

Department of State



PAGE 02 OF 11 STATE 339906  
ORIGIN NODS-00

CO1/05 001692 NOD14

INFO OCT-00 /000 R

DRAFTED BY EUR/SOV: TWSIMOMS/AYERSHBOW: AV  
APPROVED BY P: MHARMACOST  
EUR: RBURT  
EUR: MPALMER  
S/S: BMCKINLEY  
P: MPENDLETON:  
S/S-O: AESHIPPIY  
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION  
NOT TO ADS

-----136365 160353Z /62  
O 160315Z NOV 84 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 339906

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, PPDC, UR, US  
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO CHERNENKO

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT
2. AMBASSADOR SHOULD SEEK MEETING WITH GROMYKO TO PRESENT TEXT OF PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO CHERNENKO (PARA 3). IN PRESENTING LETTER, AMBASSADOR SHOULD ALSO USE POINTS PARA 4 ON "UMBRELLA" CONCEPT. PLEASE INFORM DEPT. WHEN APPOINTMENT WITH GROMYKO SCHEDULED; WE WILL PROVIDE SOVIET EMBASSY COPY OF LETTER AT AME TIME.
3. BEGIN TEXT:

199-051 #266

SECRET  
Department of State



PAGE 03 OF 11 STATE 339906

C01/05 001692 NOD143

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

- THANK YOU FOR YOUR REPLY TO MY ORAL MESSAGE TRANSMITTED THROUGH AMBASSADOR HARTMAN AND FOR YOUR CONGRATULATIONS UPON MY REELECTION. I AM ESPECIALLY- PLEASED TO NOTE THAT WE ARE BOTH PREPARED TO SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS THAT STAND BEFORE US AND TO ADDRESS THE TASK OF ELIMINATING THE NUCLEAR THREAT. I WOULD LIKE TO CONVEY SOME OF MY THOUGHTS ABOUT WHAT WE CAN DO TO BRING THIS ABOUT.

- AS I PREPARE TO EMBARK ON THE NEXT FOUR YEARS OF MY PRESIDENCY, I SEE NO MORE IMPORTANT TASK BEFORE ME THAN ENSURING PEACE AND GREATER SECURITY, NOT ONLY FOR THE UNITED STATES, BUT FOR ALL COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD. IT IS A FACT OF LIFE THAT OUR TWO GREAT COUNTRIES SHARE IN RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAKING MANKIND MORE PEACEFUL AND MORE SECURE. NEITHER OF US ALONE CAN SUCCEED IN THIS TASK.

- OF COURSE, WE WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES IN OUR POLITICAL BELIEFS, AND BOTH OF US WILL DEFEND THE INTERESTS OF OUR COUNTRIES VIGOROUSLY. NEVERTHELESS, I AM CONVINCED THAT OUR DIVERGENT INTERESTS NEED NOT -- AND (BEGIN UNDERSCORE) MUST (END UNDERSCORE) NOT -- BRING US INTO CONFLICT. WE HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO ACT TO PUT OUR RELATIONSHIP ON A SAFER AND MORE CONSTRUCTIVE COURSE, AND TO EXPAND COOPERATION AS MUCH AS CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT.

- THE WORLD HAS UNDERGONE PROFOUND CHANGES OVER THE LAST FOUR DECADES, AND YOU AND I HAVE WITNESSED BOTH THE BEST AND WORST TIMES IN SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS. THE

TWO OF US TODAY HAVE NOT ONLY THE POWER, BUT THE RESPONSIBILITY, TO BRING ABOUT CONSTRUCTIVE CHANGES IN



SECRET  
Department of State

S/S-0  
OUTGOING

PAGE 04 OF 11 STATE 339906

C01/05 001692 NOD14

OUR RELATIONSHIP. INDEED, WE OWE IT TO THE ENTIRE WORLD TO DO ALL WE CAN TO SEEK PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF OUR DIFFERENCES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR COOPERATION WHEREVER POSSIBLE.

- I HAVE STUDIED CAREFULLY OUR PREVIOUS CORESPONDENCE AND YOUR RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS. THE DISCUSSIONS - SECRETARY SHULTZ AND I HAD WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER GROMYKO IN SEPTEMBER, AS WELL AS THE SUBSEQUENT EXCHANGES BETWEEN MR. GROMYKO AND MR. SHULTZ WITH OUR RESPECTIVE AMBASSADORS, HAVE BEEN MOST USEFUL. SECRETARY SHULTZ HAS ALSO REPORTED TO ME ON HIS NECESSARILY BRIEF BUT ENCOURAGING MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER TIKHONOV IN NEW DELHI.

- IN REVIEWING THIS RECORD, I HAVE BEEN LOOKING TO THE FUTURE RATHER THAN TO THE PAST, SINCE MY APPROACH IS STRATEGIC RATHER THAN TACTICAL. THE CONCLUSIONS I WOULD DRAW FROM THESE VARIOUS COMMUNICATIONS AND MEETINGS IS THAT WE ARE IN AGREEMENT ON A NUMBER OF BASIC PRINCIPLES WHICH SHOULD GOVERN OUR RELATIONS, BUT THAT WE HAVE NOT YET FOUND THE PRACTICAL MEANS TO MOVE OUR RELATIONSHIP BEYOND USEFUL SMALL STEPS ON BILATERAL ISSUES TOWARD A MORE PRODUCTIVE OVERALL COURSE. ON SUCH IMPORTANT MATTERS AS THE OBJECTIVE OF PEACE AND THE GOAL OF REDUCING AND EVENTUALLY ELIMINATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WE HAVE A COMMON VIEW. BUT AT THIS POINT, IT SEEMS TO ME, WE MUST CONCENTRATE OUR ATTENTION ON HOW TO MOVE FORWARD IN PRACTICAL WAYS.

- EXPERIENCE SHOWS, I BELIEVE, THAT WE CANNOT DO THIS IF EITHER OF US DEMANDS CONCESSIONS OF THE OTHER IN ADVANCE. I AM CONVINCED THAT WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OUR TWO COUNTRIES FACE IF WE SHOULD REQUIRE SOVIET CONCESSIONS PRIOR TO NEGOTIATIONS. WE POSE NO SUCH REQUIREMENT, AND IF YOU CAN ADOPT AN

SECRET  
Department of State



PAGE 05 OF 11 STATE 339906

C01/05 001692 NOD14

ANALOGOUS POSITION, THIS WOULD OPEN THE WAY FOR FINDING REALISTIC SOLUTIONS TO REAL PROBLEMS.

- THE SUGGESTIONS I MADE IN MY ADDRESS TO THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON SEPTEMBER 24 REFLECTED MY DESIRE TO FIND MEANS ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH OF US FOR ADDRESSING THE ISSUES BEFORE US. I KEPT MY SUGGESTIONS GENERAL, BECAUSE I WISHED TO PRESERVE THE POSSIBILITY OF CONSULTING WITH YOU PRIVATELY AND THUS DEVELOPING IDEAS COOPERATIVELY. BUT LET ME TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO GIVE YOU MY CURRENT THINKING ON THEM.

- ONE QUESTION THAT MUST BE ADDRESSED IS HOW WE GO ABOUT THE TASK OF NEGOTIATING NEW ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS. I THINK OUR FOREIGN MINISTERS, BOTH DIRECTLY AND THROUGH AMBASSADORS, SHOULD PLAY AN INCREASINGLY ACTIVE ROLE, AS WAS THE PRACTICE IN PREVIOUS YEARS. IN THIS CONTEXT, I HAVE SUGGESTED THAT WE INITIATE TALKS WHICH ADDRESS BROADER STRATEGIC CONCEPTS THAN DO THE FORA AVAILABLE TO US UP TO NOW. THE OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO CREATE A FIRMER FOUNDATION FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON THE WHOLE RANGE OF SPECIFIC ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE PROCESS OF REDUCING ARMS AND INCREASING STABILITY. I VISUALIZE SUCH TALKS AS PROVIDING AN "UMBRELLA" UNDER WHICH SPECIFIC ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE PLANNED, AND SUGGESTIONS FROM BOTH SIDES COULD BE EXAMINED, WITH THE GOAL OF FINDING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE APPROACHES FOR NEGOTIATION.

- GEORGE SHULTZ HAS SUGGESTED TO ME THAT ONE WAY TO TEST THIS CONCEPT WOULD BE FOR BOTH OF US TO DESIGNATE A REPRESENTATIVE WHO IS THOROUGHLY FAMILIAR WITH THE STRATEGIC THINKING OF HIS HIGHEST POLITICAL AUTHORITY AND WHO WOULD MEET WITH HIS COUNTERPART WITH A MANDATE TO DEVELOP SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR SUBMISSION TO US FOR CONSIDERATION. OF COURSE, THEIR CONSULTATIONS AND



## Department of State

PAGE 06 OF 11 STATE 339906

CB1/05 001692 NOD14

RECOMMENDATIONS WOULD BE TOTALLY CONFIDENTIAL. IF INITIAL EXPERIENCE WITH THIS PROCEDURE SHOULD BE POSITIVE, WE COULD CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF CARRYING IT FORWARD AS A CONTINUING MEANS OF CONTACT TO PROVIDE ADVICE AND GUIDANCE TO THE TOTAL ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

- IF YOU AGREE THAT THE IDEA HAS MERIT, I AM PREPARED TO APPOINT A PERSON OF NATIONAL STATURE IN THE ARMS CONTROL AREA TO WORK WITH GEORGE SHULTZ AND ME.

- IN OUR CORRESPONDENCE AND IN YOUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS, YOU HAVE PLACED GREAT STRESS ON THE QUESTION OF NEGOTIATIONS ON "PREVENTING THE MILITARIZATION OF OUTER SPACE." IN HIS DISCUSSIONS HERE, MR. GROMYKO REAFFIRMED THE IMPORTANCE THE SOVIET UNION ATTACHES TO THIS ISSUE. AS I SAID IN OUR MEETING, THE UNITED STATES IS READY TO MEET WITH YOU TO DISCUSS SPACE WEAPONS, AND WE HAVE NO PRECONDITIONS AS TO THE FORM OR SCOPE OF THE DISCUSSIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, WE BELIEVE THAT THE MOST PRESSING ISSUE IS HOW TO BEGIN THE PROCESS OF REDUCING OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS. I THINK YOUR OWN EXPERTS WOULD AGREE THAT THESE TWO AREAS ARE INHERENTLY RELATED, EVEN THOUGH WE MAY ULTIMATELY CHOOSE, AS WAS THE CASE IN THE PAST, TO DISCUSS THEM IN SEPARATE NEGOTIATING FORA. THE BROADER, "UMBRELLA," CONSULTATIONS I HAVE SUGGESTED COULD GIVE US A VEHICLE FOR AGREEING ON APPROACHES TO THE INTERRELATED ISSUES.

- NUCLEAR AND SPACE WEAPONS ARE NOT THE ONLY ARMS CONTROL AREAS IN WHICH WE SHOULD STRIVE TO MAKE PROGRESS IN THE COMING YEARS. NUCLEAR TESTING IS ANOTHER. I HAVE

TAKEN NOTE OF YOUR SUGGESTION THAT RATIFICATION OF THE 1974 AND 1976 TREATIES WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO PROGRESS ON OTHER SUBJECTS. IN THIS REGARD, YOU ARE AWARE OF THE SUGGESTION I MADE IN MY UNITED NATIONS ADDRESS THAT WE EACH INVITE EXPERTS FROM THE OTHER COUNTRY FOR DIRECT

## Department of State

S/S-0  
OUTGOI

PAGE 07 OF 11 STATE 339906

C01/05 001692 NOD14

MEASUREMENT OF UPCOMING UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTS. THERE HAVE BEEN UNCERTAINTIES ON BOTH SIDES ABOUT WHETHER THE YIELDS OF CERTAIN TESTS HAVE BEEN BELOW THE 150-KILOTON LIMIT ESTABLISHED IN THE 1974 TREATY. THE DIRECT MEASUREMENT I HAVE SUGGESTED, WHILE SEPARATE FROM THE TREATY RATIFICATION ISSUE, MIGHT REDUCE THOSE UNCERTAINTIES IN RELIABLE FASHION TO THE POINT WHERE THE PATH TO RATIFICATION WOULD AGAIN BE OPEN.

- ANOTHER AREA WHERE POSITIVE RESULTS COULD BE ACHIEVED IS THAT OF MEASURES TO ENHANCE CONFIDENCE AND REDUCE THE RISK OF CONFLICT ARISING THROUGH ACCIDENT OR MISCALCULATION. AT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE, WE HAVE AGREED TO YOUR PROPOSAL TO DISCUSS NON-USE-OF-FORCE COMMITMENTS. IN THE CONTEXT OF NEGOTIATIONS ON MEASURES TO GIVE THAT PRINCIPLE CONCRETE NEW MEANING. WITH POLITICAL WILL ON BOTH SIDES, THIS SHOULD PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR AN AGREEMENT THAT MEETS BOTH SIDES' INTERESTS. BILATERALLY, WE HAVE AGREED ON STEPS TO IMPROVE OUR DIRECT COMMUNICATION LINK, AND THERE ARE FURTHER WAYS TO IMPROVE COMMUNICATION THAT I WOULD HOPE WE COULD EXPLORE IN THE COMING YEAR.

- I ALSO HOPE YOU WILL GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE OTHER SUGGESTIONS I HAVE MADE CONCERNING WAYS OF MOVING FORWARD NOT ONLY IN ARMS CONTROL BUT IN OTHER FIELDS:

- MEETINGS AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL ARE ONE EXAMPLE. OUR MINISTERS OF AGRICULTURE MET IN 1983 AND WILL BE MEETING AGAIN SOON. WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE DISCUSSION OF BILATERAL COOPERATIVE ACTIVITIES IN A NUMBER OF OTHER FIELDS PROGRESS TO THE POINT WHERE WE COULD ENVISAGE JOINT COMMISSION MEETINGS AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL NEXT YEAR. IN THE DEFENSE FIELD, TOO, OUR MINISTERS HAVE MET IN THE PAST, AND THE TALKS BETWEEN OUR NAVIES IN THE



SECRET

# Department of State

S/S-0 /  
OUTGOING

PAGE 08 OF 11 STATE 339906

CB1/05 001692 NOD14

CONTEXT OF THE AGREEMENT TO AVOID INCIDENTS AT SEA HAVE BEEN USEFUL. I THINK FURTHER EXCHANGES BETWEEN SENIOR OFFICIALS ON VARIOUS DEFENSE ISSUES WOULD BE A PROMISING WAY OF REDUCING MISUNDERSTANDING. THIS IS THE CONTEXT IN WHICH I SUGGESTED SUCH POSSIBILITIES AS EXCHANGES OF OBSERVERS AT MILITARY EXERCISES AND EXCHANGES OF FIVE-YEAR DEFENSE PROCUREMENT PLANS.

- REGULARIZED MEETINGS AT THE POLICY LEVEL ON REGIONAL ISSUES WOULD BE ANOTHER APPROPRIATE WAY TO ENHANCE OUR DIALOGUE. THE DANGER OF TURBULENCE AND INSTABILITY IN VARIOUS REGIONS REINFORCES MY CONVICTION THAT IT IS IMPORTANT FOR US TO BE EXPLAINING OUR POLICY APPROACHES CONCERNING REGIONAL ISSUES TO EACH OTHER MORE SYSTEMATICALLY THAN IN THE PAST. PLACING OUR DISCUSSIONS OF REGIONAL ISSUES ON A MORE SYSTEMATIC BASIS WOULD HELP US TO UNDERSTAND MORE FULLY EACH OTHER'S APPROACH AND WOULD AT LEAST REDUCE FURTHER THE DANGER OF MISCALCULATION IN TIMES OF CRISIS. WE HAVE MADE SPECIFIC OFFERS FOR EXPERTS' TALKS ON THE MIDDLE EAST, SOUTHERN AFRICA AND AFGHANISTAN, AND HOPE YOU WILL BE ABLE TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THESE PROPOSALS.

- QUESTIONS IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS HAVE NOT FIGURED PROMINENTLY IN OUR CORRESPONDENCE, BUT I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT I AM STRONGLY IN FAVOR OF CONCRETE STEPS TO INCREASE COOPERATION IN THE CULTURAL, ECONOMIC AND SCHOLARLY FIELDS, AND TO EXPAND CONTACTS TO THE MUTUAL BENEFIT OF OUR PEOPLES. I HOPE THAT WE CAN FIND WAYS TO GIVE NEW MOMENTUM TO AN INVIGORATION OF ACTIVITIES IN THESE AREAS. IN THIS CONNECTION, LET ME SAY ONCE AGAIN THAT STEPS BY THE SOVIET UNION TO RESOLVE PENDING HUMANITARIAN ISSUES CAN HAVE A VERY IMPORTANT POSITIVE INFLUENCE IN EVERY OTHER FIELD OF OUR RELATIONSHIP, FOR THE REASONS I EXPLAINED TO FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO.

SECRET



SECRET

# Department of State

S/S-0  
OUTGOING

PAGE 09 OF 11 STATE 339906

C01/05 001692 NOD143

- SO THAT WE CAN MOVE FROM CONSULTATION TO ACTION --  
THE CONCRETE DEEDS WE BOTH WANT -- I HOPE THAT WE CAN  
IMPLEMENT THESE IDEAS AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE.

- OUR FOREIGN MINISTERS CAN FOLLOW UP IN GREATER DETAIL  
ON ALL THE VARIOUS ISSUES BETWEEN US, AND I BELIEVE THAT  
AN EARLY MEETING BETWEEN THEM MIGHT BE USEFUL.

- LET ME SAY ONCE AGAIN THAT I VALUE OUR  
CORRESPONDENCE, AND I LOOK FORWARD TO RECEIVING YOUR  
REACTION TO MY THOUGHTS AND PROPOSALS.

- - SINCERELY,

- - RONALD REAGAN

HIS EXCELLENCY

KONSTANTIN USTINOVICH CHERNENKO

CHAIRMAN, PRESIDUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET

- - OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS  
MOSCOW

END TEXT

#### 4. TALKING POINTS ON THE "UMBRELLA" CONCEPT:

-- THE PRESIDENT IS PREPARED TO NAME A REPRESENTATIVE OF  
NATIONAL STATURE WITH WHOM HE AND SECRETARY SHULTZ WOULD  
WORK CLOSELY. WE WOULD EXPECT THAT HIS INTERLOCUTOR  
WOULD BE A SENIOR OFFICIAL WITH THE FULL CONFIDENCE OF  
THE POLITBURO.

-- FOR OUR PART, THE PRESIDENT'S REPRESENTATIVE WOULD NOT  
COME FROM OUR NORMAL BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURE; WE OF COURSE  
WILL NOT PRESUME TO ADVISE THE SOVIETS ON THEIR CHOICE,



SECRET  
Department of State



PAGE 18 OF 11 STATE 339906

C01/05 001692 NOD14

AND WE RECOGNIZE THAT OUR SYSTEMS ARE DIFFERENT. HOWEVER, IF THE CONCEPT IS TO WORK, WE WOULD HOPE THAT THEY WOULD NAME AN INDIVIDUAL WHO IS ABLE TO EXPLORE CONCEPTS INFORMALLY AND RELIABLY ON BEHALF OF THEIR HIGHEST POLITICAL AUTHORITY.

-- WE HAVE IN MIND INDIVIDUALS, NOT DELEGATIONS. (THE INDIVIDUALS, OF COURSE, MIGHT HAVE AN ASSISTANT OR NOTE TAKER WITH THEM.) BUT THE PURPOSE IS TO ENGAGE OUR HIGHEST AUTHORITIES IN FRANK, CONFIDENTIAL, SUSTAINED DISCUSSIONS OF HOW TO PROCEED IN ARMS CONTROL.

-- AS FOR AGENDA, WE ARE PREPARED TO ADDRESS (BEGIN UNDERSCORE) ALL (END UNDERSCORE) ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS BOTH SIDES OFFER. MANY ARE ALREADY ON THE TABLE; OTHERS MAY BE ADVANCED. THE OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO AGREE ON A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ADDRESSING THEM AND SETTING PRIORITIES AND NEGOTIATING APPROACHES WHICH ARE MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY.

-- WE CAN DISCUSS THE AGENDA IN ADVANCE IF THEY WISH, OR WE CAN LEAVE THIS TO THE REPRESENTATIVES IN THEIR INITIAL MEETING.

-- AS FOR PLACE, WE ARE PREPARED TO SEND OUR REPRESENTATIVE TO A MUTUALLY AGREED LOCATION IN A THIRD COUNTRY.

-- WE WOULD ANTICIPATE AT LEAST TWO OR THREE SESSIONS, LASTING SEVERAL DAYS EACH (WITH BREAKS TO CONSULT POLITICAL AUTHORITIES IN CAPITALS).

-- ON OUR PART, WE WOULD UNDERTAKE SPECIAL EFFORTS TO KEEP THE CONTACT SECURE FROM LEAKS AND PRESERVE CONFIDENTIALITY.

SECRET

S/S-0  
OUTGOI

SECRET  
Department of State



PAGE 11 OF 11 STATE 339906

-C01/05 001692 NOD14

-- WE ARE EAGER TO BEGIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, SO THAT WE  
CAN FIND A WAY TO PROCEED TO THE CONCRETE DEEDS BOTH  
SIDES WANT.

END TALKING POINTS.

SHULTZ

SECRET