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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ  
The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Your Meetings with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

Based upon our earlier discussions, the President has reviewed the plans for your upcoming meetings in Vienna with the Soviet Foreign Minister. The President agrees that the U.S. objectives for these meetings are as follows:

1. consolidate the accomplishments made at Reykjavik by confirming Soviet agreement on those issues which we feel were resolved to our satisfaction;
2. clarify the U.S. and Soviet positions in the Defense and Space area;
3. pocket the positive aspects of General Secretary Gorbachev's remarks on verification;
4. press for making progress in START, INF and in other areas where common ground exists and resist Soviet attempts to link such progress to the Defense and Space area; and
5. confirm Soviet intent to press forward with planned activities in the non-arms control areas as agreed in Reykjavik. (S)

The President also agrees with our objectives in each of the individual areas discussed at Reykjavik. (U)

-- With respect to the areas of human rights, regional and bilateral issues, we should confirm the work plan developed in Iceland. (U)

-- In START, we should confirm the language agreed at Reykjavik, as well as the supporting understanding reached during the U.S./Soviet experts discussions concerning the implementation of the agreed language. (S)

-- In the INF and nuclear testing areas, we should seek Soviet agreement on the language that we have previously proposed. (S)

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-- In the area of Defense and Space, we should:

a. note for the record the last U.S. proposal made in Reykjavik;

b. note for the record the last Soviet proposal made in Reykjavik;

c. identify the key differences between these positions to include:

1. that the Soviet position is more restrictive than the existing ABM Treaty;

2. that we differ on what further reductions should occur during the second five years of the ten-year period; and

3. that we require a clear statement that either side would be free to deploy advanced defenses against ballistic missiles after the ten-year period, unless mutually agreed otherwise. (S)

The most recent instructions to the U.S. Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks (documented in NSDD 249) provide the authoritative guidance needed in the START, INF and Defense and Space areas. NSDD 247 provides corresponding guidance in the area of nuclear testing. Also attached are other items of guidance recently approved by the President which will also be helpful to you. With these documents to draw upon as needed, we should be in an excellent position to pursue the objectives outlined above. (S)

The President agrees that, if we are successful in achieving our objectives in Vienna, there could be a statement issued as a result of the meeting. He also agrees that if we are not successful, we should make a concerted effort to present and explain the positions we have recently tabled in Geneva to the public in the U.S. and overseas. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

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PROPOSED NEXT STEPS IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL ~~(U)~~

- We would propose to complete the High Level Conventional Task Force (CTF) report for NAC Ministers on December 11-12, to incorporate the following concepts. (U)
- At the NAC Ministerial, Ministers would (1) review the CTF report; (2) endorse the concept of alliance-to-alliance negotiations on Atlantic-to-the-Urals force reductions and limitations, as an essential element of the response to the Halifax mandate; (3) mandate the CTF to remain in existence both to complete details of preparing for such negotiations, and to become the directing body for developing and issuing coordinated "guidance" to the delegations at the negotiations, clearly understood to foreclose individual national positions at the negotiations, and (4) call for the Warsaw Pact to agree to meet at a Preparatory Conference (PrepCon) at a time and place mutually agreed, to establish terms of reference for such a negotiation.
- Subsequent to the NAC statement, the Allies would undertake two separate areas of action at the CSCE RevCon in Vienna, respectively concerning future negotiations within the CSCE framework on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) and human rights, and outside the CSCE framework on force reductions, as follows:

1 - Within CSCE Framework

Call on the RevCon to mandate:

- a. A new CSBM negotiation, within the CSCE framework, as a follow on to CDE -- a kind of CDE II.
- b. A human rights negotiation, within the CSCE framework, of equal status to the above negotiation on CSBM.

2 - Outside of the CSCE Framework

Call on the RevCon to:

- a. take note of the importance of reductions in the forces of the two Alliances;
- b. encourage the two Alliances to establish negotiations for significant conventional force reductions and limitations from the Atlantic to the Urals; and
- c. invite such a negotiation to inform CSCE participants not parties to the negotiation periodically on progress in the negotiation. (S)

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If the Warsaw Pact has responded before the end of the RevCon to the Western invitation, the RevCon could note the encouraging activity on the part of the two Alliances. If the Warsaw Pact does not respond promptly to our invitation, we should seek to have the RevCon urge the Warsaw Pact to respond. (C)

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Treatment of Third Country Nuclear Ballistic Missile Systems in U.S. Arms Control Proposals

The guidance below reflects the President's decision on how third country nuclear ballistic missile systems are to be treated in the context of our arms control proposals to the Soviets. (S)

The US would describe its position, if asked, as

(1) The proposals we have put forward to the Soviets concerning the reduction and elimination of offensive ballistic missiles in the next ten years are bilateral proposals, applying explicitly only to US and USSR systems. As the US has long stated, we do not propose to negotiate, now or in subsequent phases, for third countries (e.g. UK and France). That is a matter of national decision by the country involved. (S)

(2) Inherent in our proposals for eliminating US and USSR ballistic missiles is the point that both the US and USSR would then be free to deploy advanced defensive systems that would, as well as deter against retention of missiles by either the US or the USSR, provide protection against third country systems, of countries that now have or could acquire such systems. (S)

As a separate point, the US would be willing to support a UK/French position that offered to discuss, in future negotiations following deep US and USSR reductions, prospects for negotiating the level of their national nuclear forces in the context of agreements redressing the conventional imbalance which now favors the Warsaw Pact. The US would also support similar discussions involving the PRC, once again following deep US and Soviet reductions in strategic offensive forces. (S)

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