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NLRR 906-114/3 #17905

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

BY CV NARA DATE 10/30/07

October 21, 1985

SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*

SUBJECT: Your Mini-Bilateral with Shevardnadze

Your chat with Shevardnadze at the UNGA reception will be an opportunity to preview your regional conflict resolution initiative of the following day and to set the stage for my breakfast meeting with the Foreign Minister October 25.

We hope to give the Soviets advance notice of the regional initiative in Moscow on Monday or Tuesday. As Shevardnadze will be accompanying Gorbachev to a Warsaw Pact summit meeting in Sofia October 21 - 23, however, he will have had little opportunity to focus on what we have in mind.

I recommend you open the discussion by indicating that a response will be forthcoming to the letter from Gorbachev which Shevardnadze delivered in September. Emphasizing that we are giving the Soviet arms control counterproposals due consideration here and in the Geneva talks, you could note our determination that other agenda items not be lost sight of as we prepare for the November meeting. You could then inform Shevardnadze of the rationale and main elements of the regional initiative you will announce in your UNGA speech, noting that I would be providing an elaboration of our views in my breakfast meeting.

To emphasize further the point that our agenda goes beyond arms control, you could reiterate our interest in early progress on the various bilateral negotiations which have started up since Shevardnadze met with you (exchange agreement, Northern Pacific air safety, civil aviation) and express disappointment that there has been no improvement on human rights. You could stress your personal preference for dealing with human rights quietly and in private, and our willingness to reciprocate in areas of interest to Moscow if we see results.

One logistical note: Shevardnadze is currently due to arrive in New York at 7:30 Wednesday evening. He may be able to arrive earlier, but we have indicated to the Soviets we would be prepared to provide a helicopter to get him to the reception in time if this proves impossible.

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