

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

84 JUN 14

P 2: 34

June 14, 1984

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*
SUBJECT: Chernenko's June 6 Letter and Dobrynin's
Talking Points: Analysis

I would like to share with you my analysis of Chernenko's reply to your last letter and to the points Dobrynin handed over in my meeting last Tuesday.

These communications basically contain nothing new, and confirm my impression that the Soviets are currently uncertain about how to handle us. Since the letter was signed June 6, it does not respond to your Dublin speech. But your last letter already contained your offer to negotiate on non-use of force if they would negotiate on confidence-building measures at Stockholm. Meanwhile, we have put down two other new arms control negotiating proposals, on chemical weapons and in MBFR. The Soviet reaction has been to pull out of the Olympics and to ratchet up their propagand campaign, while claiming privately that they are willing to move forward (and agreeing to another round of talks on minor consular issues). In this letter and these points, Chernenko repeats the general argument that they want to move forward and we do not, but offers practically nothing to back it up.

Chernenko's language is correct and non-polemical. In response to your effort to explain why we see a threat in many Soviet actions, he goes on at length with a familiar rendition of Soviet complaints about us (encirclement with bases, INF missiles at their doorstep, etc.). The core theme is that we refuse to treat the USSR as an "equal."

On the security side, Chernenko basically reiterates the same tired agenda of one-sided arms control proposals as the solution to the problems in the relationship. On regional issues, he calls for restraint and says Dobrynin will present some "specific considerations" on our proposals for talks, but all Dobrynin had to say was that they are willing to listen to our views on southern Africa and the Middle East/Persian Gulf before deciding whether they will sit down for actual exchanges of views.

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As in previous letters, Chernenko leaves bilateral issues to others, i.e. Gromyko and the Foreign Ministry, but even here Dobrynin had mainly complaints that we are not moving on the things they care about, like fishing allocations and Aeroflot flights to the U.S. However, he also promised to get back to us soon on our proposals for new rounds of talks on hotline upgrade and the Pacific maritime boundary and for talks on search and rescue operations in the northern Pacific.

Finally, Chernenko closes with a complaint that you keep injecting Soviet internal affairs -- meaning human rights -- into your letters.

On the arms control side, there are a few items of detail worth pointing out:

-- In terms of the emphasis given to various arms control items, the "Chernenko agenda" as it now stands is: negotiations on outer space arms control; renouncing construction of large-scale anti-ballistic missile defense systems; limitations on naval activities and naval armaments (a recent Gromyko "initiative"); non-use of force; and nuclear testing.

-- On non-use of force, Chernenko is careful: he touts their proposal for a Warsaw Pact-NATO treaty on non-use of force, which they propose to discuss separately from the Stockholm conference; he next talks about chemical weapons and MBFR, and only then turns to Stockholm, where he expresses the hope that "the United States will take a position that would make possible agreement on mutually acceptable solutions." Dobrynin's points do not mention non-use of force at all. This suggests there may be some unresolved differences between Chernenko and Gromyko on how to handle your offer to discuss non-use of force together with our confidence-building measures in Stockholm. (Their negotiator in Stockholm is being almost totally non-committal at this point.)

-- Finally, both communications promise to negotiate on chemical weapons in Geneva and MBFR in Vienna, even though they are very skeptical of our offers, but Dobrynin's points turn down our offer of private discussions here on either issue "in view of the character of the latest American proposals." In other words, they accept bilateral discussions, but only at the negotiating sites.

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In sum, then, the Soviets have given us a mixed but, on balance, a poor showing. The tone is defensive, and so is the content. This is not surprising: they are on the defensive because we have the initiative in most aspects of our relationship. I found it interesting that Dobrynin -- in his remarks -- insisted so strongly that they "are not afraid to be seen negotiating with this Administration," and that they can do business even this year. But there may be some daylight between him and Moscow, where they continue to appear unwilling to negotiate on the basis of the substantial agenda you have put forward. So, despite Dobrynin's complaint about accusations that they are "hibernating," I think that remains a fairly accurate description of what they are doing.

To sustain our initiative, I think you should respond fairly quickly to Chernenko's message, and I will be sending you a draft in the next week or so. Overall, our response should be to keep pressing them both privately and publicly, as you did so successfully in your Dublin speech.

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TO MCFARLANE

FROM MATLOCK

msg 5/25/84

DOCDATE 13 JUN 84

CHERNENKO, KONSTANTI

06 JUN 84

SHULTZ, G

14 JUN 84

KEYWORDS: USSR

HS

SUBJECT. CHERNENKO LTR REPLYING TO PRES LTR RE STATE OF US - USSR RELATIONS

ACTION: NFAR / NOTED BY PRES

DUE:

STATUS S

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

*No further action required.
Return to Secretariat
for file -*

JG W

COMMENTS

REF#

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ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

<i>MATLOCK</i>	<i>S JUN 13 1984</i>	<i>prepare memo for Pres</i>		
<i>NSC/S</i>	<i>C 19 July '84</i>	<i>NFAR per note from Matlock</i>		

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)