



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET~~

February 4, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Press Guidance for Upcoming Soviet UN Mission
Reduction

We plan soon to notify the Soviets and the UN of our decision to require a reduction in the overall size of the Soviet UN Missions by approximately 100 personnel. The date of the announcement is tentatively set for February 14. This date may still be subject to further change depending on a number of issues in U.S.-Soviet relations. A ceiling of 170 permanently assigned personnel for the Soviet UN Missions will be imposed over a two-year period, with subceilings of 10 each for the Ukrainian and Byelorussian UN Missions.

We are forwarding to you a copy of the press guidance and the contingency statement. This information continues to be sensitive, and should not be released until the news becomes public. The statement will not be issued when we inform the Soviets, but will be released only in response to press inquiries.

Nicholas Platt
for Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Contingency Statement on Soviet UN Missions
Press Guidance

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by Q/S NARA, Date 7/2/02

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REDUCING THE SIZE OF THE SOVIET
MISSIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS

On February 14, the United States Government officially informed the Soviet Mission to the United Nations and the United Nations Secretary General that the Soviet UN Missions (Soviet, Ukrainian, and Byelorussian) must be reduced in four stages over a two-year period from the current level of 275 to a staffing level of 170 permanently assigned personnel by April 1, 1988. Under this overall ceiling, there is a subceiling of ten each for the Byelorussian and Ukrainian UN Missions.

The United States Government has long been concerned about the unreasonably large size of the Soviet UN Missions. The current size of the Soviet UN Missions is not warranted by the staffing needs for official UN business. Moreover, it poses a threat to U.S. national security. Over the years, the United States Government has made clear to the Soviet authorities its concern that Soviet UN Missions personnel have engaged in inappropriate activities. The Soviet UN Missions, unfortunately, have continued to engage in activities unrelated to UN business, including espionage.

Our action is a reasonable, prudent step. We have structured the reductions in a way intended to minimize dislocations for the Soviet UN Missions. Even after the reductions are achieved, the Soviet representation to the UN will continue to be larger than that of any other country.

We have imposed this ceiling after careful consideration. It is consistent with our obligations under the UN Headquarters Agreement and under international law. We do not believe this move need have a negative impact on our bilateral relations. We look forward to continuing the efforts begun by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in their Geneva meeting to build a more constructive foundation for U.S.-Soviet relations.

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IF NEWS LEAKS BEFORE INFORMING SOVIETS:

Q. Is it true that the U.S. is planning to require a reduction in the size of the Soviet UN Missions?

A. -- WE HAVE NO COMMENT.

Q. Why is the US taking this step now, and won't this action impair bilateral relations with the USSR? Won't this step complicate prospects for a Reagan-Gorbachev summit?

A. -- WE SEE NO REASON WHY THIS STEP SHOULD IMPAIR US-SOVIET RELATIONS. THE SIZE OF THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS IS NOT CONNECTED TO US-SOVIET BILATERAL RELATIONS. WE LOOK FORWARD TO CONTINUING OUR EFFORTS TO BUILD ON THE RESULTS OF THE GENEVA SUMMIT. THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE IN THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITMENT TO HOLD A SUMMIT MEETING WITH GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV.

Q. How did you inform the Soviets, and what was their reaction?

A. -- WE INFORMED THE SOVIETS AT APPROXIMATELY THE SAME TIME THAT WE INFORMED THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL. WE DO NOT WISH TO CHARACTERIZE CONFIDENTIAL DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS.

Q. How was the size of the reduction determined, and how will it be achieved? What if the Soviets don't cooperate?

A. -- THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS ARE LARGER THAN THE NEXT TWO LARGEST MISSIONS COMBINED [US - APPROX. 126, AND PRC APPROX. 116]. MOREOVER, THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS HAVE DOUBLED IN SIZE OVER THE LAST TWO DECADES.

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THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS DO NOT JUSTIFY 275 PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED MISSION MEMBERS TO CONDUCT OFFICIAL UN BUSINESS. WE BELIEVE THAT 170 PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED PERSONNEL [WITH SUBCEILINGS OF TEN EACH FOR THE BYELORUSSIAN AND UKRAINIAN MISSIONS] IS AMPLE FOR THE NEEDS OF THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS. EVEN AFTER THIS REDUCTION, THE SIZE OF THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS WILL BE LARGER THAN THAT OF ANY OTHER COUNTRY.

REDUCTIONS FROM THE PRESENT LEVEL OF APPROXIMATELY 275 TO 170 PERSONNEL WILL BE ACHIEVED IN FOUR STAGES BETWEEN APRIL 1, 1986 AND APRIL 1, 1988. WE HAVE REQUESTED THAT THE SOVIETS IDENTIFY AT EACH STAGE THOSE POSITIONS THEY WISH TO RETAIN UNDER THE CEILING. WE WILL ONLY ISSUE VISAS TO FILL OR REPLACE IDENTIFIED POSITIONS UNDER THE CEILING.

WE ANTICIPATE THE REDUCTION WILL BE ACHIEVED MOSTLY THROUGH ATTRITION, AND SHOULD RESULT IN MINIMAL DISLOCATION FOR THE SOVIET MISSIONS. WE WILL MONITOR SOVIET COMPLIANCE TO ENSURE THAT THE REDUCTIONS ARE ACHIEVED.

IF THE SOVIETS REFUSE TO IDENTIFY POSITIONS THEY WISH TO RETAIN UNDER THE CEILING, WE WILL ONLY ISSUE VISAS UP TO THE PERMITTED CEILING. THE FOUR TRANCHES OVER A TWO YEAR PERIOD WILL REQUIRE THE SOVIET MISSION ITSELF (EXCLUDING

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THE BYELORUSSIAN AND UKRAINIAN MISSIONS) TO REDUCE FROM ITS PRESENT LEVEL OF APPROXIMATELY 243 TO 218 BY SEPTEMBER 1. REDUCTIONS IN TURN WILL PROCEED ACCORDINGLY: DOWN TO 195 BY APRIL 1, 1987; DOWN TO 173 BY SEPTEMBER 1, 1987; AND DOWN TO 150 BY APRIL 1, 1988. SIMILARLY, THE UKRAINIAN AND BYELORUSSIAN MISSIONS MUST REDUCE FROM THEIR PRESENT SIZE OF 17 AND 15, RESPECTIVELY, TO 13 EACH BY APRIL 1, 1987, AND TEN EACH BY APRIL 1, 1988.

Q. Why are you cutting the number of Soviets at their UN Missions in New York when you have agreed to allow a new Soviet Consulate to open in New York?

A. -- The exact number of Soviets that will staff the new Consulate in New York and the date of its opening is still to be determined. The size and opening dates, however, of the new U.S. and Soviet Consulates will be strictly reciprocal. The Soviet Consulate in New York will be small. Even with the addition of Soviet Consulate personnel, there will be a major reduction in the Soviet presence in the United States when the cuts in the Soviet UN Missions are effected. With the opening of a new Soviet Consulate, the Soviets will be able to legitimately conduct cultural, consular, trade, and other bilateral activities in the New York area that are not appropriate for UN Missions. Imposing a personnel ceiling on the Soviet UN Missions should help limit the activities of the Soviet Missions to UN business.

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Q. Aren't the Soviets likely to retaliate by lowering the number of USG employees in the Soviet Union? And won't this complicate USG efforts to increase our official presence in the USSR?

A. -- WE DO NOT EXPECT THIS WILL BECOME AN ISSUE IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT THE CURRENT SIZE OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY AND CONSULATE GENERAL [279 AND 41 PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED PERSONNEL RESPECTIVELY] FOR NOW IS GREATER THAN THAT OF OUR EMBASSY IN MOSCOW AND CONSULATE GENERAL IN LENINGRAD [200 AND 28 RESPECTIVELY]. THERE IS NO CEILING THE NUMBER OF U.S. DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR PERSONNEL IN THE USSR.

AS WE ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF OUR POSTS IN THE U.S.S.R., WE WILL ALSO BE REPLACING CERTAIN SOVIET NATIONAL EMPLOYEES WITH AMERICANS. A CONTRACT FOR MAINTENANCE WORKERS HAS BEEN SIGNED AND TWENTY-TWO CONTRACT EMPLOYEES WILL BE ARRIVING AT POST THIS YEAR. AN OMNIBUS CONTRACT FOR APPROXIMATELY 55 ADDITIONAL EMPLOYEES TO FILL CLERICAL AND SUPPORT POSITIONS IN OUR EMBASSY AND CONSULATE GENERAL WILL BE AWARDED THIS YEAR. THESE CONTRACT PERSONNEL SHOULD BEGIN ARRIVING IN OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 1986.

AS A RESULT, OUR OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE USSR WILL INCREASE, MAKING THE RESPECTIVE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR PRESENCE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES SUBSTANTIALLY EQUIVALENT. IF THE SOVIETS

IMPOSE A CEILING ON OUR DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR PERSONNEL THAT WOULD NOT PERMIT US TO BUILD UP TO THE PRESENT SOVIET LEVEL OF 320, WE ARE PREPARED TO RECIPROCATE.

Q. Did Congressional pressure contribute to the Administration's decision, and have you briefed Congress?

A. -- WE SHARE CONGRESSIONAL CONCERN ABOUT THE HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE THREAT. THE DEPARTMENT CONTINUES TO EXAMINE WAYS OF BETTER CONTROLLING THE HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE THREAT, AND IS PREPARED TO TAKE STEPS AS NECESSARY WHEN IT IS IN THE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST. WE HAVE ALREADY BRIEFED CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS ON OUR DECISION.

Q. How will a reduction in the size of the Soviet UN Missions protect U.S. national security. Won't the Soviet circumvent this ceiling by tasking their Warsaw Pact allies and increasing the size of those missions?

A. -- OUR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE UN HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT DO NOT OBLIGE US TO PERMIT THE SOVIETS TO MAINTAIN A MISSION OF UNLIMITED SIZE OR TO ENGAGE IN INAPPROPRIATE OR ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES. ~~THE REDUCTION~~ IN THE SIZE OF THE SOVIET MISSION WILL HAVE CONSIDERABLE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BENEFITS. AVAILABLE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE RESOURCES WILL BE MORE EFFECTIVELY UTILIZED.

WE HAVE ~~ALSO~~ WARNED CERTAIN WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES THAT WE WILL BE WATCHING CLOSELY TO SEE WHETHER THEY

ATTEMPT TO PICK UP THE SLACK BY INCREASING THE SIZE OF THEIR UN MISSIONS, AND THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO SIMILARLY CONSTRAIN MOSCOW'S WARSAW PACT ALLIES IF WE DETERMINE THAT ANY OF THEM IS INCREASING ITS PRESENCE TO COMPENSATE FOR LOST SOVIET ASSETS.

Q. Does this ceiling apply to temporary duty personnel? If not, isn't this a way for the Soviets to circumvent these reductions?

A. -- THE CEILING DOES NOT APPLY TO TEMPORARY DUTY PERSONNEL. THERE ARE TIMES WHEN UN MISSIONS HAVE A LEGITIMATE NEED FOR TEMPORARY DUTY PERSONNEL. AN EXAMPLE IS DURING THE UNGA OR DURING A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON A PARTICULAR TOPIC. WE WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR CLOSELY THE NUMBER OF SOVIET TEMPORARY DUTY PERSONNEL TO ENSURE THAT IT IS CONSISTENT WITH ACCEPTABLE PRACTICE. WE WILL NOT PERMIT THE SOVIETS TO USE TEMPORARY DUTY PERSONNEL TO CIRCUMVENT THIS CEILING.

Q. By what right does the USG presume to determine the "reasonable size" of another country's mission to the United Nations? If the circumstances were reversed and the United Nations were in Leningrad, would not the US Mission to the UN be of similar size to that of the Soviet Mission in New York?

A. -- IN THE UN HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT, THE UNITED STATES RESERVED THE RIGHT TO PROTECT ITS NATIONAL SECURITY. PERMITTING A SOVIET UN MISSION OF UNLIMITED SIZE CLEARLY WOULD POSE A THREAT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES. IN IMPOSING

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THIS CEILING, WE HAVE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THE SOVIET UNION'S IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE WORLD. THE CEILING WILL PERMIT THE SOVIET UNION TO CONTINUE TO HAVE THE LARGEST UN REPRESENTATION OF ANY COUNTRY, AND SHOULD BE AMPLE TO CONDUCT LEGITIMATE UN BUSINESS.

Q: Why is the USG cutting back the ceiling of the Soviet Missions to the United Nations?

A. -- WE CONCLUDED, AFTER CONSIDERATION OF ALL FACTORS, THAT THE CURRENT SIZE OF THE THREE SOVIET MISSIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS [USSR, BYELORUSSIA, AND THE UKRAINE] FAR EXCEEDS THE STAFFING NEEDS THAT FLOW FROM THE CONDUCT OF UN BUSINESS. WE HAVE IMPOSED A PERSONNEL CEILING WHICH WILL ALLOW THE THREE SOVIET MISSIONS ENOUGH PERSONNEL TO CONDUCT LEGITIMATE UN-RELATED BUSINESS, BUT CUT SHARPLY THEIR MARGIN FOR ANY ACTIVITIES UNRELATED TO THE UN AND/OR DAMAGING TO THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES. EVEN WHEN THIS CEILING IS REACHED, THE SOVIET MISSIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS WILL BE MUCH LARGER THAN ANY OTHER COUNTRY'S MISSION.

Q. Is this decision part of an ongoing USG effort to penalize the UN by imposing travel restrictions, arbitrary cutbacks in assessed contributions, and polemical criticism?

A. -- NO. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAS SYSTEMATICALLY WORKED FOR THE PAST FIVE YEARS TO MAKE THE UNITED NATIONS RETURN TO THE ORIGINAL PURPOSES AND BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER. OUR CRITICISM HAS BEEN CONSTRUCTIVE AND AIMED TOWARD THIS GOAL.

OUR DECISION IS PART OF A MAJOR EFFORT TO COUNTER ACTIVITIES BY PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO OR WORKING FOR THE UNITED NATIONS IN NEW YORK WHICH ARE INIMICAL TO THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES -- E.G., ESPIONAGE. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE IMPOSED LAST FALL TRAVEL MEASURES ON SOVIET AND OTHER HOSTILE-COUNTRY EMPLOYEES OF THE UN SECRETARIAT, AND ON CERTAIN EAST EUROPEAN MISSIONS.

OUR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UN, ASSESSED AND VOLUNTARY, ARE IN LARGE PART A FUNCTION OF OUR DOMESTIC BUDGETARY SITUATION AND CAPABILITIES. WE ARE WORKING WITH OTHER MEMBER STATES TO ACHIEVE SIGNIFICANT REFORM OF THE UN BUDGET PROCESS, AND GREATER PROPORTIONAL INFLUENCE FOR MAJOR DONORS. WE ARE MAKING CLEAR TO UN OFFICIALS AND OTHERS THE IMPACT OF RELEVANT US LEGISLATION, INCLUDING THE KASSEBAUM AMENDMENT AND GRAMM-RUDMAN-HOLLINGS, ON OUR UN ACCOUNTS.

Q. Why does the USSR have three UN Missions?

A. -- THE NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE LAST YEARS OF WORLD WAR II THAT LED TO THE SIGNING OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER IN SAN FRANCISCO IN JUNE 1945 INVOLVED SEVERAL TRADEOFFS BETWEEN THE WESTERN ALLIES AND THE SOVIET UNION. ONE TRADEOFF INVOLVED GIVING THE USSR THREE SEATS IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY [HENCE, THREE UN MISSIONS], IN EXCHANGE FOR SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE

HEAVILY WESTERN MAKEUP OF THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS
[US, UK, FRANCE, CHINA, USSR]. IN PRACTICE, THE
THREE SOVIET MISSIONS ACT AS ONE.

Q. How did you inform the Secretary General? What was the UNSYG's reaction?

A. -- WE HAVE BRIEFED THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND
APPROPRIATE MEMBERS OF THE UN SECRETARIAT. AS A
MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, WE DO NOT COMMENT ON DETAILS OF
CONFIDENTIAL DISCUSSIONS.

Q. How is this decision related to the 1985 moves to impose travel controls and other restrictions on Soviet and other "hostile-nation" employees in the UN Secretariat, and to require selected East European Missions and East European employees of the UN Secretariat to use the services of the Office of Foreign Missions for official travel in the United States?

A. -- THE ADMINISTRATION IS DETERMINED TO VIGOROUSLY
COMBAT ESPIONAGE AND OTHER ACTIVITIES INIMICAL TO THE
NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES. WE ARE
MAKING A COMPREHENSIVE EFFORT TO ENHANCE OUR
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES. THIS EFFORT
INCLUDES: THE DECISION INVOLVING THE SOVIET UN
MISSIONS, TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS ON SOVIET AND OTHER
HOSTILE COUNTRY EMPLOYEES OF THE UN SECRETARIAT, AND
THE REQUIREMENT THAT SELECTED EASTERN EUROPEANS IN
THIS COUNTRY USE OFM TRAVEL SERVICES FOR OFFICIAL
TRAVEL. EACH ACTION WAS TAKEN ON ITS OWN MERITS AND
AFTER CAREFULLY WEIGHING OUR DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN
NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS.

Q. Is this action legal? Does it conform with USG obligations under the Headquarters Agreement and the UN Charter?

A. -- LIMITING THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS TO A REASONABLE SIZE IS CONSISTENT WITH USG OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT, THE UN CHARTER, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW.

Q. What other UN missions will be affected by this decision?

A. -- NONE. WE HAVE NO CURRENT PLANS TO IMPOSE CEILINGS ON OTHER UN MISSIONS.

Q. Why are you not imposing ceilings on the PRC UN Mission and other "unfriendly" missions [Nicaragua, Iran, Libya, etc.]?

A. -- AS NOTED, WE HAVE NO CURRENT PLANS TO IMPOSE CEILINGS ON OTHER MISSIONS. THE SIZE OF OTHER COUNTRIES' MISSIONS IS NOT UNREASONABLE GIVEN THEIR STAFFING NEEDS.

Q. Why did the U.S. allow the Soviet UN Missions to grow to such an "unreasonable" size?

A. -- THROUGH THE YEARS WE HAVE MONITORED THE GROWTH AND ACTIVITIES OF THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, WE HAVE WARNED THE SOVIETS ABOUT INAPPROPRIATE CONDUCT UNRELATED TO UN BUSINESS. THESE MISSIONS ARE NOT SURROGATE EMBASSIES OR CONSULATES FOR THE SOVIET UNION. THE SOVIET MISSIONS ON OCCASION HAVE ENGAGED IN CONSULAR, CULTURAL, TRADE AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES UNRELATED TO UN BUSINESS.

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WE RECENTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE SOVIET MISSIONS HAD REACHED A SIZE FAR BEYOND WHAT THEY NEED TO CONDUCT LEGITIMATE UN-RELATED BUSINESS. THE NEW CEILING IS AN EFFORT TO CUT THEM BACK TO A REASONABLE SIZE. IT IS ALSO A REASONABLE, PRUDENT STEP TO REDUCE THE THREAT OF SOVIET ESPIONAGE.

Q. What evidence do you have that the personnel at the Soviet UN Missions have engaged in espionage?

A. -- FOR OBVIOUS REASONS WE ARE UNABLE TO MAKE PUBLIC CLASSIFIED INFORMATION ABOUT ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS.

THE LAST TIME A SOVIET UN MISSION MEMBER WAS PUBLICLY PUNISHED WAS 1983 (FIRST SECRETARY ANATOLIY MALNEV). SINCE THAT TIME, THERE HAVE BEEN UNPUBLICIZED EXPULSIONS.

Q. Do clandestine activities by Soviet UN Mission personnel continue to be a problem

A. -- WE CAN CONFIRM THAT SOVIET UN MISSION PERSONNEL CONTINUE TO ENGAGE IN CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES. AN UNCLASSIFIED PUBLICATION THAT MAKES REFERENCE TO CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES OF SOVIET UN MISSION AND SECRETARIAT PERSONNEL IS ARKADY SHEVCHENCKO'S RECENT BOOK.

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(NOTE: IF PRESSED ON THE NUMBER OF UNPUBLICIZED EXPULSIONS SINCE 1983, WE CAN INDICATE THAT THE NUMBER HAS BEEN VERY LOW. IN FACT, THERE HAS BEEN ONLY ONE UNPUBLICIZED EXPULSION, BUT WE DO NOT WANT TO GET INTO NUMBERS.)

Q. What about spying by Moscow's Warsaw Pact allies? And shouldn't their missions be similarly limited?

A. -- ESPIONAGE AGAINST THE UNITED STATES IS OF CONCERN TO US WHATEVER THE COUNTRY. HOWEVER, AS WE HAVE NOTED, THE CURRENT SIZE OF THE EAST EUROPEAN MISSIONS IS WITHIN REASON. THEIR UN MISSIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS: BULGARIA - 24, CUBA - 56, CZECHOSLOVAKIA - 20, GDR - 39, HUNGARY - 22, POLAND - 22, ROMANIA - 13. OF COURSE, WE WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR ALL HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. WE HAVE DECIDED THAT IT IS NOT NECESSARY ^{AT THIS TIME} TO LIMIT THE MISSIONS OF ANY OTHER COUNTRIES.