chosen to embark on these debates, it would have been mired in stasis, and it never would have created the succession of strategic theories that allowed it to grow and flourish.

A fifth lesson is that although past strategic concepts have helped create policies and strategies that enabled NATO to address threats to Alliance security, they also have been especially influential in helping the Alliance address its defense preparedness requirements and agenda. In this capacity, strategic concepts have provided the guidance needed by NATO military authorities to help shape Alliance-wide force improvement efforts. In essence, they provided a framework for shaping subsidiary Military Committee planning documents (e.g., MC 48, 299, 317, and 400), and the NATO force planning process, including ministerial guidance to members, country plans of members, and NATO reviews of country plans. The effect was to help blend the separate military forces of members into an integrated multinational posture that could better meet NATO military requirements as they evolved during the Cold War and beyond. Without such guidance from strategic concepts, NATO doubtless would have been less militarily prepared throughout its long history, and thus less secure against threats and dangers as they evolved.

A sixth lesson is that NATO has had successful experiences with pursuing dual-path agendas to reaching agreement on how to handle difficult strategic challenges. This was clearly the case when, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, NATO chose to pursue both defense improvements and détente. Whereas MC14/3 guided NATO's new military strategy and improvements, the Harmel Report and succeeding policies helped determine how détente and arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union were to be pursued in tandem. Another example is the experience of the 1980s, when NATO pursued the two paths of deploying Pershing II and GLCM missiles while also entering into LRINF negotiations with the Soviet Union in an effort to achieve complete removal of such missiles from the inventories of both sides. In both cases, NATO would not have been able to attain its goals by pursuing only one path or the other, but did succeed by pursuing both paths concurrently.

A seventh, final lesson is that when controversies arise, the process of writing new strategic concepts must be handled wisely and effectively—as regularly was done in the past. NATO's history shows that this process has three dimensions: institutional, analytical, and political. In today's world, strategic concepts are political-military documents. Main institutional responsibility for writing and coordinating them lies with the NATO Secretary General and his subordinate staffs in Brussels, including the Military Committee, but historical experience shows the wisdom of drawing on national capitals for their ideas and inputs. Traditionally the United States has been a source of leadership in this arena, but such other members as Britain, Germany, and France have regularly contributed as well. On at least two occasions, NATO has created outside committees of “wise men” to help write new strategic concepts and associated studies, and if contemporary circumstances warrant this step, it could be employed again.

Regardless of who performs the writing and coordinating, historical experience also shows the importance of ensuring that the new strategic concept rests on sound analytical foundations regarding how dangers and challenges are assessed, multiple goals are balanced and prioritized, and supporting policies, strategies, and plans are evaluated. NATO's long-standing insistence on sound analysis is a key reason why strategic concepts have been effective documents that helped end debates about their contents. Likewise the political process—the act of forging unanimous consensus and NAC approval—is highly important, for unless the new strategic concept commands widespread support among NATO's members, it will not be adopted by the NAC, and if it is adopted, it will not be implemented enthusiastically. Throughout its history, NATO has shown skill at handling this political process in ways that produced both high substantive content and internal consensus. The political dynamic of forging consensus often requires intense negotiating, bargaining, and compromising: a central task is to ensure that these mechanisms enhance the quality of the new strategic concept, not detract from it. These three interlocking dimensions make the process of adopting a new NATO strategic concept challenging, but as

history shows, NATO has mastered them before, and today it still possesses the tools to master them again.

Post-Cold War Strategic Concepts

The Rome Strategic Concept was the last Strategic Concept to refer to the Soviet Union. It was announced on November 8, 1991, almost exactly two years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and exactly one month before five Soviet republics signed an agreement² that effectively ended the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Over the next three weeks, a series of formal steps progressively eliminated components of the Soviet apparatus. By the end of the year, the republics had taken over all functions of government, and Soviet rule was officially extinct; thus ended the threat that had brought NATO into being.

The changed security environment wrought by the rise of Yeltsin and the decline of Gorbachev and the Soviet Communist Party—and by the reunification of Germany—was reflected in the language of the 1991 Strategic Concept. Even though the Soviet Union still existed, the term *threat* was applied historically. Looking ahead, NATO saw *risks*, but no state with the Soviet Union's ability or intent to pose a threat to Europe. Those risks were “adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in central and eastern Europe.” NATO might also face problems beyond Europe's borders. “The stability and peace of the countries on the southern periphery of Europe are important for the security of the Alliance, as the 1991 Gulf war has shown,” and “the build-up of military power and the proliferation of weapons technologies” in that area was a matter of concern. The Alliance also needed to “take account of the global context” because “security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism and sabotage.” The possibility that terrorists might acquire WMD was not addressed.

The thrust of the Rome strategic concept was that the importance of “soft power” had increased and the role of military power had changed.³ Allied forces were to be “adapted to provide capabilities that can contribute to protecting peace, managing crises that affect the security of Alliance members, and preventing war. Thus, “[t]he overall size of the Allies' forces, and in many cases their readiness, will be reduced.” With the decline in importance of armed forces—and the reduced importance of American strategic forces—Europe would assume a larger share of a lighter burden. To offset reduced expenditure, “collective defence arrangements will rely increasingly on multinational forces, complementing national commitments to NATO,” and interoperability of forces assumed a new importance. It had become possible to “draw all the consequences from the fact that security and stability have political, economic, social, and environmental elements as well as the indispensable defence dimension.”

In 1991, NATO faced “a great deal of uncertainty about the future and risks to the security of the Alliance,” with optimism. The possibility that failed states and non-state actors could challenge the international system was not contemplated at the Rome Summit.

² The Belavezha Accords, signed on December 8, 1991, by the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus effectively dissolved the Soviet Union; on Christmas Day, Mikhail Gorbachev resigned as president of the USSR and dissolved the office; the next day, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dissolved itself.

³ The term *soft power*, coined by Joseph Nye the year before the Rome strategic concept was drafted, aptly describes the new emphasis of the concept but was not used in the document. See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990).

In 1999, the NATO strategic concept approved by the 1991 Rome Summit was replaced by a new strategic concept that was adopted at the Washington Summit. The decision to write a new strategic concept, undertaken after some debate, reflected a broad agreement that so much had changed since 1991 that NATO needed to recast its strategic principles. The process of drafting and coordinating was primarily carried out by NATO Headquarters, led by the International Staff, the International Military Staff, and the Military Committee, with strong input from NATO military commanders. Member countries played active roles, marked by vigorous participation by the United States, France, and others. Intense debates swirled over such issues as the balance between Article 5 and non-Article 5 missions,⁴ the goals of NATO enlargement, whether NATO was willing to perform security missions outside Europe, the European security identity, and the principles of legitimacy and UN mandates for NATO operations beyond its borders. These debates raged until the eve of the Washington Summit, but ultimately NAC agreed on a new strategic concept that ran fully twenty pages, ten devoted to security policy and ten to NATO defense strategy and military forces.⁵

The Washington concept stated that NATO's core strategic purposes are to safeguard the freedom and security of its members by political and military means, help promote a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe anchored in a stable security architecture, preserve the transatlantic link that binds the United States to Europe, and maintain Alliance cohesion and unity so that all members are protected equally.

To serve these purposes, the concept called for NATO to perform five fundamental security tasks: security, consultation, deterrence, defense, crisis management, and partnership. Surveying the Euro-Atlantic area, the Washington concept declared that developments in recent years have been generally positive, and that NATO has made progress in working with other institutions, such as the EU/WEU, OSCE, and the UN, in helping promote peace and security while bringing greater stability to the Balkans. The concept also portrayed a future of risks and dangers, including regional crises at the periphery of the Alliance, ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, abuses of human rights, failed states, WMD proliferation, terrorism, and threats to energy security. It further noted that while NATO borders might be directly menaced by some of these dangers, external threats could affect Alliance security interests. Accordingly, the Washington concept put forth a broad approach to security in the 21st century that combined defense preparedness with appropriate attention to political, economic, social, and environmental factors. NATO, it said, must carry out a demanding set of activities: maintain its military prowess, be prepared for conflict prevention and crisis management in and around Europe that might be carried out under Article 4, pursue partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with Russia, Ukraine, and the Mediterranean region, begin the process of enlargement by admitting new members, and pursue arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation.

⁴ Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that: "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

"Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security." Full text of the North Atlantic Treaty is available at <<http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/treaty.htm>>.

⁵ See *The Alliance's Strategic Concept* (Brussels, Belgium: NATO Headquarters, 1999), available at <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>>.

In the defense arena, the Washington concept declared that, while NATO must retain strong forces for Article 5 missions in defense of Alliance borders in the remote event of a major attack on them, it must also be prepared to carry out non-Article 5 missions, including partnership-building, engagement, peacekeeping, and crisis response operations that might be as big as Article 5 missions. It further said that NATO forces should be prepared to support, on the basis of separable but not separate capabilities, operations by the EU/WEU. Accordingly the Washington concept called for a properly prepared conventional force posture that would be maintained at tiered readiness levels, with limited forces that could react quickly backed by larger forces that could be mobilized over a longer period of time. These conventional forces, it said, must be equipped with necessary capabilities in such areas as command and control structures, advanced weapons, training and exercises, combat formations, deployability, logistic support, and sustainment. In establishing these guidelines, the Washington concept made clear that NATO defense planning had shifted away from traditional preoccupation with border defense missions and toward multiple new missions, many conducted under Article 4. But, apart from noting NATO's military presence in the Balkans—the Kosovo war was being waged when the Washington summit took place—the new strategic concept was vague on the geographic regions in which NATO's future operations might take place and the force preparedness standards that should guide NATO military planning. Important details in the defense arena were left to a temporary High Level Steering Group (HLSG) charged with overseeing implementation of the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) issued by the Washington summit.⁶

Utility of the Washington Strategic Concept. How has the Washington concept fared thus far? While it identified terrorism as a future threat, it did not contemplate terrorist attacks of the kind inflicted on the United States on September 11, 2001, or the dramatic events that followed from those attacks. In important ways, these events brought an end to the previous era and ushered in a new international security system. During the 1990s, NATO was mainly preoccupied with Alliance enlargement and related security affairs in the Euro-Atlantic area. The post-9/11 security environment expanded NATO concerns to global threats in the form of terrorists with intercontinental reach, potentially aggressive rogue states, and accelerating WMD proliferation. The Washington concept also elevated the importance of the Greater Middle East in global affairs and in NATO's own priorities for homeland security and power projection.

The Washington concept has played a positive role in several arenas since its adoption. Under its auspices, NATO finally won the Kosovo war of 1999. After Serbian troops left the province, NATO established the KFOR peacekeeping force there to help keep the peace, and KFOR troops remain there today. Overall, the Washington concept gets a fair share of credit for NATO's enduring efforts to maintain peace in Bosnia and Kosovo and play a constructive role in the Balkans. Although the Washington concept did not provide detailed guidance on further NATO enlargement (beyond the original three countries admitted), it provided authoritative support for NATO's subsequent decision to admit seven new members, thus expanding membership to 26 countries. NATO enlargement, in turn, helped lay a security foundation for a mostly parallel enlargement by the EU. The combined effect of NATO and EU enlargement has been to make Europe a safer, more democratic continent.

In the defense arena, the DCI failed to meet its original promises, but at the Prague Summit of 2002, NATO took important steps to increase preparedness for new missions: it created the Allied Command Transformation (ACT), launched creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF), and endorsed the Prague Capability Commitment (PCC) to replace the DCI. In the aftermath came measures by several European members to accelerate improvements of their military forces for new missions. The Washington concept deserves some credit for these steps, even though they

⁶ The text of the April 25, 1999, Defense Capabilities Initiative is available at <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99s069e.htm>>.

responded to new security conditions and goals that were not fully anticipated by it. Finally, the Washington concept provided a backdrop for NATO's decision to take command of ISAF in Afghanistan and to send 25,000 European troops there. But here again, NATO's growing role in Afghanistan was a response to security conditions that were anticipated by the Washington concept only in general terms. The writers of the Washington concept could not have known that, within a few years, NATO would be intervening in Afghanistan, coping with threats of major terrorist attacks, and otherwise grappling with a world that had become far more dangerous than was commonly perceived in 1999.

Relevance Today. In recent years, NATO has embarked on many new endeavors that stretch, if not violate, the outer boundaries of the strategic principles and policies envisioned by the Washington concept. For example, the Washington concept envisioned operations outside the Euro-Atlantic region as taking place under Article 4, not Article 5. Events since 2001, however, have shown that such external dangers as terrorism and WMD proliferation pose genuine Article 5 threats that can mandate not just consultations, but a collective defense response. The Washington concept was largely blind not only to the looming prospect of global terrorism, but also to the menaces posed by radical Islamic fundamentalism and an increasingly unstable Middle East and surrounding regions. Today, NATO is grappling with these threats through complex strategic responses—a fusion of military, political, and economic power—that were not envisioned, much less specifically mandated, by the Washington concept. Indeed, NATO's official communiqués at Prague, Istanbul, and Riga read as though they respond to challenges and imperatives almost wholly different from those animated by the Washington concept.

If the Washington concept already seems outdated when judged in relation to activities that NATO has been pursuing in recent years, the same judgment holds doubly true when applied to the future.

Concepts are overtaken by new events in such areas as fresh threats and security goals as well as new technologies and force priorities. While the future is murky, NATO seems destined to become a different alliance a decade from now than is the case today. New strategic policies and strategies will be needed: e.g., to help coordinate actions by NATO and the EU, to deal with terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, to help stabilize the greater Middle East, to cope with an increasingly troublesome Russia, to build missile defenses, and to continue transforming NATO's military forces so they can better perform new expeditionary missions. Simply stated, the Washington concept no longer can serve to address these demands, much less provide authoritative strategic guidance on how NATO can best handle them. If the Washington concept is not replaced by a new and better concept, one aligned with the changed strategic environment, NATO will increasingly be left without a map or compass, or even a clear destination. Guidance will come in the form of periodic summit communiqués and related documents that lack the authoritativeness of strategic concepts.

Conditions are Right for a New Concept. Thus, the central issue is not whether NATO needs a new strategic concept. It does. The issue is whether political conditions within the Alliance are favorable for writing a new concept that combines coherent vision with internal consensus. Critics of writing a new concept believe that key NATO members—the United States, Britain, Germany and France—are still too much at loggerheads to permit constructive dialogue among them, and are not yet sufficiently responsive to the needs of new members. While the concerns of these critics are understandable, political tempers within the Alliance have cooled considerably since the low point of 2003, when the invasion of Iraq was launched in the face of widespread opposition. Since then, the United States has learned difficult lessons about the limits of military intervention in the Middle East and has been working hard to repair transatlantic political relations. Moreover, Britain, Germany, and France are under new leaders who have expressed

commitment to building close ties with the United States. In Germany, Chancellor Angela Merkel's policies point toward restored U.S.-German relationships in key areas. In France, President Nicolas Sarkozy's foreign policy offers opportunities to achieve agreement on NATO policies. Nor are these positive signs confined to atmospherics. The common transatlantic ground that has been achieved in guiding NATO's intervention in Afghanistan, and in pursuing cooperative diplomacy toward Iran, suggest that similar cooperation might be possible in writing a new strategic concept.

Process and Timelines

What process should be employed in writing a new NATO strategic concept? Past experience has shown that success can be achieved by tasking NATO Headquarters, under leadership of the NATO Secretary General, to handle the drafting and coordinating process. But NATO's key members must play principal contributing roles too by submitting their own analyses and evaluations. The need for strong multinational contributions applies to the United States, and it also applies to such important members as Britain, Germany, France, and others. The presence of multiple actors inevitably complicates the process of achieving agreement on the final product, but this is the best vehicle for ensuring that when a new strategic concept is written, it will have high substantive content, express the views of multiple national capitals, gain widespread support at the NAC, and be enthusiastically implemented once adopted. If necessary, an unofficial team of outside "wise men" can be employed to prepare an initial draft that can then be used by NATO Headquarters and member nations to help launch the writing of a final product. Regardless of the exact process employed, writing a new strategic concept will stand the best chance of succeeding if the Alliance makes good use of its analytical talents, institutional mechanisms, and consensus-building procedures that have worked well so often in the past.

What should be the contents of a new NATO strategic concept? While this question will be addressed in detail in Part II's treatment of key baskets of issues, suffice here to say that at a minimum, a new strategic concept should bring the Alliance up to date with goals, policies, and practices that have been adopted since the Washington concept was adopted. Beyond this, a new strategic concept should be forward looking. It should endeavor to determine basic directions that NATO security policy and defense strategy should be taking for the next 5–10 years, which promise to be a period of major changes in global security affairs. Perhaps most important, a new NATO strategic concept must be sufficiently wide-ranging and comprehensive in ways that cover the ever-widening spectrum of challenges, missions, and priorities ahead. For understandable reasons, past NATO strategic concepts have mainly focused on military and defense issues. Such issues must be addressed again in sufficient detail, but a new strategic concept must also be equipped with a robust political framework.

What timelines should NATO follow? While NATO should act promptly, it should also act in measured ways to ensure that a new strategic concept is well-conceived. In the past, typically several months have been required to carry out the entire exercise of analysis, writing, and consensus-building. The NATO Summit of 2009 offers an opportunity to launch the process of review and evaluation under direction of the NATO Secretary General. This process could have two parallel tracks: a formal track carried out at NATO Headquarters and in consultation with member governments, and an informal track of conferences and workshops that draw on the ideas and insights of outside experts. Once these two efforts have produced agreement on main themes and contents, the task of drafting the new strategic concept and coordinating it among member governments can begin. Perhaps the new strategic concept could be adopted at a special summit held in 2010, or at the next regularly scheduled summit in 2011. Regardless of the summit chosen, the key point is that NATO does need to make the writing of a new strategic concept a main item on its agenda in the period ahead.

Part II: Forging a New Transatlantic Compact

Although launching an effort to write a new NATO strategic concept is imperative, it should not be the only vehicle for seeking to impart the Atlantic Alliance with greater unity, energy, and purpose in dealing with contemporary security affairs. NATO's strategic concept traditionally has focused on military and defense issues. Today the Alliance faces wide-ranging political and security challenges that must be addressed by a larger framework that extends well beyond the traditional province of NATO's strategic concept. Indeed, the United States and its European allies will be hard-pressed to reach consensus on a new, sufficiently comprehensive NATO strategic concept unless they pursue a wider dialogue on these broader challenges. Equally important, the task facing the United States and its European allies is to energize not only NATO, but also other key institutions, including the EU, and to determine how NATO is to work more closely in partnership with these bodies.

Accordingly, efforts to write a new NATO strategic concept should be embedded in parallel efforts to craft a new "transatlantic compact," one that addresses the fundamentals of U.S.-European political cooperation. This compact would cover the totality of the U.S.-European partnership in security affairs, and thereby provide a coherent, overarching framework for determining how NATO, the EU, and other common institutions and activities are to work together.

This section begins by discussing the nature of such a transatlantic compact and the reasons for embarking on an effort to craft it. Next, it examines three baskets of issues that will need to be addressed by this compact as well as by a new NATO strategic concept, including new strategic missions for the partnership, principles of decisionmaking and policy implementation that include reaffirmation and strengthening of common commitments to reciprocal multilateralism and closer NATO-EU relations, and improved Alliance capabilities for expeditionary missions and comprehensive approaches. Finally, it concludes by offering alternative suggestions for how this dual agenda can be pursued in today's political climate, either through grand U.S.-European summitry from the outset, or by first writing a new NATO strategic concept and then seeking to gradually apply the new transatlantic compact to other arenas of U.S.-European collaboration.

Essence of a New Transatlantic Compact

A compact can be a diplomatic treaty, such as the Washington Treaty that created NATO in 1949, or something far less formal, for example, a political agreement issued as a special communiqué by governments at a summit meeting. Regardless of its exact form, a compact is a firm agreement that reflects a harmony of opinion among the parties, creates mutual obligations, and joins the parties together to pursue common goals and agreed actions. In the case of the United States and its European allies, a new diplomatic treaty may not be required, but forging a solid political accord on how they can cooperate more effectively in strategic terms is.

Reaching agreement on such a compact is both desirable and necessary to enable the United States and its European allies to collaborate more closely. In important ways, the United States and Europe share many common interests, values, and goals in dealing with contemporary international security affairs. They also share many similar diagnoses of the problems and challenges confronting them in Europe and elsewhere. These similar diagnoses have resulted in collaboration in such places as Kosovo and Afghanistan, in pursuing common diplomacy toward Iran and other trouble spots, and in seeking to harmonize their approaches toward NATO and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). But despite these similar diagnoses, the United States and Europe often embrace different prescriptive solutions and pursue different policies and practices in handling global challenges. Magnifying these different approaches are dissimilar

attitudes toward a host of subsidiary issues, including threat perceptions in various regions, the use of military power and other instruments, distribution of responsibilities and authorities for strategic missions, fair burden-sharing, approaches for employing NATO and the EU, and stances toward building improved capabilities. All of these issues create thorny problems, but many of them may be resolvable, or at least differences can be narrowed appreciably, if the United States and European countries employ diplomatic outreach toward each other in a spirit of collaboration and compromise.

A governing strategic reality, as true today as during the Cold War, is that close partnership between the United States and Europe can help magnify the power and effectiveness of both sides of the Atlantic, thereby enabling each participant to achieve its core purposes more effectively, and more cheaply, than otherwise would be the case. A renewed, energized, and mutually beneficial partnership requires a transatlantic compact to provide not only agreement on common missions and associated policies, but also an accord on processes and procedures for decisionmaking and policy implementation that take full advantage of transatlantic strengths. Such an accord needs to reaffirm and strengthen key principles of alliance participation in today's world, including common commitments and associated "rules of the road" regarding how the United States and its European allies are to behave toward each other as they endeavor to cooperate. In particular, a viable transatlantic compact requires stronger American efforts to treat European allies as equal partners in mutual strategic endeavors, and it requires, in reciprocity, those allies and their European institutions to make stronger contributions to these endeavors in ways that match their responsibilities and claims to equal influence. Reaching a strengthened agreement on the principle of reciprocal multilateralism and on getting NATO and the EU to cooperate more closely would need to be a key focal point of a new transatlantic strategic compact. Equally important, such a compact would also require agreement on the need for both the United States and Europe to develop improved capabilities for military expeditionary missions and for comprehensive approaches that involve adroit blending of civil-military assets, especially during interventions involving stabilization and reconstruction missions.

Can an effort to forge such a compact succeed? There are good reasons for being hopeful of a successful outcome if the effort is launched. One reason is that today's difficult times require a serious stocktaking of the transatlantic partnership at its fundamentals, and that without it, the Atlantic Alliance may be doomed to a future of drift and limited effectiveness. A second reason is that in contrast to the sharp disputes and mutual frustrations of a few years ago, the governments of the United States and key European allies, having witnessed the paralyzing effects of discord and the benefits of increased cooperation in Afghanistan and other areas, may be willing to launch a serious, wide-ranging discussion of the transatlantic relationship with a positive agenda in mind. A third reason is that similar efforts have succeeded in the past—the Cold War provides multiple examples—and perhaps can succeed again if high-level leadership is shown. And fourth, new leadership provides opportunities for a new compact. Whether the time is right for such an attempt today may be questioned by some, but encouraging signs come from the ongoing U.S. shift toward greater multilateralism in its foreign policy, and from parallel efforts by several European countries, including France, to reinvigorate their cooperation with the United States.

Notwithstanding these positive incentives, an effort to forge a new transatlantic compact that brings the United States and Europe closer together on behalf of a common security agenda would confront challenges of consensus-building on both sides of the Atlantic. The United States would have to build internal support to shift its strategic policies in important ways and so would European countries. In Europe, the challenge would be compounded by the need to mobilize support among multiple nations, not only such big powers as Britain, France, and Germany, but also enough smaller powers to create a critical mass of support across NATO, the EU, and the entire continent. Perhaps the consensus-building problem would be too formidable to create a

full-blown new compact in a single big bang of political awakening, but considerable progress could be made by treating this compact as an evolutionary creation: as something that focuses initially on achievable goals and gradually expands its horizons as successes are achieved and mutual confidence grows. After all, both NATO and the EU were built this way. The bottom line is that while no crystal ball can foretell the future in this arena, prospects for success will not be knowable unless an attempt is made. A source of confidence is that owing to events of past decades, many participating governments have plenty of diplomatic experience in knowing how to achieve both substantive policy content and political consensus in their dealings with each other. Crafting a new transatlantic compact will not be child's play, but neither does it lie beyond the province of mature leadership.⁷

Three Baskets of Issues

If an effort to forge a new transatlantic compact is launched, its success will be judged not by its rhetorical flourishes, but by whether it provides a concrete agenda for the United States and Europe to pursue, plus a contractual agreement between them regarding how their mutual contributions are to be combined to create cooperative, effective policies. In other words, a new transatlantic compact must be a defining and empowering agreement that is taken seriously and heeded on both sides of the Atlantic. To be fully successful, such a compact would need to address a wide spectrum of U.S.-European cooperation on the world stage, not just NATO, or the EU, or some small subset of common policies (e.g. counterterrorism). With these standards in mind, the new transatlantic compact would need to address three baskets of critical issues.

1. In deciding on common purposes, what strategic missions, with associated goals and purposes, should the U.S.-European transatlantic partnership endeavor to perform in the coming years?
2. In performing these missions, what processes and procedures for decisionmaking and policy implementation will best take advantage of transatlantic strengths, how should they guide the manner in which the U.S.-European partnership functions in political and institutional terms, and how should NATO and the EU work together?
3. To be able to collaborate more effectively, what improved capabilities should the United States and its European allies seek to create for carrying out expeditionary missions and comprehensive approaches, and how should these capabilities be applied?

The manner in which these three baskets of issues are addressed and answered will go a long way toward defining the nature of a new transatlantic compact and, in addition, providing substantive guidance for writing a new NATO strategic concept. For basket 1, the transatlantic partnership has a range of options at its disposal. The principal challenge is to choose wisely in this arena, and then to ensure that the decisions reached in baskets 2 and 3 make sense in light of the option selected in basket 1.

Basket 1: Reaching Agreement on Common Strategic Missions.

A compelling reason for pursuing a new transatlantic compact is the dramatic extent to which new security challenges are arising and magnifying each other in today's world. Only a decade ago, many observers judged that with the Cold War over and its bipolar structure a thing of the past, the world was headed toward perpetual peace and harmony. That comforting forecast has

⁷ For in-depth discussions of U.S.-European political relations and related issues, see Simon Serfaty, ed., *A Recast Partnership? Institutional Dimensions of Transatlantic Relations* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2008). Especially insightful chapters are those by Simon Serfaty, Franklin Kramer, Jolyon Howorth, and Julian Lindley French.

now faded from the scene, to be replaced by a more ambiguous and guarded appraisal that recognizes not only the continuing importance of positive trends, but also the growing impact of negative trends from multiple sources. Today's most dangerous threats are posed by terrorism, WMD proliferation, and radical Islamic fundamentalism: the most alarming worry is that WMD systems might fall into the hands of terrorist groups willing to use them against Western targets, including the United States and Europe. Accompanying these threats are worries about an unstable Middle East, stalled democratization, failing states in Africa, uneven economic progress, global warming, increasing multipolarity, complex relations with Russia and China, South Asia's turbulence, and Asia's rising power, all of which create profound uncertainties about where the world is headed. Moreover, globalization, by drawing once-distant regions closer together, is depositing these troubles on the doorsteps of the western democracies in ways compelling close attention to them. The odds of containing these troubles and charting a path toward global stability and progress will be far greater if the United States and its European allies can collaborate on behalf of common purposes and associated missions. A new transatlantic compact could help lay a stronger foundation for such cooperation.

One of the most important challenges facing a new transatlantic compact will be to re-establish, in new-era terms, the political and strategic link that unites the United States and its European allies in close collaboration in security policy and defense strategy. Although member governments still value the Alliance because of its cooperative connections, opinion polls show diminishing public support for the Alliance in Europe and, to a lesser degree, in the United States.⁸ Withering public support can make it much harder for member governments to work together. Conversely, the presence of strong public support can enable the Alliance to act boldly and decisively in the face of strains, controversies, and difficult challenges. A new transatlantic compact can help restore public support by making clear the Alliance's continuing vital importance and its capacity to advance both American and European interests in tandem.

Even though surface appearances seemingly create a rationale for a highly ambitious cooperative agenda, the reality is that the transatlantic partnership cannot readily be transformed into an alliance for all causes and all seasons. Although the United States and Europe share many common interests and values, they are separate strategic entities with goals and involvements that differ from place to place and issue to issue. In particular, whereas the United States is a truly global power, Europe thus far has been principally focused on its own continent, and is now only beginning to play assertive security roles in areas beyond its borders. Harmonizing these disparate perspectives requires a focus on challenges where the United States and Europe already are pursuing common agendas, or can reach agreement through a diplomacy of outreach. Beyond this, both the United States and Europe have finite resources that will have to be targeted carefully—with specific goals, strategies, and priorities in mind—if they are to be used effectively, without overloading both participants. For these reasons, a new transatlantic compact will need to strike a balance between inclusiveness and selectivity in determining the number and types of strategic missions that are to be embraced in these five broad categories:

- Providing for homeland security of the Euro-Atlantic space against new-era threats including terrorism and nuclear missiles possessed by such rogue states as Iran.
- Protecting against political intimidation using threats of cutoffs of energy supplies and cyber attacks on information networks.

⁸ See “World View of U.S. Role Goes From Bad to Worse,” *BBC World Service Poll*, January 23, 2007; “Except for Spain, Majorities or Pluralities in Five European Countries Believe Life Has Become Worse Since Joining the EU,” *Financial Times/Harris Interactive Poll*, March 19, 2007; “Transatlantic Trends, Key Findings 2006,” The German Marshall Fund and the Compagnia di San Paolo, June 2006.

- Continuing NATO and EU enlargement aimed at unifying and democratizing Europe, while maintaining stable relations with Russia.
- Performing expeditionary missions in the Greater Middle East and adjoining regions, and pursuing associated political and strategic goals there.
- Enhancing deterrence and updating nuclear strategy.

Homeland Security. In today's world, the imperatives of homeland security require Alliance members to get back to the basics by working together to carry out Article 5 of the NATO Treaty against new-era threats. Throughout the Cold War, the Alliance was heavily preoccupied with Article 5, the clause of the treaty that provides for collective defense of NATO territory, because it faced a menacing threat of cross-border invasion posed by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. When the Cold War ended, Alliance-wide interest in the requirements of Article 5 declined, not only because no new threats appeared on the immediate horizon, but also because NATO members possessed ample military forces to defend against any threats that might possibly arise. The 9/11 attacks and their aftermath, however, dramatically changed this calculus in ways that propelled Article 5 back to the forefront, but in entirely different terms. Since then, the Alliance has been compelled to refocus on Article 5 and homeland security plans against such fresh, new-era threats as terrorist attacks and use of WMD against members. Considerable progress has been made since 2001, but additional improvements need to be made.⁹

Homeland security today requires capabilities and activities in several categories: guarding the approaches and achieving border security for the NATO region, preventing and managing terrorist incidents, strengthening capacities for consequence management in event of terrorist use of WMD or large-scale natural disasters, and providing defense against air and missile attack. In this arena, NATO's highest-profile activity to date has been carrying out Operation *Active Endeavour*, which employs naval forces and other assets to safeguard the Mediterranean Sea and other waters against terrorist activities, including smuggling of WMD systems into Alliance ports. NATO has played a supporting role in otherwise helping prevent and manage terrorist incidents, such as in sharing intelligence and developing new technologies. But main responsibility for this important task has been trusted to the EU and individual nations employing their own resources. If deficiencies of resources still exist today, they seemingly lie in capacities for consequence management in event of large-scale incidents that could overpower national resources. Creating better capabilities for consequence management is a task that mandates cooperation among NATO, the EU, and member states of both bodies.

In recent years, the requirement to provide missile defenses against nuclear attacks by such rogue countries as Iran has become a subject of growing attention. Throughout the Cold War, missile defense was limited by the ABM Treaty. But during the 1990s, the United States, fearing emerging missile threats from rogue countries, developed plans to deploy a force of 100 missile interceptors, radars, and C4ISR assets to meet this threat. As these plans matured, interest gradually grew in expanding this capability to protect European allies from similar threats. After several years of debate and controversy, NATO's leaders at the Bucharest Summit of 2008 voiced approval of a U.S. plan to deploy a small force of ten missile interceptors in Poland and associated radar systems in the Czech Republic. The core intent, they explained, was not to challenge Russia's nuclear deterrent posture, but instead to defend against a future nuclear missile threat posed by Iran. In this spirit, they called for efforts to develop a comprehensive missile defense architecture that could eventually integrate U.S., NATO, and Russian missile defense systems. Now that this deployment decision has been endorsed by the NATO summit, the long-

⁹ For further analysis, see CTNSP/INSS Special Report, *Transatlantic Homeland Defense* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2006). See also Esther Brimmer (ed.), *Five Dimensions of Homeland and International Security* (Washington D.C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University, 2008).

term challenge will be to field these missiles and radars and ensure their effective operation. Careful military management will be needed, but political management will be needed as well. Lessening Russian objections will be one concern; another will be meeting Poland's demands for additional military support and modernization from NATO. The missile defense issue seems destined to continue being at the forefront of Alliance decisionmaking, in ways requiring close U.S.-European cooperation, for many years to come.

Russian Intimidation. In addition to providing for homeland security against terrorists and nuclear missile attack, the United States and its European allies will need to collaborate in coping with an entirely new threat that has emerged only recently, and has the potential to become quite serious. This is the menace of political intimidation using threats to cut off energy supplies and to launch cyber attacks on information networks. Today Europe is highly dependent on oil and natural gas supplies flowing through pipelines from Russia. In recent years, Russia has cut off these energy supplies to such neighbors as Ukraine and Belarus. The ostensible purpose was to compel both countries to pay long-standing energy bills, but many observers judged that Russia was trying to intimidate both countries for larger political purposes. In spring, 2007, Estonia's information networks were subjected to cyber attacks, evidently originating in Russia and employing botnets to carry out denial of service operations. That cyber attack was contained and the damage promptly repaired, but it illuminated the extent to which information networks across all of Europe (and the United States) are potentially vulnerable to extremely damaging attacks. The risk of such attacks is that they could not only disrupt these networks but also inflict serious damage on key services, such as financial institutions, the communications industry, police and fire departments, electrical power, and water purification. Russia publicly denies any intent to employ cyber attacks as well as cutoffs of energy supplies against Europe, but skeptics of its foreign policy judge that in the coming years, it might increasingly turn to such threats to intimidate Europe and the United States to acquiesce in its strategic goals. Nor is Russia the only actor that might resort to such tactics. Cyber attacks could be launched by many countries around the world, as well as by non-governmental actors, including terrorist groups.

What is to be done to counteract these threats? Thus far, Europe has been slow to awaken to these dangers, but awareness is growing. At its Bucharest Summit of 2008, NATO announced that it was adopting a policy on cyber defense along with the institutions and authorities to carry out efforts at enhancing defensive capabilities in this arena. Likewise, NATO adopted a new study on its role in energy security, which proclaimed that NATO would be active in such fields as intelligence fusion and sharing, advancing regional and global cooperation, supporting protection of critical infrastructure, and supporting consequence management. These initiatives provide reasons for encouragement, yet some critics judge that in both arenas, NATO is mainly preoccupied with protecting its own cyber networks and energy infrastructure, rather than with the larger needs of Europe and the Alliance as a whole. These two arenas will require increasingly close cooperation between the United States and Europe that employs not only NATO, but also the EU and other institutions.

As this paper was going to press, Russian forces invaded Georgia. This intervention raises the risk of Russian intimidation of neighbors to a new level. NATO's new strategic concept must now review the nature of Article V of the Washington Treaty in this new context.

NATO and EU Enlargement. A new transatlantic compact will also need to devote priority attention to judging how democratic enlargement is to continue unfolding along Europe's periphery, and to how relations with Russia are to continue being made stable. Part of this agenda involves determining how many new members are to be admitted to NATO and the EU. At its Bucharest Summit in 2008, NATO announced that Croatia and Albania would be admitted soon, that Macedonia would be admitted when the dispute over its name is settled, and that Ukraine and Georgia would eventually be admitted, with the prospect that the Membership Action Plan

(MAP) might be extended to them later this year.¹⁰ Membership for Georgia in particular presents problems with regard to the Article 5 commitment and secession movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Montenegro, Bosnia, and Serbia are also potentially in the queue. Providing for the security of these new members will be a key priority for NATO; the same applies to the EU as it enlarges further. An equally important task will be ensuring the security and prosperity of countries that are not likely to gain admission to these bodies soon, but may become closer partners. Relations with Russia enter the strategic equation here because its government seems steadily drifting toward a more nationalist foreign policy that views continuing western enlargement into its bordering regions as a threat to its geopolitical interests. Recent experiences show that while Russia no longer poses a direct military threat to Europe, it remains a nuclear power that may be willing to use diplomatic intimidation, threats of natural gas and oil cutoffs, and other instruments to pursue an increasingly assertive agenda in these regions. While some observers fear that the United States and Europe are on a collision course with Russia, risks of this undesirable outcome can be lessened by employing a diplomacy of continued engagement and dialogue with that country, coupled with a restored emphasis on dissuasion and deterrence in some areas. Finding a solution to the conundrum posed by further democratic enlargement in the face of growing Russian resistance promises to be a continuing, thorny geopolitical challenge that will need to be addressed by the United States and Europe, and will need to be a key focus of any new compact between them.

Expeditionary Missions. A new transatlantic compact will also need to pay close attention to the Greater Middle East and the entire “southern arc of instability” that stretches from North Africa through the Persian Gulf into South Asia. Today this vast zone is a cauldron of political conflict, unstable security affairs, radical Islamic fundamentalism, ethnic and cultural hatreds, failed states, authoritarian governments, economic stress, and military tensions. A decade or two ago, the Atlantic Alliance could afford the luxury of viewing this zone as lying mostly outside its traditional geostrategic perimeter, but this is no longer the case. Globalization is drawing once-distant regions closer together and giving new actors, including terrorists, global reach. Although the United States and Europe today are cooperating closely in Afghanistan, their collaborative involvements elsewhere in the Greater Middle East and adjoining regions are only beginning to take shape. Europe for its part has historic responsibilities in Africa where peace support operations require constant attention. Charting how to expand this collaboration, in ways that satisfy both the United States and Europe, will need to be an important feature of a new transatlantic compact.

Across this vast zone, priority attention must be given to crafting a shared willingness by the United States and Europe to perform military expeditionary missions together in regions where threats and dangers are likely to arise. As used here, the term “expeditionary missions” is meant in its broadest sense: to include power projection missions that cover a wide spectrum of operations ranging from peacekeeping and stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) to major combat operations. Notwithstanding the bitter debate over the invasion of Iraq in 2003, recent years have witnessed the United States and Europe draw closer in their willingness to mount such expeditionary missions. The past decade has seen U.S. and European forces operate together in the Balkans in performing peacekeeping roles in Bosnia and Kosovo. Today’s most salient example is Afghanistan, where sizable U.S. and European forces are operating together under ISAF and NATO command in fighting the Taliban and bringing democracy and stability to that country. Even so, many observers judge that several European members of NATO, including Germany, have not deployed sufficient forces to Afghanistan, and are not participating

¹⁰ See NATO Press Release, “Bucharest Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of States and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008” (Brussels, Belgium: 2008), available at <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-049e.html>>.

extensively enough in combat missions. This deficiency of Western forces, coupled with Taliban insurgency warfare and problems inherent in Afghanistan, are making success uncertain.

Achieving success in Afghanistan will remain a compelling requirement for NATO and the transatlantic partnership for the foreseeable future. But Afghanistan likely will not be the only endangered place in the Greater Middle East, as well as South Central Asia, South Asia, and Africa, where requirements for military expeditionary missions might arise for a wide spectrum of operations. If the United States and Europe are to cooperate in such missions, they will need to establish a shared mindset on when military power is an appropriate instrument, on how military power can best be successfully employed to achieve political goals, on standards for determining military requirements and operational practices, and on a host of related technical issues. NATO will remain the best forum for pursuing such collaboration, but it will be a usable forum only if the United States and Europe can agree on the fundamentals of military strategy for expeditionary missions. Creating such a military accord does not promise to be easy, given the differing perspectives on both sides of the Atlantic, but recent experiences have educated the United States on the sheer difficulty of employing military power to political effect in these regions, and have educated the Europeans on the need to employ military force and expeditionary missions on critical occasions. Perhaps these hard-learned lessons can help enable both sides to find increasingly solid common ground in this important arena.

Nor can such an accord be limited to military strategy and operations. As the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq show, the act of militarily intervening to remove hostile governments and squelch existing or imminent threats is often far easier to accomplish than the presence missions of stabilization and reconstruction that normally come in the wake. By any measure, stabilization missions can require as many or more resources than combat missions, and they demand not only adequate military forces, but also sizable civilian assets in multiple areas focused on comprehensive approaches to rebuilding governments, economies, and societies. Such demanding missions often take years to succeed. Nor is the need for such missions limited to crisis interventions that begin with military invasions. In the coming years, they may be needed simply to help shore up friendly governments and countries that are plunging into chaos and on the verge of becoming failed states. Africa already provides ample examples, and such big countries as Pakistan and others could require outside assistance as well. An accord on the need to perform these missions, on becoming prepared for them, and on how to carry them out would need to be an important part of a transatlantic compact, including better NATO-EU cooperation.

Notwithstanding the importance of being willing to employ military force and civilian assets in the Greater Middle East and adjoining regions, a new transatlantic compact would also need to be characterized by a common political and diplomatic strategy there. Thorny issues arise. How can Iran and other troublesome powers best be handled, contained, and deterred? How can friendly powers be made secure in regions marked by interstate rivalries, ethnic and sectarian hatreds, terrorism, and WMD proliferation? How can Israel be kept secure while seeking a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian rivalry? How can Pakistan be kept stable and democratic while avoiding an India-Pakistan war that might go nuclear? How can regional stability be ensured while avoiding the pitfalls of aligning too closely with autocratic regimes? How can democratization be promoted without paving the way for hostile, anti-western governments? How can radical Islamic fundamentalism be defused in an era when widespread frustrations are fanning its growth? How can economic progress be brought to these regions in ways that help bring peace and democracy in its wake? What are the main U.S. and European goals and strategies in these regions, how are they best pursued, and what forms of transatlantic collaboration are necessary and possible?

None of these complex questions are easily answered, but all of them will require well-conceived, multifaceted strategies to address them effectively. The key point is that common answers must be sought because the United States and Europe are now irretrievably involved in

these regions to the point where detachment is no longer a viable option. In this troubled arena, relations between the United States and Europe have often been marked by conflicting perspectives, but signs of greater collaboration—e.g., diplomacy toward Iran and Lebanon—have been appearing lately. Whether this emerging transatlantic consensus can be broadened and accelerated is to be seen, but working hard to achieve it will need to be a key feature of a new strategic compact for the compelling reason that if the United States and Europe work at cross-purposes in these regions, or merely fail to cooperate, both of them may be destined to fail.

Although a primary focus on Europe and the Greater Middle East seems necessary for a new transatlantic compact, the rest of the world cannot be ignored, especially for the long haul. Owing to the steady emergence of China as a great power with a geopolitical agenda, coupled with Russia's increasingly assertive conduct, the global security system seems headed toward greater multipolarity and, potentially, friction with these countries. Also important, the entire Asian region is growing in economic and political power in ways that seem destined to have a major impact on the global security system. In South Asia, India is emerging as a major power with an agenda of its own. By tradition, the task of handling this profound transformation would be entrusted to the United States, which has long experience in dealing with China and Russia, presides over a bilateral system of security treaties in Asia that protect democratic allies there, and has been developing close relations with India and Pakistan. Even so, a core problem with continuing to follow this approach in any singular way is that the United States may be too embroiled in the Greater Middle East, and too overextended elsewhere, to perform this demanding task on its own. If Europe can be added to the strategic power equation, in ways supporting the United States and its allies, prospects for achieving a stable multipolar system—one that counterbalances and integrates China while protecting Asia and other regions—will increase significantly. Adding Europe in this way would require it to adopt a global security perspective to a degree not currently being embraced. Fortunately the difficult task of forging a common U.S.-European approach in this demanding and uncertain arena does not have to be mastered immediately. But creating a foundation for it arguably could be a goal of a new transatlantic compact.

Enhancing Deterrence. One lesson from the 9/11 terrorist attacks that has been extended to Iran is that it is more difficult to deter new-era threats than it was to deter threats during the Cold War. This is particularly true in the nuclear arena. But alternatives to deterrence also have drawbacks, as we have seen with the doctrine of preemption. At the same time, NATO's nuclear strategy has become outmoded. Several recent developments highlight the need for a new NATO nuclear and deterrent strategy. First, at the Bucharest Summit NATO accepted the need for missile defenses, but public support is quite thin. Second, questions are being raised again on both sides of the alliance with regard to the need for retaining the remaining U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. Third, if Iran develops a nuclear capability with a delivery system, how can Iranian use of that capability be successfully deterred? And fourth, what is needed to hedge against an emergent threat from Russia? This may require a more robust set of deterrent options in the wake of Russia's recent attacks on Georgia. NATO needs to update and strengthen its deterrent mission.

Three Options for Transatlantic Strategic Missions. In essence, the United States and Europe have three broad options at their disposal in deciding on which strategic missions should be embraced by a new transatlantic compact. The first, minimalist option would have this compact focus mainly on common security goals in the Euro-Atlantic area, coupled perhaps with steps to create a more flourishing transatlantic economy. This option would not be blind to regions outside Europe, including the Middle East, or wind back the clock on current outreach activities there, including the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. But neither would it seek to greatly expand these activities. In essence, this option would be limited to calling

on the United States and Europe to collaborate on an ad-hoc basis, i.e., temporarily and in specific cases when their interests and priorities happen to intersect.

The second option would be a more ambitious compact. It would focus on the Euro-Atlantic area coupled with common, sustained collaboration for carrying out political strategies, expeditionary missions, and comprehensive approaches across key parts of the Greater Middle East and Africa, and by adding more partners to the enterprise.

The third option is a maximalist approach. It would aim to create a truly global compact, one that, in addition to covering Europe and the Greater Middle East, strives to handle the emerging multipolar security system, contend with challenges posed by China, and preserve stability in Asia. This maximalist approach would provide a framework for integrating Asian democratic partners into the Euro-Atlantic compact, for providing leadership to the entire democratic community, and for participating in such global endeavors as controlling WMD proliferation, promoting climate control, and encouraging economic development.

Selecting which of these options to pursue depends on the strategic goals and time horizons of the transatlantic partnership. It also depends on the willingness and capacity of the United States and Europe to forge the necessary political consensus to harmonize strategic policies and commit the required resources for carrying out mutual activities. Choosing wisely among these options, in both the near-term and long-term, will go a long way not only toward defining the nature of a new transatlantic compact, but also toward determining its effectiveness in the coming years.

How can these three options best be appraised? In a nutshell, the minimum Eurocentric option arguably is too narrow, because it would pay insufficient attention to challenges arising in distant areas that will greatly affect the security of both the United States and Europe. For opposite reasons, a sudden leap into the maximum global option seems too demanding, because it would overload the transatlantic partnership and is not yet compellingly necessary in today's climate. This leaves a main focus on option two as an attractive choice: a vigorous focus on the Euro-Atlantic area, coupled with steadily expanding cooperation across the Greater Middle East and adjoining regions. This approach is attractive because it combines strategic necessity with the transatlantic partnership's potential capacity to operate effectively. This option makes best sense in the near-to-mid term; as it matures, it could be accompanied by a gradual shift toward the global option as strategic needs evolve and the partnership's capacities grow.

Although these three strategic options help illuminate broad choices, they should not be viewed as mutually exclusive, or as establishing rigid start points and end points. All three point to compelling challenges that the transatlantic partnership will need to continually address. For this reason, a new compact needs to set clear priorities, but it also should be a flexible creation. It should allow the United States and Europe to work together in appropriate ways in all three arenas—Europe, the Greater Middle East, and globally—and to shift emphases as problems are solved and new challenges and opportunities arise. Above all, this compact should enable the transatlantic partnership to successfully address current priorities, while giving it ample room to adapt, mature, and grow. Such a glide path toward continuing maturation and growth is how the transatlantic Alliance started the Cold War—modestly, but growing steadily into a potent strategic entity that won the contest in Europe by promoting military security, political democracy, and economic progress. The same prescription applies to crafting a compact that helps determine how the transatlantic partnership is to be given new life, energy, and focus today.

Basket 2: Fostering Effective Decision Processes, Reciprocal Multilateralism, and Close NATO-EU Relations

Even a flexible and evolving compact that pursues demanding goals within and beyond the Euro-Atlantic area will need a set of effective processes and procedures for decisionmaking and policy implementation that take advantage of the full scope of transatlantic strengths. Effective strategic performance in this key arena will never be easy for an alliance that encompasses two continents and is composed of the U.S. superpower, many European countries, and multiple institutions that include NATO and the EU. But there is a great deal of difference between performing poorly and performing competently. Achieving improved performance, compared to that of recent years, is an achievable goal. Doing so will require agreement on key principles and associated rules of the road regarding how the transatlantic partnership is to function in political terms, and how the United States and Europe are to behave toward each other in areas where they are endeavoring to collaborate.

Reciprocal Multilateralism. In particular, better performance will require reaffirmation and strengthening of U.S. and European commitments to what might be called “reciprocal multilateralism” which entails close consultation, consensual decisionmaking, acceptance of responsibility, and implementation of combined policies. By itself, reciprocal multilateralism is no guarantee that all future Alliance decisions will be made wisely and implemented effectively. But it can provide a potent safeguard against crippling differences of opinion, mutual antagonisms, and the breakdown of collaborative mechanisms. Beyond this, it can help ensure that, when decisions are being made and policies implemented, the best ingredients of Alliance-wide cooperation are available.

Fortunately the United States and its European allies, acting mainly through NATO, have already learned how to practice this type of demanding multilateralism in dealing with continental security and defense affairs. The same cannot yet be said for their cooperation in dealing with areas outside Europe, including the Greater Middle East and adjoining regions. To be sure, progress has been made since the dark days of 2003, when the invasion of Iraq drove a deep wedge between the United States and multiple European countries led by Germany and France, and produced rancor on both sides of the Atlantic. Today, a spirit of greater empathy and cooperation is manifest in increasingly common U.S. and European policies toward Afghanistan, Iran, Lebanon, and other places, but considerable additional progress must be made if the United States and its European allies are to act as consistent, mutually supportive partners in these volatile and complex regions, which are producing today’s greatest threats.

Although public controversy was especially inflamed by the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, with troops from only Britain and a few other European countries by America’s side, the problem of flawed U.S.-European gear-meshing in the Greater Middle East has deeper sources, originated years before, and has not yet been adequately resolved. During peacetime, the United States found itself largely alone in handling daily security affairs in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere. When a crisis threatening war or otherwise requiring military action arose, the United States would turn to its European allies for help. Unable to call on NATO, which remained focused on Europe, U.S. leaders adopted the practice of assembling ad-hoc coalitions composed of enough willing participants to meet military requirements for the emergency at hand. This practice worked for the Persian Gulf War of 1990–1991, a special situation that created a clear threat and triggered a large European response led by Britain and France. After this war, ad-hoc coalition building was revealed to have serious drawbacks. Typically, the United States would approach the Europeans with its strategic policies already established, and with expectations that they would provide resources to support these policies. European countries often resented not being

consulted when these policies were being forged as well as alleged U.S. “cherry picking” of allies. Because they had made no prior contractual agreements to participate, they would balk at providing military forces or otherwise contributing in major ways. The difficulties that arose during the Iraq invasion of 2003 thus were not isolated events, but instead reflected fundamental problems regarding principles governing how the transatlantic partnership should operate outside Europe.

Continued reliance on ad-hoc coalition building may still be favored in some quarters because it excuses the United States and Europe from making prior commitments to common action in nebulous circumstances before crises erupt. Experience shows, however, that even under the best of circumstances, ad-hoc coalition building is a flawed instrument for crisis management because it typically results in improvised responses that can produce inadequate resources from both the United States and Europe, fail to deter potential aggressors, and fail to meet high priority requirements for the situations at hand. Even when adequate resources are potentially available, the act of assembling and transporting them can be time-consuming, thus delaying decisive responses in potentially damaging ways. Equally important, such improvised coalition-building at the time of crises prevents the prior, regular, U.S.-European consultations that are vital to managing daily peacetime affairs and to creating the consensual agreements that permit swift, sure responses during crises. Likewise, ad-hoc coalitions are normally transient creations that fade after the crisis has passed, and are not available for addressing fresh challenges in the aftermath. To handle the requirements of the future, something better than ad-hoc coalition building is needed, in ways that foster ongoing consultations about peacetime strategic priorities in the Greater Middle East, coupled with agreements on how the United States and Europe are to be responsible for providing military forces and other assets during crises and wartime operations, and afterward, as well. Reciprocal multilateralism provides an instrument for helping to achieve this goal.

For the United States, fostering reciprocal multilateralism will require a concerted effort to treat Europe and its leading countries as co-equal partners in strategic affairs. This principle does not mean granting European countries veto power over U.S. foreign policy. The United States must retain the freedom to act independently when necessary. But it does mean a switch away from making American strategic judgments unilaterally, and then expecting European countries to act in support merely because they are expected to be loyal allies. At its core, reciprocal multilateralism requires genuine collaboration when such strategic judgments are being made, in an effort to find common ground if possible. Doing so requires the United States to respond in forthcoming ways in areas of special importance to Europe, such as global warming. More fundamentally, it requires the United States not only to listen carefully, but also to grant European countries meaningful influence over the heart-and-soul of its security policies and strategies in cases when these countries are being asked to make important contributions.

Reciprocal multilateralism applies with equal power and a mandate for change to Europe. In particular, it requires European countries to accept the principle that, if they aspire to co-equal influence and authority over strategic choices in the Greater Middle East and elsewhere, then they must be willing to accept commensurate responsibility for bearing burdens, accepting risks, and sharing costs. This principle applies not only to launching military interventions and other forms of crisis response, but also to sharing the responsibilities, obligations, and commitments that arise on a daily basis in peacetime, over a period of many years. Reciprocal multilateralism does not mean that the Europeans must identically match all U.S. involvements in the Greater Middle East and adjoining regions. Nor does it mean that the exact blend of U.S. and European contributions must be the same from one issue to the next, for there will continue to be cases in which one participant leads and the other plays a supporting role or is not involved at all. Nor does it mean pursuing unanimity of strategic thought to the point of preventing both sides of the Atlantic from

acting assertively in cases where disagreements exist. Instead, it means firm but flexible recognition that responsibility and authority must be allocated in equal doses, that both the United States and Europe regularly must endeavor to achieve a meeting of minds, cooperate whenever possible, and refrain from blocking each other from taking responsible actions when they are not directly collaborating.

The commitment to reciprocal multilateralism in new areas must be reaffirmed and strengthened in today's climate. Following the principle concertedly was a key reason why the transatlantic partnership and NATO performed so well during the Cold War. Once common approaches were agreed on, both the United States and its European allies normally felt that their authorities and responsibilities were balanced, that no participant was overloaded with too many burdens or stripped of critical influence, and that their respective contributions were blended in ways which advanced common security goals on both sides of the Atlantic. Plenty of disagreements occurred along the way, but the practice of joint consultation, coupled with fair-minded bargaining and negotiating, regularly ensured that initial conflict gave way to consensus and effective action. Moreover, reciprocal multilateralism was beneficial because it made sure that, when complex issues arose, they were addressed by multiple governments, not just one, in ways that produced better policies and strategies.

Whether this principle can now be consistently applied to the Greater Middle East and adjoining regions is to be seen. Suffice it to say that it is key to the future ability of the United States and its European allies to attain their strategic goals and to deal effectively with new-era threats there. Reciprocal multilateralism, coupled with agreement on common strategic missions, especially offers a formula for breaking away from the pattern of relying on ad-hoc, improvised coalitions that perform ineffectively too often. In its place, reciprocal multilateralism offers an approach to creating permanent coalitions of U.S. and European countries for performing each strategic mission in sustained, effective ways. The exact nature of this coalition could vary from issue to issue, involving the United States and different European countries in shifting ways. But in each case, the coalition would be an enduring feature of the strategic terrain, capable of guiding security affairs toward common goals and desired outcomes. Equally important, each strategic mission would have its own permanent coalition, thus ensuring an across-the-board response from the transatlantic partnership.

NATO-EU Cooperation. If a new transatlantic compact for common security missions, enhanced strategic performance, and reciprocal multilateralism is to succeed, it must be anchored in an agreement to establish close cooperation between NATO and the EU in the security and defense arena. These two large institutions are the principal instruments by which the United States and Europe endeavor to handle contemporary strategic affairs in Europe and potentially elsewhere. NATO is especially important to the United States, because it enables the American government to exert presence and leadership in Europe, and because it provides a potent source of allied military forces that are interoperable with U.S. forces for operations outside Europe. While the Europeans value NATO for the same reasons, their special attention today is devoted to nurturing the EU and charting its future growth. On paper, these two institutions seem natural partners because they perform compatible, mutually supporting strategic missions. Whereas NATO helps provide Europe's security foundation, the EU helps determine how Europe's superstructure of multinational political integration and enlargement is to be built on this foundation. In reality, however, historical circumstances conspired to produce the opposite of close partnership: enduring suspicion and rivalry between the two institutions that weakened both of them in security affairs and elsewhere. Progress toward lessening this rivalry and establishing greater cooperation has been made recently, but it needs to be accelerated. In their public rhetoric, NATO and the EU have already proclaimed a partnership. The challenge now is to supplement this rhetoric with concrete action.

The origins of the NATO-EU competitive relationship owe heavily to the longstanding rivalry between the United States and France for leadership in Europe. Whereas the United States relied on NATO, France increasingly used the EU to pursue its own goals. As a result, the United States sought to constrain the development of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) that might come at the expense of NATO. This U.S. attitude was reflected in a series of policy pronouncement beginning with the so-called “Bartholomew telegram.”¹¹ France for its part sought to prevent new NATO strategic departures that might come at the expense of its visions for ESDP. In this strained climate, which often viewed NATO and the EU in zero-sum terms, the professional bureaucracies of both institutions developed attitudes of suspicion and indifference toward each other. As a result, supporters of NATO and the ESDP tended to block and frustrate each other. For example, the EU was blocked by Britain from creating its own senior military headquarters and from fully funding the European Defense Agency; and NATO was discouraged from pursuing homeland security in Europe and stability operations in Africa.

In recent years, the pendulum has begun slowly swinging toward greater cooperation, and encouraging progress has been made. In 2003, NATO and the EU finally signed the long-delayed Berlin Plus Accord, which permitted the EU to draw on NATO assets for military missions in cases where NATO had already exercised its right of first refusal. Although the Turkey-Cyprus problem prevented NATO-EU summits (this roadblock continues today), NATO and the EU began establishing formal institutional relationships at lower levels. An EU staff cell was established at NATO’s SHAPE headquarters. NATO and the EU established a pattern of regular annual meetings, including two meetings by their foreign ministers each year, four high-level military staff talks per year, and other meetings at lower levels. Also important, the EU launched efforts to create its own military forces, in the form of large reaction forces and multiple small battle groups that could be deployed outside Europe’s borders for a variety of missions. Fearing EU encroachment on its own missions and force improvement priorities, NATO initially reacted to these departures with skepticism. But as time passed, many of its members, including the United States, began seeing opportunities for burden-sharing and better European defense integration in an EU that possesses important military capacities for power projection of its own.

Perhaps most important, NATO and the EU began performing security missions outside their borders that illuminated the potentialities of both bodies, promoted cooperation between them in some cases, and suggested a future division-of-labor between them. By 2007, NATO was performing fully seven external security missions in places ranging from the Mediterranean Sea to the Balkans and Afghanistan, while striving to establish cooperative military ties to key Middle East countries. Meanwhile, the EU was performing seven external missions of its own, including in the Balkans, Lebanon, and sub-Saharan Africa. With this many new-era missions—fourteen in total—each institution likely would have been overloaded in absence of contributions from the other. Moreover, their mutual experiences in the Balkans, especially Bosnia, showed the advantages of a practice in which NATO would intervene first to dampen major combat between local participants, and the EU would follow afterward to perform residual peacekeeping, stabilization, and reconstruction missions.

In today’s climate, hope for additional progress comes from several quarters. The United States has recently developed a more forthcoming attitude toward the EU and its ESDP. Equally important, French President Nicolas Sarkozy has adopted a more forthcoming attitude toward the United States, and has offered to return France to NATO’s integrated military command, from which it has been absent since 1966, in exchange for U.S. and NATO support for ESDP. Warmer

¹¹ The “Bartholomew telegram” was a cable sent to NATO posts by Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs Reginald Bartholomew on February 20, 1991. It is reprinted in Willem van Eekelen, *Debating European Security: 1948–1998* (The Hague: SDU Publishers, 1998), 340–44.

U.S.-French relations help set the political stage for closer ties between NATO and the EU, which evidently will write a new strategic concept of its own in the coming months. Also, important, the EU's signing of the Lisbon Treaty is creating an Office of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, thus lessening the EU's traditional hydra-headed structure in this arena. For the first time, the EU, and all of Europe to a degree, will have a single official who can pursue cooperative ties with the United States and NATO. Although the EU's future is uncertain, continued integration in the security and defense arena will broaden long-range prospects for the transatlantic partnership to take the form of a triangular relationship among the United States, NATO, and the EU. Such a triangular relationship could strengthen the capacity of all three participants to cooperate more closely in performing new strategic missions in a setting of reciprocal multilateralism.

A second set of differences now block closer NATO-EU cooperation, differences between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus and over Turkey's admission to the EU. Turkey tends to block NATO-EU cooperation within the Alliance while Greece blocks cooperation within the EU. Turkey feels that elements of the Berlin-Plus Agreement advantageous to them have been breached and they object when NATO and the EU meet on the grounds that Cypriot delegates do not have proper security clearances. Positive political developments on Cyprus may provide an opportunity to remove this blockage but a major initiative is needed.

NATO-EU Division of Labor. If NATO and the EU are to collaborate closely, under leadership by the United States and key European powers, their interaction will need to be guided by clear strategic principles that are appealing to both bodies. Such principles would need to treat NATO and the EU as co-equal partners on the world stage, with neither body subordinate to the other in security and defense affairs. Such principles could be guided by an informal division of labor between NATO and the EU, one aimed not at hamstringing either institution, but instead at enabling both of them to take best advantage of their scarce resources. For the foreseeable future, NATO will remain the transatlantic partnership's premier military alliance for high-end defense requirements, including force transformation, demanding expeditionary missions, and major war-fighting. The EU will not be able to aspire to such defense standards for many years, but it could help promote armaments cooperation, common R&D and procurement, standardization and interoperability, training, multinational logistics, and other activities in ways that conserve scarce resources and thereby benefit European and NATO defense preparedness. The EU also will be able to acquire military forces and related capabilities for several important security and defense missions, including peacekeeping, training with foreign nations, stabilization and reconstruction (S&R), limited crisis interventions in such places as Africa, and providing civilian assets for comprehensive approaches. While such assets may be primarily intended for the EU's use, future collaboration perhaps could result in them being assigned to NATO missions. An example is the EU's ongoing effort to create fifteen battle groups of about 1,500 troops apiece, and to supplement them with an operational headquarters and associated air and naval forces. If the EU agrees, these battle groups and joint assets could be made available for some NATO forces and missions: e.g., the NATO Response Force (NRF). The same applies to any other modern forces that the EU might create, such as larger rapid reaction forces.

A division-of-labor approach should not be rigid. Instead, it could be flexible and evolutionary, with decisions made by a variety of decisionmaking bodies on a case-by-case basis. Frank Kramer and Simon Serfaty have proposed the creation of a Euro-Atlantic Forum consisting of all 32 EU-NATO members that would act as a "strategic coordinator" for transatlantic security

issues.¹² Regardless of how the division-of-labor idea is appraised, the governing reality is that, if the United States and Europe are to achieve closer cooperation inside and outside Europe, they will both need a healthy NATO and a healthy EU. Equally important, neither NATO nor the EU can realistically aspire to perform the wide range of future strategic missions without significant help from the other. In recent years, both bodies have embarked on the task of performing strategic missions beyond Europe's borders, but their current efforts may seem modest in comparison to the demanding endeavors that lie ahead. Because they can magnify each other's powers while allowing both to focus on compelling priorities, close cooperation between NATO and the EU provides the best prescription for ensuring that both succeed, individually and collectively, in ways that promote the common goals of a strategic compact for the transatlantic partnership.

Basket 3: Building Capabilities for Expeditionary Missions and Comprehensive Approaches

A transatlantic compact will need to address improved capabilities in these two areas, because future requirements for them could be high, and current assets fall well short of meeting them. How large will these requirements be? U.S. and European military forces and civilian assets are carrying out two major contingencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, while also operating in the Balkans and responding to crisis situations in Africa. The era of multiple concurrent contingencies has arrived, and future contingencies could be as large as, or larger than, those of today, and equally numerous, too. U.S., NATO, and European officials are already aware of the need to be prepared for multiple contingencies. But the exact nature of these contingencies—their time, place, circumstances, and requirements—cannot be confidently foreseen. For this reason, considerable flexibility and adaptability will be needed. The transatlantic partnership will need adequate military and civilian resources to respond effectively.

Expeditionary Missions. In the military arena, the United States already possesses sizable assets for power projection and expeditionary missions, but will need to solidify its commitment to continued NATO preparedness. A few years ago, the Department of Defense forged a plan to reduce the U.S. military presence in Europe from about 100,000 military personnel to about 65,000. A centerpiece of this plan was to reduce the U.S. Army in Germany from four heavy brigades to only a single *Stryker* brigade, plus an air assault brigade in Italy. Recently, this drawdown plan has been suspended. If a new plan is adopted, it should leave enough Army brigades in Central Europe to train with their-European counterparts and be fully prepared for potential missions.¹³ Also, U.S. forces could take command of a NATO multinational corps headquarters, as well as continue to participate closely in the NRF. In addition to keeping its European Command properly resourced and involved in NATO, the United States can contribute by ensuring that its Central Command and new Africa Command work collaboratively with NATO and the EU.

Even with continuing U.S. contributions, remedying the deficiency of military resources for expeditionary missions will depend heavily on whether Europe can increase its contributions beyond current levels. Larger European defense and security budgets are needed. Whereas currently the United States spends well over four percent of its GDP on defense, Europe spends well less than two percent of its GDP for the same purpose. What matters at least as much as

¹² See Franklin D. Kramer and Simon Serfaty, "Recasting the Euro-Atlantic Partnership," in *A Recast Partnership? Institutional Dimensions of Transatlantic Relations* (Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2008), 191–213.

¹³ The current U.S. military presence in Europe is about 95,000 personnel, counting ground, air, and naval units. See *The Military Balance, 2008* (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007).

levels of security expenditures is creation of better European assets that can be applied to power projection, while also attending to emerging new-era needs in homeland security and defense. European members of NATO currently maintain about two million military personnel on active duty. Wealthy NATO members, mainly from northern Europe, maintain nearly one million active military personnel, including 500,000 ground troops, 56 combat brigades, 1,400 combat aircraft, and 150 naval combatants.¹⁴ But most of these large forces remain configured for old-style, border defense missions inherited from the Cold War, and are not readily deployable for new-era expeditionary missions.

Addressing this deficiency, NATO's *Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG)*, issued at the Riga Summit of 2006, called for fully 40 percent of NATO's ground forces to be prepared for operations in distant areas, for 8 percent of them to be deployable at any single time, and for the remaining 32 percent to provide sustainment assets plus capabilities for additional concurrent contingencies.¹⁵ Roughly speaking, the 8 percent figure translates into a requirement for 4 or 5 divisions (12–15 brigades), or 120,000–150,000 troops when combat units and logistic support assets are counted. European countries today field enough active divisions and brigades to meet this 8 percent requirement, but they currently lack the mobility forces and logistic support assets to deploy them rapidly outside Europe, even when British and French forces—the best prepared for projection missions—are included. Moreover, European countries recently have been falling short of quotas for manning the much-heralded NRF, a swiftly deployable strike force that totals only 25,000 personnel for its ground, air, and naval components. In a wartime emergency, additional forces could be generated, but low readiness levels, shortages in strategic lift, and equipment shortfalls would set an upper limit on the total number. Whether more than 75,000 ground troops plus commensurate air and naval assets could be quickly deployed outside Europe is an open question.

What should be future European and NATO preparedness goals in this arena? On paper, the idea of having fully 40 percent of European ground forces available for deployment missions looks impressive, but it might overestimate requirements and create too many force goals for available budgets to handle. Conversely, the idea of having only 8 percent of forces ready for short-notice deployments might underestimate requirements. A ready posture of only 4 or 5 divisions might prove inadequate if two or more contingencies erupt concurrently. Perhaps the Europeans and NATO might be better off by focusing on preparing 6–8 divisions for rapid deployment, backed by a total pool of 16–20 mobilizable divisions (roughly 30 percent of total forces). These and other ideas will need to be considered by NATO and European military authorities. Regardless of the exact numbers chosen, the key point is that if future requirements are to be met, European capabilities for swiftly projecting military power will need to increase significantly in the coming years.

Hope for tangible progress comes from the prospect that high-leverage, low-cost changes in such areas as training, doctrine, and reorganization can yield significant improvements to deployability for expeditionary missions. British and French forces already are organized for such missions. Together, they field 18 ground brigades, 600 combat aircraft, and 90 naval combatants, a significant portion of which are deployable. In Afghanistan, such countries as the Netherlands and Canada have been making large contributions that meet any fair sense of “per capita quotas” assigned to them. Among other countries, Germany is making progress in the arena of force reorganization. Today, Germany fields 21 ground brigades, 300 combat aircraft, and 15 major

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ See “Comprehensive Political Guidance of the Riga Summit,” available at <<http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b061129e.htm>>. See also the communiqués of the summits held in Istanbul, available at <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm>> and Riga, available at <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm>>.

naval combatants, but this sizable posture has traditionally been oriented to local defense. Recently, Germany issued a far-sighted plan calling for its ground forces to be reorganized into three bodies for expeditionary missions: 35,000 troops for rapid reaction, high-intensity combat missions, 70,000 troops for stabilization and other low-intensity missions, and 147,500 troops for logistic support.¹⁶ Some other countries are following this path, albeit in less ambitious ways. Individually, few of them will likely be able to commit large forces for expeditionary missions, but if most of them can contribute small forces—a division or a brigade and some fighter aircraft apiece—the combined effect can be to add sizable forces to Europe’s ledger for power projection.

Generating adequate, deployable manpower and combat units is only part of the requirements equation. As the *CPG* observed, NATO forces for expeditionary missions must be well-equipped and properly transformed so that they can perform new-era combat missions and achieve interoperability with U.S. military forces. Fortunately, Europe’s wealthier countries already possess modern ground weapons, aircraft, and ships that meet requirements in this area. But significant additional transformation is needed in such areas as improved C4ISR assets, information networks, unmanned aerial surveillance, SOF forces, precision-strike systems, air-ground coordination, WMD defense assets, airlift and sealift, and logistic support. Across Europe, military investment budgets are typically too small to permit rapid acquisition programs in these areas. This is a key reason why defense budgets need to grow, so that investment funds can be increased in the face of high spending on manpower and daily operations. Even with current investment budgets, however, several countries are pursuing innovative procurement programs. In the coming years, such new systems as the F-35 fighter, the NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC), the Ground Surveillance Monitor, the medium-size A-400M transport aircraft, and, for Britain, two new, large aircraft carriers, will enter the inventory. Over a period of 5–10 years, this positive trend will gradually elevate European military capabilities for new-era missions.

NATO can contribute to this enterprise by encouraging sound force goals and investment priorities for European countries, and by taking steps to further refine its force structures and command relationships. Ongoing efforts to encourage better information networking, airlift and sealift, critical enabling assets, and multinational logistic support make sense. Priority attention should be given to those forces that actually will be used for expeditionary missions rather than border defense, e.g., the NRF, SOF units, and some High Readiness Forces (HRF), such as the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) and other multinational corps headquarters and formations. In addition, NATO could contribute by breathing greater life into its Allied Command for Transformation (ACT), thereby providing its European members with strong guidance regarding their plans and programs in transformation, modernization, and armaments cooperation. The same sense of priority attention to expeditionary missions applies to the EU and its defense preparedness efforts, which will help make best use of scarce resources if they are harmonized with those of NATO.

Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations. In today’s setting, expeditionary missions often go hand-in-hand with S&R operations. Growing recognition of the need for extended, demanding S&R missions arose in the aftermath of the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Although the immediate goal of regime change was swiftly accomplished in both places, U.S. and coalition military forces were then assigned the larger goal of stabilizing both countries, eliminating enemy residual opposition there, and helping lay a security foundation that would enable both countries to undertake the long transition to democratic governments, civil societies, and functioning

¹⁶ See *White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr, 2006* (Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defence, 2006), 69, available in English at <http://www.bmvg.de/portal/PA_1_0_P3/PortalFiles/C1256EF40036B05B/W26UWAMT995INFOEN/W_2006_eng_DS.pdf?yw_repository=youatweb>.

economies. These new ambitious goals, in turn, required U.S. and coalition forces to perform a large set of demanding, unfamiliar, and unplanned missions that fall under the rubric of S&R, e.g., counterterrorism, fighting criminal gangs, pacifying ethnic violence, restoring distribution of electrical power, water, food, and fuel, other aspects of infrastructure rehabilitation, and rebuilding armies, police forces, and other institutions of governance and law enforcement. In all of these areas, U.S. and coalition forces soon found their work cut out for them, and the demands facing them have not abated in the years since both invasions were launched.

Future requirements for S&R missions could be large. Meeting requirements for these capabilities during the initial stages of an intervention can be demanding, and the act of sustaining large S&R forces is more demanding because it necessitates periodic rotation of forces, thus creating a need for a sizable total pool of available assets. Fortunately, European militaries possess plenty of manpower and associated capabilities to generate large S&R assets, including administrators, trainers, military police, CIMIC (Civil Military Cooperation), construction engineers, and medical personnel. But steps to better organize and prepare them are needed for both combat and non-combat contingencies. Today some European militaries (e.g. Britain and France) prefer to remain focused on traditional warfighting, and want to configure EU battle groups for high-tech, combat operations. In particular, France's new White Paper seems to limit France's willingness to engage in S&R operations.¹⁷ Germany and others, however, have expressed interest and a willingness to act in the S&R preparedness arena. They need sound guidance from NATO to set their priorities individually and collectively. At its Riga Summit, NATO acknowledged the need for improved S&R capabilities but took no steps to establish a command structure or coordination center, or to identify the size and characteristics of forces needed. Nor was anything definitive said at NATO's Bucharest Summit of 2008. Better guidance for planning and programming will be needed from NATO and the EU in this arena.

Comprehensive Approach. Although S&R missions remain a preoccupation of the U.S. military and its European partners, performing them has recently been subsumed under the larger category of "comprehensive approaches," whose importance was acknowledged by NATO in the Riga Summit of 2006 and Bucharest Summit of 2008. The core idea is that the mission of restoring order and progress to damaged countries cannot be accomplished by military forces alone. Instead, it must be performed by a combination of military forces and civilian assets that are forged together on behalf of common purposes. Significant civilian assets are needed because they are best able to perform critical rehabilitation functions, including civil engineering, infrastructure construction, communicating across cultures, creating law enforcement systems, establishing modern governmental structures, setting economic and financial policies, regulating currencies, and promoting effective education systems. Such civilian functions, in turn, cannot normally be performed by a single institution. Instead, they must be performed by a multiplicity of actors, including governmental bureaucracies such as the U.S. State Department as well as NATO and especially the EU, assets from partner countries outside Europe such as Japan and Australia, international agencies such as the United Nations and OSCE, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the Red Cross, and numerous civilian contractors. Fusing these civilian activities and blending them with ongoing S&R missions of military forces is the demanding purpose of comprehensive approaches.

As recent experience shows, comprehensive approaches are anything but easy to carry out. This especially is the case in the immediate aftermath of major combat, when military forces may be present in large numbers, but civilian assets are slow to arrive on the scene. As these civilian

¹⁷ See *The French White Paper on defence and national security* (Paris: The Presidency of the Republic, June 2008), available at <http://www.ambafrance-ca.org/IMG/pdf/Livre_blanc_Press_kit_english_version.pdf>.

assets begin arriving, they often must operate in a setting of chaos and violence, in ways requiring that they be protected by military forces from insurgency and terrorist opposition to them. Once these civilian assets have deployed in sufficient numbers, and are able to operate in a peaceful setting, they can begin functioning with growing effectiveness. At this juncture, a new challenge arises, that of providing them top-down guidance and control so that their activities are properly coordinated in a setting of multiple agencies and actors with goals, agendas, priorities, and procedures of their own—not all of which are easily compatible or reconciled with each other. Even after each civilian activity is properly resourced, and proper teamwork is established, the act of carrying out the full spectrum of demanding missions can require months or years, and in badly damaged or underdeveloped countries, progress can be excruciatingly slow. Patience and persistence are required for comprehensive approaches to succeed.

The difficult experiences encountered thus far in such places as the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq show that comprehensive approaches, involving close cooperation among military and civilian instruments, should not be mounted on the fly through improvised, ad-hoc arrangements. In the military arena, ad-hoc mechanisms can sometimes be employed because the requisite military forces are already available, are sufficiently ready and equipped, and respond obediently to orders from atop. The same does not apply to most civilian agencies and instruments, and to their capacity to interface with military forces. Although governmental agencies respond to executive orders from their commanders, multinational institutions and NGO are a different matter. They must be recruited and persuaded to participate. Even when the full spectrum of required actors is mobilized, many of them may lack prompt access to the specific assets that are needed in each case. Valuable time can be lost as these actors assemble the proper combination of skilled personnel and equipment. Such problems can be quickly solved when only a small number of civilians must be deployed to a distant area, but an entirely different, less tractable situation emerges when hundreds or thousands of civilians, with many different skills, must be sent, and then must establish close cooperation with military forces.

Such considerations highlight the paramount importance of advanced planning for the civilian side of comprehensive approaches, and for the civilian-military interface, if future interventions are to succeed. To be sure, no advanced planning can anticipate the unique demands of each situation. But such plans can make a critical difference between responding poorly and effectively because they help identify and mobilize the basic categories and amounts of resources, and help create the organizational practices, that might be needed in each case. Above all, they can place the United States and its partners in the general ballpark of having adequate resources and collaborative practices, while lessening the risk of being caught completely unprepared when surprising demands emerge. As Dwight Eisenhower once said, “plans are nothing, but planning is everything.” The key implication is that because demanding military-civilian missions in this arena are likely to be a permanent feature of tomorrow’s strategic terrain, the United States and its European allies need to intensify serious planning for them.

The need for advanced planning carries with it the requirement to develop better civilian capabilities than exist today on both sides of the Atlantic. Both the United States and Europe could establish a standing civilian core for these missions. Merely compiling a list of potential volunteers would not suffice. Participating personnel must be given adequate education, training, and exercise opportunities to develop the special skills that are needed. This especially applies to such demanding areas as police training, justice, rule of law, and cross-cultural communications. National leadership in this arena is needed because the necessary personnel and skills will remain largely in the possession of participating countries. But NATO and the EU have important roles to play as well. They can employ their planning mechanisms to help guide and coordinate the application of national resources, programs, and budgets. They can establish centers of excellence for helping promote common training and doctrines. They can create operational plans for

determining how to act when the need arises. Also, they can create command structures capable of carrying out military-civilian missions, e.g., by allocating one of NATO's multinational corps headquarters for this purpose. At its Bucharest Summit, NATO proclaimed that it had adopted an "Action Plan" for pursuing comprehensive approaches. The challenge now is to carry out this plan effectively, while working closely with the EU and other bodies.

Becoming better prepared for expeditionary missions, S&R operations, and comprehensive approaches is only partly a function of creating the necessary resources and deploying them when needed. Being successful also is a function of knowing how to apply these resources in concrete situations so that the strategic goals of U.S.-European interventions can be accomplished as effectively and swiftly as possible. Recently, the frustrations of operating in Afghanistan and Iraq have given rise to a growing emphasis on learning how to apply effects-based practices that strive to ensure a coherent relationship between the means and ends of operations. The capacity of the United States and Europe to learn this art will go a long way toward determining whether their future interventions in distant areas continue to be frustrating, or instead turn out successfully.

Traditional Defense. The invasion of Georgia will renew concerns along Russia's borders about Moscow's intentions. Already, Poland has indicated in the context of missile defense deployments that it does not fully trust the Article V guarantee. NATO may need to review its conventional military capabilities to deal with a resurgent Russia.

Conclusion

In summary, the idea of forging a new transatlantic compact that bonds the United States and Europe more closely in security affairs, one in which a new NATO strategic concept would be embedded, has important merits. But if such a compact is to succeed, it must have tangible, real-life components and consequences. On both sides of the Atlantic, it must create a sense of common strategic missions within and beyond Europe, forge agreement on principles of reciprocal multilateralism and close NATO-EU relations, and produce a commitment to creating improved capabilities for expeditionary missions, S&R operations, and comprehensive approaches. Such an ambitious agenda, with all of its requirements for gear-shifting and new directions by both the United States and its European allies, cannot be accomplished overnight. But if the effort is launched and sustained, progress can be made in ways that have steady cumulative effects over a period of years and thereby help address today's threats while making key parts of the world more peaceful. This, at least, is the promise of such a compact and a dual-path approach.

How can this idea best be implemented in political terms in a manner that appeals to both the United States and Europe? One idea is to have a new transatlantic compact become the centerpiece of a grand summit whose attendees would include the United States, participating European countries, NATO, and the EU. At such a summit, the initial version of the compact could be adopted and issued as a special communiqué. Afterward, working groups could further develop its contents, and NATO could write a new strategic concept. A year or two later, another grand summit could be held to formally adopt conclusions and recommendations and launch further studies by working groups. Through regular, successive summits, coupled with ongoing studies, the compact could steadily expand.¹⁸

If the idea of grand U.S.-European summits fails to gain traction, the alternative is a less publicly visible approach that seeks progress via multiple avenues of action. In this option, the United States would first pursue close consultations with key European countries on the ingredients of such a compact. As consensus emerges, a new NATO strategic concept would be written. Afterward, this consensus would be gradually but steadily be expanded to NATO-EU relations and other venues of transatlantic collaboration. A single document embodying the full compact might not emerge anytime soon, but it could eventually be signed, and in practical terms, this multifaceted evolutionary approach could gradually help steer the transatlantic partnership in the right directions.

Both of these options have attractions and liabilities. The first offers the best prospects for big immediate success, but it would require mobilizing a widespread consensus on both sides of the Atlantic, perhaps in ways that exceed the art of the possible in today's situation. The second is less immediately ambitious, but it would face fewer political obstacles, and could gradually be expanded as consensus grows. Neither option offers an easy path, but either of them could succeed if it is pursued systematically. The key point is that if a new transatlantic compact is to be forged and brought to life (along with a new NATO strategic concept), one or the other of these options needs to be tried. In today's troubled world, the imperatives for action, and the potential payoffs, are too great to be ignored.

¹⁸ For further analysis of this option, see Kramer and Serfaty, "Recasting the Euro-Atlantic Partnership."

Appendix: NATO's Historical Experiences with New Strategic Concepts

DC 6/1 Initial Strategy of Deterrence and Defense Specialization (1949–1951)

When the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in early 1949, the Cold War was already underway, but the newly minted Alliance had no organizational structure or defense strategy to guide its efforts. Moreover, its military forces were perilously weak. In Central Europe, these forces included only about 8 ground divisions and 600 combat aircraft that were woefully inadequate to defend against the much larger Soviet army deployed in Eastern Europe. Had war broken out then, NATO's forces likely would have been defeated quickly. In this setting, NATO's defense ministers issued the first strategic concept in December 1949; it was approved by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in January 1950. DC 6/1 endorsed deterrence of war as the ultimate goal of NATO's defense plans for the Cold War. It also called on NATO members to cooperate to develop adequate forces for defending Europe and to create coordinated plans for employing these forces in the event deterrence failed.

DC 6/1 did not, however, produce an integrated plan for achieving these goals. Instead, it crafted a loose collection of principles for coordinating efforts by member nations. In essence, it called for an alliance based on national specialization and a division of labor rather than a uniform distribution of military missions. For example, the United States and Britain were assigned the missions of strategic bombardment and maritime defense. While both countries were also given the mission of providing supporting air and ground forces, the task of defending the European landmass was mainly given to the continental powers. At the time, France lacked a large army, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) had only recently achieved sovereignty and was not yet a member of NATO or permitted an army of its own, and other members were not well-armed. As NATO's military leaders realized, the best that could be expected in a war was a weak initial NATO defense effort along the Rhine River, followed by a long-term mobilization of U.S. and British military power in a prolonged campaign to regain lost ground. Such a defense concept fell well short of fulfilling the collective defense clause (Article 5) of the NATO treaty, but at the time, it was the most that the political traffic would bear in the United States, Britain, and elsewhere.

Because DC 6/1 was a compromise document that created a political-strategic vision without embracing long-term military requirements for coalition defense, it survived less than two years. But during its brief life-span, it helped bring important improvements to NATO's defense preparedness. Under its auspices, the SACEUR position was established and SHAPE Headquarters was created. It also helped inspire cooperative defense measures in such areas as common military doctrine, combined exercises, construction of military installations, standardization of maintenance, repair, and service facilities, and collaboration in research and development. Meanwhile, member countries began enlarging their military forces and strengthening their readiness. Such efforts helped establish a foundation of multilateral cooperation that proved critical when NATO began launching a major rearmament effort in 1952.¹⁹

¹⁹ For more details on DC 6/1 and NATO's other strategic concepts during the Cold War, see Richard L. Kugler, *Commitment to Purpose: How Alliance Partnership Won the Cold War* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003). See also Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945–1950* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979).

MC 14/1 NATO Defense Buildup and Collective Defense (1951–1957)

The period 1950–1951 witnessed an intensification of the Cold War, including outbreak of the Korean War, Soviet acquisition of nuclear weapons, and increases in the readiness of the Soviet Army. The result was a major increase in the military threat to NATO. The United States launched a major military buildup, and NATO followed suit. The new strategic concept, MC 14/1, was the first to be drafted by the NATO Military Committee, and the first to benefit from SHAPE's professional analyses of NATO's enduring military requirements. Strong political impetus came from the United States. Widespread consensus for MC 14/1 was achieved relatively quickly, but it required close coordination and consensus-building among NATO members.

MC 14/1 abandoned the old precept of defense specialization in favor of collective defense, integrated military formations under NATO commanders, and a theater-wide perspective. Representing a combination of U.S. and European thinking, it relied on American strategic nuclear bombardment and Alliance-wide mobilization to achieve ultimate victory in a war, but it also included plans for strengthening NATO's in-being continental forces. In Central Europe, it called for a NATO defense line on the Rhine River for a period of 5 years until Alliance force improvements permitted a more forward defense. It called for building 54 mobilizable divisions for defense of AFCENT (NATO Central Region), 21 divisions for defending AFSOUTH, and 14 divisions for defending AFNORTH. It also called for commensurate increases in NATO's air forces and naval power: it called for a total of 9,000 combat aircraft and 700 warships. When these forces proved unaffordable, NATO commissioned a study by a Temporary Council Committee led by three "wise men:" Averell Harriman (United States), Jean Monnet (France), and Edwin Plowden (U.K.). Their study produced the Lisbon Force Goals, which stretched out NATO's time horizon for achieving MC 14/1's ambitious goals and called for a balanced mixture of active and reserve forces. The Lisbon Goals were approved by the NAC in 1952.

Over the next 6 years, MC 14/1 provided the strategic framework for pursuing a host of political and military improvements that greatly increased NATO's security against the growing Soviet threat. The position of NATO Secretary General was established, the NAC was upgraded to include chiefs of state, and the SACLANT and CINCHAN military commands were established. NATO's rearmament effort accelerated. U.S. defense spending rose dramatically, and U.S. military assistance flowed to Europe. Between 1950 and 1954, annual defense spending by European members tripled. In Central Europe, active military manpower increased from 350,000 in 1949 to 600,000 in 1954. Animating this effort was a "transatlantic bargain" among the United States and its key European allies to provide an integrated defense posture in Central Europe that would protect the FRG. The United States committed to station five divisions there, Britain agreed to create a British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) of four or five divisions, Belgium and the Netherlands agreed to provide corps-sized forces, and France agreed to make significant commitments. In addition, an agreement was forged to rearm the FRG, which embarked on a long-term effort to create an army of twelve divisions and an air force of about 650 combat aircraft.

This set of transatlantic agreements had not only military import, but political significance that underscored a deepening commitment to collective defense and coalition planning. Combining the commitments of multiple members not only elevated NATO's overall strategic prospects, but also enabled each nation to pursue security goals that would have been impossible for any of them to achieve individually—a hallmark of NATO's growing effectiveness as the Cold War unfolded. Because rearmament was a slow process, initial efforts were not enough to meet the Lisbon goals. By 1956, nonetheless, NATO was able to field 17 active divisions, 2,000 armored vehicles, and 1600 combat aircraft in Central Europe—with promises of additional US wartime

reinforcements plus the gradual fielding of more German and French forces. Also important, NATO embarked on programs to increase training, bolster ammunition stockpiles, construct new airfields, and establish signal networks, pipelines, and storage facilities. These efforts fell short of creating a fully viable conventional defense posture, but they significantly elevated NATO combat power.

MC 14/2 Strategy of Massive Retaliation (1957–1967)

This period witnessed a further deepening of the Cold War and a growing military confrontation in Central Europe. The Soviet Union began deploying nuclear bombers and missiles, and strengthened Warsaw Pact conventional forces to pose an offensive threat of nearly 100 divisions and 4,000 combat aircraft. Cold War political tensions heated up, with the Berlin crisis a key focal point of growing Soviet assertiveness. NATO members in the mid-to-late 1950s were searching for ways to lessen the costs of military preparedness. New nuclear technologies, weapons, and delivery systems seemed to answer their needs, and the NATO summit of 1957 produced agreement on MC 14/2, which anchored NATO's defense plans on a large-scale theater nuclear operation backed by a massive nuclear blow against the Soviet Union in event of war. The central idea of MC 14/2 was that the threat of rapid nuclear escalation and devastating retaliation could reliably deter virtually all forms of Soviet aggression, including invasion of Central Europe. This new concept of massive retaliation reflected the Eisenhower Administration's strategic thinking and its political leadership of NATO. European members initially resisted this nuclear strategy, but eventually came to support it because it ensured U.S. nuclear guarantees while also lowering their own defense costs. Consequently MC 14/2 was adopted with widespread consensus across NATO, but only after searching analysis and debate over the strategic implications.

MC 14/2 was accompanied by major programs to strengthen U.S. and NATO nuclear forces. The United States initially deployed a large force of long-range strategic bombers, and then began constructing ICBMs and SLBMs. Britain and France also decided to become nuclear powers with bombers and missiles of their own. Meanwhile, the United States embarked on a program to deploy theater and tactical nuclear forces in Europe in the form of missiles, tactical aircraft, and tube artillery. Eventually the United States deployed about 7,000 nuclear warheads in Europe and adopted a program of cooperation that enabled allied forces to gain access to tactical nuclear weapons for theater war-fighting. By the late 1950s, NATO was rapidly becoming well-endowed with a nuclear posture capable of deterrence and defense. The effect was to upgrade NATO's overall security at a time of mounting dangers.

By the early 1960s, growing attention was devoted to NATO conventional forces, whose improvement efforts had slowed during the late 1950s. This effort was especially led by the Kennedy Administration, but it also benefited from growing support by NATO's military authorities. Initially, several European members, including Germany, were hesitant about any weakening of nuclear deterrence, but they eventually came to see value in practical, affordable steps to enhance NATO's conventional posture. In Central Europe, the main focus was on fielding a force of 30 divisions and 2,000 tactical combat aircraft that could forge a cohesive defense line across the 750-kilometer AFCENT front. In the late 1950s, NATO had moved its defense front from the Rhine River to the vicinity of the Weser-Lech Rivers, about 70 kilometers west of the inter-German border. Emergence of the German Army, with twelve first-class divisions, coupled with U.S. force modernization to enable this concept and allow NATO to contemplate a fully forward defense. By the mid-1960s, NATO moved its defense line to the inter-German border, and formed its layer-cake array of eight adjacent national corps formations. At the time, NATO still did not have enough ground and air forces in Central Europe for a sustained defense, and the U.S. military involvement in Vietnam prevented it from being able to

send large reinforcements in a crisis. In particular, a NATO ground posture of only 30 divisions lacked operational reserves in the rear areas, thereby making nuclear escalation the only alternative in the event of enemy breakthroughs of NATO's front line.

MC 14/3 Strategy of Flexible Response (1967–1991)

The mid-1960s saw the Soviet Union launch a sustained program to deploy many ICBMs and SLBMs, and to greatly bolster the Warsaw Pact's offensive capabilities with new tanks, armored fighting vehicles, and other weapons—even as Moscow began issuing calls for détente in Europe. MC 14/3 was partially a response to this growing military threat, but more fundamentally, it addressed strategic flaws in MC 14/2's reliance on massive nuclear retaliation as an all-purpose deterrent. Dissatisfaction with MC 14/2 began in the United States, where Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and other officials feared that the Soviet Union could employ its own nuclear forces to deter a NATO nuclear response, and thereby might feel free to use its powerful conventional forces to commit aggression against NATO's still-vulnerable conventional posture. In his famous address to NATO defense ministers at Athens, Greece, in 1962, McNamara called for NATO to broaden its defense strategy by bolstering its conventional forces so that they would have a stronger deterrent and defense capability of their own. McNamara's speech caused a political uproar in Europe, because many officials feared that greater reliance on conventional forces might weaken nuclear deterrence and invite non-nuclear war in Europe. More fundamentally, they feared that the United States might be trying to back away from its nuclear guarantees to NATO and Europe.

The resulting debate caused a deep transatlantic rift in NATO. Indeed, France withdrew from NATO's integrated military command, and some German officials publicly threatened to withdraw their country from NATO and build a nuclear deterrent force of their own. By the mid-1960s, however, NATO began employing its professional military staffs, its analytical talents, and its consensus-building mechanisms to find common ground. The result was agreement on MC 14/3, a strategy of flexible response that combined still-strong nuclear deterrence with enhanced conventional defenses in ways that satisfied both Americans and Europeans. MC 14/3 was written by NATO's Military Committee, but received major inputs from multiple members, including the United States, Britain, and the FRG. It required careful writing because it synthesized diverse military arguments, all of which had to be blended to advance the goals and interests of the various countries. This effort resulted in a document that employed military reasoning and political compromises to acutely balance perspectives on both sides of the Atlantic while equipping NATO with an improved defense strategy for the next phase of the Cold War. When MC 14/3 emerged, some critics accused it of being a compromise document that papered over still-existing disagreements and would not survive for long. Subsequent experience proved them wrong.

MC 14/3 embraced forward defense of NATO's borders, including the FRG. Within this framework, it called for three mutually supporting tiers of military operations: direct defense, deliberate escalation, and general nuclear response. Direct defense was mainly the province of conventional forces, deliberate escalation was the province of theater nuclear forces, and general nuclear response was the province of strategic nuclear forces, such as ICBMs, SLBMs, and long-range bombers. The core idea was not only to establish across-the-board deterrence with strong nuclear and conventional forces, but also to provide NATO a broad range of military options that could be selected flexibly in meeting the demands of crises. As a practical matter, MC 14/3 meant that NATO would meet enemy conventional aggression with a strong, initial conventional defense, and in event this defense buckled after a month or so, it would then cross the nuclear threshold deliberately and carefully, reserving massive retaliation as the final stage. MC 14/3 was thus a complex, multifaceted concept, but it proved successful because it made military and

political sense. The Americans were content because MC 14/3 upgraded the importance of conventional defense and flexible options. The Europeans were content because MC 14/3 preserved the nuclear deterrence umbrella intact and made the enemy aware that in event Europe was attacked, NATO would employ nuclear weapons to defend itself if conventional defense failed. NATO's military authorities were content because MC 14/3 provided them a coherent strategic theory that could be used to build strong nuclear and conventional defenses at the same time.

MC 14/3 was approved by the NAC in 1967. It was accompanied by another important NATO document, the Harmel Report. Written by a team of five outside "wise men," the Harmel Report was entitled "Future Tasks of the Alliance." It endorsed closer transatlantic consultation in meeting the demands of contemporary security affairs. In particular, it urged a combined NATO security policy of defense and détente. At the time, several European members wanted to respond to the Soviet Union's call for détente, which was first issued in 1966. The United States was worried that détente might create a false atmosphere of reconciliation in which NATO would lose its resolve to continue strengthening its military forces. The Harmel Report sought to balance these differing transatlantic viewpoints by calling for a careful approach to détente coupled with ongoing NATO defense improvements, continued stability, and eventual settlement of the German question (i.e., Germany's divided status). The Harmel Report had a positive effect because it helped enable NATO to pursue détente and defense preparedness at the same time. Prospects for détente slackened in 1968 when the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia, but interest rose again in the early 1970s. Under the Harmel Report's auspices, NATO's members pursued SALT nuclear negotiations, an ABM Treaty, MBFR negotiations on conventional force levels, and the Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). These diplomatic efforts produced mixed results by the mid-1970s, but owing to the Harmel Report's consensus, they did not derail NATO's commitment to pursue the military wherewithal for MC 14/3.

Faced with an accelerating Soviet military buildup, NATO's initial foray into defense preparedness under MC 14/3 was a 5-year plan adopted in 1967. In 1970, NATO adopted a 10-year plan named AD-70, which focused on practical steps in such areas as training and exercises, war reserve stocks, and infrastructure. Progress initially was slow because of limited European defense budgets, but within a few years, the political atmosphere across NATO began to change. A critical development came when the United States withdrew from Vietnam and switched its defense strategy to focus on NATO and Europe. In response to U.S. leadership, Germany, Britain, and France began devoting growing attention to the preparedness of their ground and air forces, as did other NATO members. Equally important, new military technologies and weapon systems began emerging from the R&D pipeline that aided NATO's strategy: e.g., modern tanks, self-propelled artillery pieces, antitank missiles, infantry fighting vehicles, air defense missiles, combat aircraft, and sophisticated munitions made it increasingly possible for an outnumbered NATO defender to contend with a larger Warsaw Pact attacker.

Under the Carter Administration in 1977, the United States led an effort to build Alliance-wide consensus to launch the Long Term Defense Plan (LTDP), a new 10-year plan with a comprehensive focus on readiness, interoperability, and stronger conventional forces. A centerpiece of the LTDP was a U.S. commitment to provide a rapid reinforcement capability of ten divisions and twenty fighter wings in order to help strengthen NATO's defenses in the early stages of a crisis. In addition, Germany began adding reserve brigades to its army, and France organized an army of six divisions to aid NATO in event of a war. In 1981, the LTDP gave way to the Conventional Defense Initiative (CDI), another multi-year effort that was sponsored by the Reagan Administration. Although the Reagan years are mostly associated with NATO's decision to deploy Pershing II and GLCM nuclear missiles, behind the scenes sustained progress was

made on improving NATO's conventional forces with more combat units, new weapons, new doctrines, better air defenses, and improved air-ground coordination.

By the late 1980s, NATO was capable of generating a D-Day force in Central Europe of about 45 divisions and 3,600 combat aircraft, backed by additional U.S. reinforcements later. As a result, NATO now had sufficient ground forces not only to forge a frontal line, but also to generate operational reserves for containing enemy breakthroughs and for performing maneuver operations of its own. In addition, the combination of NATO ground and air forces provided the firepower needed to inflict very high losses on enemy forces and possibly to stop an attack without having to employ nuclear weapons. NATO's defenses were still not perfect, but the Warsaw Pact was now susceptible to failure too. The effect was to greatly lessen NATO's vulnerability to surprise attack and political intimidation, to reduce undue reliance on nuclear escalation, and to raise legitimate doubts about the Soviet Union's ability to prevail over NATO in a conventional war. When Moscow called for an end to the Cold War in 1989–1990, this sudden development owed partly to the USSR's own perilous economy and political system, but it also owed partly to NATO's success at building strong nuclear and conventional defenses that frustrated the USSR's expensive, fruitless quest for military superiority in Europe. In no small way, this favorable outcome owed to MC 14/3, which enabled NATO to surmount its debates over defense strategy to mount a concerted, sustained effort to build the modern military forces that were mandated by the final two decades of the Cold War.

Strategic Concept of Rome Summit (1991–1999)

Although MC 14/3 proved to be NATO's longest-lasting strategic concept, its useful life came to an end when the Cold War abruptly concluded. During 1989–1991, the European security situation was fundamentally transformed by the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the withdrawal of Soviet military forces from Eastern Europe, and finally, dissolution of the Soviet Union itself. These profound changes not only swept away the Cold War military threat facing NATO, but also created a newly freed zone of East European states that mostly were striving to become democracies and draw closer to western institutions, including NATO. This hopeful development in Central Europe, however, was accompanied by worrisome trends elsewhere. In 1991, the United States led a large coalition, under UN auspices, to eject Iraq from Kuwait. Success of the Desert Storm campaign, however, left a still-unstable Persian Gulf in its wake. Shortly afterward, Yugoslavia in the Balkans began unraveling, and savage ethnic fighting broke out in Bosnia. For such reasons, the post-Cold War era of the 1990s promised to bring a combination of opportunities and dangers, both of which required wise U.S. and European policies in response.

During 1990–1991, a debate broke out over how NATO should respond to the new European security situation and other challenges. Some participants no longer saw a need for NATO to remain as a close defense alliance with strong military forces. Indeed, a few recommended that NATO should be dissolved and that the United States and Europe no longer needed their transatlantic partnership. NATO's members, however, saw things differently and wanted to preserve their alliance intact while also making changes mandated by the new security conditions. After a relatively brief period of internal debate and soul-searching, the result was agreement to issue a new NATO strategic concept at the Rome Summit of 1991.²⁰ Made available to the public (rather than kept classified), this document provided a rich synthesis of political and military analyses that blended a new security policy with a new defense strategy. The Rome concept was drafted at NATO headquarters, but involved analytical inputs and close coordination from the United States, Britain, Germany, France, and other members. As a result, it embodied a new,

²⁰ Available at <<http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b911108a.htm>>.

widespread consensus across the Alliance that provided broad guidance on how the future was to be addressed.

The Rome concept's most important tenet was its firm statement that the transatlantic link would be maintained, that NATO would continue to perform its traditional defense mission, and that it would prepare for new responsibilities in the Euro-Atlantic area. It said that NATO's overriding objective is to safeguard the security of its members and to establish a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe through both political and military means. It called for a broad-based Alliance security policy based on three mutually reinforcing elements: dialogue, cooperation, and collective defense. Its call for dialogue was focused widely, to include all European countries as well as Russia and its neighbors. It stressed that in working to create a new European security architecture and to quell new forms of instability, NATO should cooperate closely with other institutions, including the European Community (EC), the West European Union (WEU), and the CSCE as well as with other regional bodies from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. In addition, it asserted that NATO needed to take into account global security affairs and associated risks, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), disruption of the flow of vital resources, and acts of terrorism and sabotage that could affect the Alliance's vital interests. It pointed out that Article 4 of the NATO treaty permits members to consult in deciding how to handle threats and dangers outside Alliance borders. Also important, the Rome concept called on NATO to be prepared for new-era crisis response roles and requirements, rather than just collective defense of NATO's borders against traditional threats. In the defense arena, it called for downsizing of NATO's military forces for the Cold War, but it also mandated preservation of enough forces to meet new-era dangers, as well as efforts to make NATO's forces more mobile, multinational, and flexible for crisis management missions.

Seen in retrospect, the Rome concept comes across as getting the strategic basics correct, but also as understandably vague about future security challenges. Even so, it endured for 8 years and helped establish a framework for new NATO security and defense activities during its tenure. Under its auspices, NATO began its historic move eastward by establishing the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), and took steps to begin admitting new members, which got underway in 1999, when Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic joined the Alliance. During the mid-1990s, NATO, surmounting its initial hesitation, finally intervened in the Bosnia conflict, and, when the Dayton Accord was signed in 1995, established a Stabilization Force (SFOR) to perform peacekeeping there. In early 1999, NATO went to war in the Balkans to eject Serbia from Kosovo, and afterward established a Kosovo Force (KFOR) for peacekeeping. These operations in the Balkans opened the door to NATO employment of military forces outside Member borders when common interests and values were threatened.

In the military sphere, NATO reorganized its military command structure, reduced its European forces by about 35 percent below Cold War levels, and trimmed its defense budgets by proportional amounts. The United States reduced its Cold War posture in Europe of 330,000 troops, but agreed to keep 100,000 troops there composed of land, air, and naval forces. Meanwhile, NATO began pursuing multinational, corps-sized formations, and endeavoring to create better forces for new-era missions, established the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) as well as Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs). It also agreed to support European efforts to create a "European Security and Defense Identity" (ESDI), including steps to endow the EU/WEU with its own military forces and to draw on NATO forces, if necessary. Such efforts helped keep Alliance borders well-protected and strengthened NATO's capacity to perform new peacekeeping and crisis response operations elsewhere. But, despite repeated calls from NATO's military leaders for further reform, the Alliance made little progress in preparing its European forces for swift power projection missions at long distances. Apart from Britain and France, European forces remained mostly configured for continental missions, and thus lacked the mobility, logistic

support, and other assets needed for expeditionary operations alongside U.S. forces. The 1990s ended with NATO agreeing on a Defense Capability Initiative (DCI), a 10-year plan to upgrade its capabilities in these areas, but subsequent progress on the DCI proved slow.