

From: NSJMP --CPUA
To: NSREL --CPUA BOB LINHARD

Date and time 10/28/86 13:16:02

10

-- ~~SECRET~~ --

NOTE FROM: JOHN POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: Shultz-Shevardnadze Vienna Meeting

Bob and Jack should plan to go with George for the meeting. You are both invited. I would like a memo from me to George prepared that I can send him before he goes. In a nice tactful way I want it to be essentially a TOR for the meeting. The objective of the meeting would be to confirm and try to get agreement on the issues that were agreed in Reykjavik and to try to separate them from the ABM/SDI issue.

- Regional, Human Rights, Bi-lateral: confirm plan from Roz's group
- START: confirm language agreed in Reykjavik
 - INF: agree on language we prepared in Reykjavik
 - Nuclear Testing: agree on language we prepared
 - ABM/SDI: note for the record our last proposal
note for the record their last proposal
note there are three fundamental differences
 1. more restrictive than ABM treaty
 2. difference in weapons reduced in second five years
 3. freedom to deploy at end of 10 years.

The memo should reference the NSDD on Geneva instructions. Will the NSDD on Nuclear Testing that Herrington referenced yesterday record our current position? If so we should get it out before Vienna and reference it.

My plan would be that if George is successful then there could be a statement out of that meeting. If not, I think he should go public with the positions we have tabled in Geneva.

George agrees with this plan.

cc: NSJFM	--CPUA	JACK MATLOCK	NSAGK	--CPUA	AL KEEL
NSWAC	--CPUA	BILL COCKELL	NSPWR	--CPUA	PETER RODMAN
NSRBM	--CPUA	ROD MCDANIEL	NSWRP	--CPUA	BOB PEARSON

OBJECTIVES:

1. CONSOLIDATE WHAT ACCOMPLISHED
 2. SET DOWN US/SOV POSITIONS ON INF/SPACE
 3. CAPTURE VERIFICATION -- BENEFIT
 4. NON-ARMS CONTROL
- 2 MEETINGS - afternoon 5th
morning 6th

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 106-11415 #8645

BY OU NARA DATE 11/29/07

SECRET/SENSITIVE

10/29/86

SHULTZ-SHEVARDNADZE TALKING POINTS

- Ambassador Dubinin has told me you want this to be ambitious meeting, to consolidate progress made at Reykjavik and move forward.
- President has said exactly same thing. We're ready.
- Suggest appropriate first step would be to commit to paper everything on which there was common ground at Reykjavik -- in arms control and other aspects of our relations -- as well as positions of our two sides on issues where we have yet to find common ground.
- With this done, we can then focus on remaining issues to see if some convergence is possible.
- Resulting joint texts can form basis for agreements our leaders could sign.

Arms Control

- Have with me draft texts for each of the three areas of nuclear and space talks and for testing, as well as for two supplementary areas.
- Believe these texts accurately represent positions of our two sides; where there is no common ground, we've included in brackets positions of both sides.
- Suggest we go through each to ensure they are in fact accurate and can provide basis for joint work.

START

- START text is drawn from paper negotiated by experts and agreed to by leaders at Reykjavik.
- It includes our agreement to 1600 delivery systems, 6000 warheads, certain counting rules for warheads, significant reductions in heavy missiles, and handling of SLCMs.
- Have also included three general verification measures agreed to in principle in discussion of INF limits at experts meeting at Reykjavik; believe these measures should be acceptable for START as well.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
DECL: OADR

NLRR F06-114/5 #8052

BY CU NARADATE 11/29/07

- This represents a good amount of progress, but we should not be satisfied to stop here.
- Our efforts on this text should focus on fleshing it out further.
- We need sublimits to constrain particularly threatening systems, along lines both sides have been discussing. It was agreed at Reykjavik that negotiations on sublimits would continue.
- Have proposed such sublimits in Geneva, taking into account Soviet views.
- For example, the number we propose for ballistic missile warheads -- 4800 -- is the result of applying an earlier Soviet proposal -- 80% -- to the agreed warhead total of 6000.
- We have also adjusted the numbers for the other sublimits in your direction.
- Ballistic missiles, and especially ICBMs, pose special threats to stability. Swift, accurate, they threaten the other side's forces. They must be subject to special sublimits.
- Completion and implementation of a 50% reductions agreement should move forward; we should not hold it hostage to progress in other areas.

(If he returns to their proposal to cut strategic forces by 50% in each category.)

- As we told you in Reykjavik, we cannot agree to 50% cuts in each category, since this would result in unequal levels.
- At Reykjavik both sides agreed upon an approach to implement the concept of 50% reductions -- 1600 SNDVs, 6000 warheads, etc. Let's focus on that approach.

INF

- INF text records our leaders' agreement on 100 warheads on LRINF missiles -- in the central USSR and in the US.
- It also includes agreement of the two sides on general verification measures.
- The INF agreement would remain in force until replaced by a new agreement calling for further reductions. This was part of your May 15 draft Treaty.

- Text also incorporates both sides' positions on SRINF.
- With regard to these systems, we can agree to your proposal to a freeze at current Soviet level. We also agree on prompt follow-on negotiations on reductions of systems of a range less than 1000 KM.
- But we cannot agree to unequal levels for our two sides; US must be permitted same level as USSR.
- Suggest our efforts on this text focus on resolving this question.
- We have long agreed that an INF agreement should not be held hostage to agreements in other areas. Let's follow through and complete a text and put it in force, as an interim agreement if necessary.

Defense and Space

- Defense and space text is drawn from final written proposal made by each side at Reykjavik.
- Three crucial questions here -- duration of period of time for which we are prepared to commit not to withdraw from ABM Treaty; situation after that time; constraints during that time.
- As for the first, we are prepared to undertake for 10 years (through 1996) not to exercise right of withdrawal from the Treaty.
- Of course, in agreeing not to exercise this right, neither side would be forfeiting right to withdraw for reasons of supreme national interest, or to respond to a material breach, and we will want to make sure this is part of any agreement.
- Prepared to meet your concerns through a more limited commitment not to withdraw for purposes of deploying advanced defenses.
- Our delegation in Geneva is prepared to discuss this in detail. If you have other concerns, prepared to discuss them.
- Turning to second question, we believe that at end of 10-year period, either side should be free to deploy defenses unless parties agree otherwise.

- As for third question, we believe that during this 10-year period each side should strictly observe the provisions of ABM Treaty. (Note: broad interpretation.)
- When ABM Treaty was negotiated, there was considerable discussion leading to agreement on what provisions of the Treaty permit and prohibit.
- We are prepared to set forth our view in detail. We are also prepared to listen to your view of what the Treaty permits and prohibits.
- We both have programs. Ours is entirely compliant with the provisions of the Treaty, and will continue to be.
- We cannot agree to make the Treaty more restrictive than the agreement signed in 1972.
- One additional issue reflected in this text -- nature of arms reductions in second five-year period.
- We propose elimination of remaining ballistic missiles; not only would this remove all weapons capable or potentially capable of a surprise first strike, it would also resolve your concern that ballistic missile defenses could be used to degrade your deterrent.

Moving Beyond Initial Reductions

- In order to move toward very low levels of nuclear weapons, we must, of course, recognize need to address concerns that require maintenance of a nuclear deterrent today. We should be able to record this recognition in agreed language.
- Dealing successfully with these other concerns will be necessary if we are to move beyond initial phase of 50% cuts in START and an interim INF agreement. We must begin to deal with them now.
- These steps should come as no surprise. We discussed them last year when I visited Moscow, and President cited them when he answered General Secretary Gorbachev's proposal of January 15.
- They include such necessary steps as establishment of a balance in conventional forces, an effective worldwide ban on chemical and biological weapons, and a strengthened nuclear non-proliferation regime. Eventually, we must also consider the involvement of other nuclear powers.

- And, of course, further efforts to reduce arms will be greatly influenced by a relaxation of tensions in various regions of the world where conflicts now exist.
- ^{THEREFORE} As for eliminating all strategic nuclear weapons, or indeed all nuclear weapons, as is President's vision, these remain steps beyond what we are considering here today.

Verification

- General Secretary Gorbachev made a number of points in Reykjavik on verification and its importance with which we can agree.
- This too should be recorded.
- Our agreement on need for effective measures for verification of compliance with obligations assumed must be implemented with concrete measures in each agreement.
- Language in directives on START, INF⁺ and Defense and Space is completely consistent with this text.
- Would like to emphasize importance of inspections; am pleased that your side now recognizes that importance.
- Use of inspections can solve problems as they arise and give both sides confidence that agreements are being honored.
- It makes no sense to arbitrarily limit number of inspections, since we cannot now predict frequency of problems.
- Purpose of such inspections is to give each side confidence in integrity of agreements.
- Suggest we add language to effect that agreements will provide for use of inspections to resolve problems that may arise and give confidence in compliance with obligations assumed.

Nuclear Testing

- Text on nuclear testing reflects our agreement on negotiations on testing, except for how those negotiations should be characterized.
- Negotiations would begin promptly. The first item on the agenda would be to resolve the verification problems with the 1974 and 1976 agreements.

[Once these problems are resolved ^{*} (and the treaties ratified)]

22

SECRET/SENSITIVE

- 6 -

↓
-- We would then immediately proceed to address further step-by-step limitations on nuclear testing in parallel with the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons, leading ultimately to cessation of testing. [We are prepared to say that publicly.]

→
-- Let's see if we can bridge the semantics gap, and move forward on this issue as we progress in other areas.

Next Step

- Have a team of arms control experts with me; know you have brought some as well.
- Suggest we turn these texts over to them to see what progress they can make, for our review tomorrow.
- With sufficient progress, we might consider releasing at least some of the texts as a consolidation of US-Soviet understandings; I have some possible language for an appropriate chapeau.

(0516a)

-- As we have stated before, a comprehensive test ban remains a long-term objective to be viewed in the context of a time when we do not need to depend upon nuclear deterrence to ensure international security and stability, and when we have achieved deep, broad, and verifiable arms reductions, improved verification capabilities, expanded confidence-building measures, and a greater balance in conventional forces.

* (FYI: By "RESOLVED" WE WOULD PREFER THAT THE VERIFICATION ISSUE ASSOCIATED WITH TBT/PNET HAS BEEN ELIMINATED AND THE TREATIES ARE RATIFIED. AS A MINIMUM, BY "RESOLVED" WE WOULD EXPECT PROTOCOLS NEEDED TO BE FINALIZED AND AGREED BY BOTH SIDES PENDING RATIFICATION.)

SECRET/SENSITIVE