

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II  
90777

SECRET/SENSITIVE

November 14, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*  
SUBJECT: Strategy for the Soviets

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NLRR FOI 7-14/5 #8694

BY CS NARA DATE 11/29/07

Where We Are After Vienna

The outcome of the Vienna meeting has at least temporarily changed the context of our dialogue with Moscow. Since mid-1985, that dialogue has evolved within the framework of preparations for successive high-level meetings, at your level and mine. The summit process forced bureaucracies on both sides -- but particularly the Soviets -- to make decisions which would otherwise have been put off. The results have been impressive.

- In a series of steps culminating in Reykjavik, the Soviets have accepted our conceptual framework for arms control: substantial, verifiable reductions in offensive forces to low, equal levels; and continued exploration of prospects for strategic defense. Vienna showed that the results of Reykjavik will be difficult to translate into concrete agreements, but that these results are irreversible in political terms.
- In bilateral relations, we have put in place a vigorous and expanding framework of agreements and progress which demonstrates our ability to work with the Soviets on the basis of genuinely mutual benefit and reciprocity.
- Progress on the human rights and regional fronts has been more ambiguous, but the Soviets have agreed as a matter of practice that these issues are an integral part of the dialogue. Especially on human rights, the Soviets are increasingly being forced to debate the issues on our terms.

Thus, we have not only brought the Soviets to accept the four-part agenda you outlined in January, 1984, we have given real content, on our terms, to our insistence that the U.S. - Soviet dialogue extend beyond arms control. These accomplishments validate your policy of active engagement with Moscow, and put us in a strong position to deal with the Soviets, even in the absence of a framework of high-level meetings.

It is not clear how long the Soviets' current intransigent approach will last. In Vienna, they were clearly more interested in engaging in propaganda games than serious negotiation -- an echo of 1983-1984, when they walked out of the Geneva talks and took over a year to come back. This time they are playing smarter. They are not only staying at the table in Geneva, but have asked for meetings between rounds, to which we have agreed.

This could mean that the Soviets will reengage fairly quickly, enabling us to resume serious discussion without much loss of momentum. But they could also simply be seeking to convey an image of reasonableness as they seek to build pressure on us through our allies and congressional/public opinion in this country.

#### What We Should Do

These are tactics we have seen before, and will no doubt see again. Our experience since 1984 suggests that a major reorientation of our own strategy is unnecessary. We do need to be clear on our overall objectives, and pay special attention to tactics.

Specifically, we should aim in the period ahead to:

- Force the Soviets to address seriously and build on the progress which was made in Reykjavik.
- As an integral part of this effort, deny them the opportunity to drive wedges between ourselves and our allies, and between the Administration and Congress.
- Sustain the momentum of our bilateral relations, forcing the Soviets to assume the blame for any slow-down.
- Give greater content to the regional and human rights elements of the agenda.

#### The Allied Dimension

Effective management of our relations with our closest allies will be particularly important to our success during this period. The Allies have for the most part avoided public expressions of concern over the implications for NATO and Europe of the discussion in Reykjavik. In private, however, and with the UK, France and the FRG in the lead, they have expressed deep reservations about moving dramatically on nuclear reductions without addressing the conventional balance. Mrs. Thatcher has been particularly adamant in this regard.

To prevent the Soviets from exploiting these concerns, or the Allies from exploring alternatives to the Transatlantic security relationship, we need to develop a program for alliance management over the months ahead. The thrust of such a program would be three-fold:

- To demonstrate that our follow-up to the Reykjavik meeting will not threaten nuclear deterrence or the Alliance's flexible response strategy, we should initiate a thorough discussion (by permreps, NATO committees, and the December NAC and DPC Ministerials) of our vision of deterrence in a world with fewer nuclear weapons. Such a discussion would also be an opportunity to emphasize conventional force improvements.
- To give the Allies something they can use with their publics, we should find means of highlighting the intensive consultations we have engaged in in the wake of the Reykjavik and Vienna meetings, and which will continue in the weeks ahead.
- To deny the Soviets the ability to exploit the issue across the board, we should resolve our differences in the Halifax Task Force over the forum for pursuing European conventional arms control negotiations.

These efforts should come together at the December NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers' meetings, where we will seek communiques which send a strong signal of Allied solidarity on the full range of security issues.

### Congress

The Soviets' other main target will be Congress, particularly the new Democratic majority in the Senate. To the extent we can, we should preempt this effort by taking the initiative to brief key leaders on Soviet behavior at Vienna and our analysis of their motives. As with the Allies, we can make the case that our policy of building our strength and negotiating with the Soviets is working, and must continue if the agreements outlined in Reykjavik are to be realized. We should also emphasize such areas as human rights, where we and the Hill will be able to make common cause.

### Arms Control Next Steps

Both with the Soviets and the Allies, our ability to dominate the arms control agenda will be critical to our success. Reykjavik has put us in a strong position to keep the pressure on Moscow.

- We have the basic elements for initial agreements on START and INF. Remaining obstacles (sublimits, throw weight, verification, SRINF) should not be insuperable once the Soviets decide to close.
- Nuclear testing is not so far along, but our current objective -- to get talks started -- is less ambitious. We are agreed on the essential elements of an agenda, and the Soviets may be prepared to be flexible in order to cover withdrawal from their self-imposed moratorium.
- Defense/Space is the most open subject: while both sides propose a ten-year non-withdrawal period, differences remain over testing constraints during that period, as well as over the nature of offensive reductions in the second five years.

Our basic objective should be to complete and bring into force the 50% START and 0/100 INF agreements as soon as possible. We can identify four ways in which this objective might be achieved:

- Continue our effort to separate START and INF from other subjects, arguing that agreements in these areas are in our mutual interests and should be brought into force.
- Add a 10-year ABM Treaty non-withdrawal commitment, coupling such a commitment to 50% START and 0/100 INF reductions. Negotiations on further steps, including elimination of ballistic missiles, would continue.
- Execute START and INF reductions over ten years, and link non-withdrawal to the faithful implementation of these reductions.
- Agree to reduce from 6000 warheads in the second five years to a small residual strategic force. Such an agreement on the second five years would allow the entire package discussed at Reykjavik to come into force.

We should explore the pros and cons of these options thoroughly, and on a priority basis, so that we can engage quickly when the Soviets get serious. I have attached a paper which might serve as the basis for such a discussion. Once our review is complete, we may decide to take the initiative along one of these lines. In the meantime, our Geneva negotiators will have a chance during their early December rump session to press the Soviets once again for a serious post-Reykjavik follow-up.

The Full Agenda

While our Allies, Congress and the Soviets will be focusing on arms control, we will need to keep up the pressure on the rest of the agenda as well. Specifically:

- On the bilateral side, there is no indication that the Soviets are backing away from their commitments. The danger is that our bureaucracy will do their work for them, by lapsing into inaction in the absence of the stimulus provided by the summit process. We should lock the Soviets into negotiations on the text of a risk reduction center agreement, set dates for a second session of our proposed Bilateral Review Commission, and proceed with the fusion cooperation program. We should also accelerate interagency consideration of exploratory meetings with the Soviets on new agreements in the areas of transportation, energy and the basic sciences. A firm NSC lead will be necessary to keep the process moving.
  
- On human rights, we will continue in our bilateral contacts to press on emigration and specific cases. The Vienna CSCE Follow-on Meeting will give us another means to keep the spotlight on human rights and to press for improved compliance. Deeds -- emigration, specific cases -- are our bottom line, but we should also seek Soviet agreement to some form of post-Vienna activity. This could take the form of one or more of the following: the U.S. "Helsinki Observers" proposal; the Dutch consultative committee; the Danish human rights conference; or, under the right conditions, Shevardnadze's proposal for a Moscow CSCE "representative forum." Together with our Allies, we should probe the Soviet invitation, expressing our readiness to consider it if the Soviets meet our other CSCE objectives, agree to consider Western proposals, and agree to conditions that would make the Moscow meeting meaningful.
  
- We proposed in Vienna a new round of experts discussions on regional issues. This forum has been a useful one for laying down markers on issues of concern to us, and we will press Moscow if a response is not forthcoming soon. We hope to start the next round with discussion on Southern Africa. Geopolitical issues lie at the heart of the U.S. - Soviet competition. They have received relatively little attention in recent high-level exchanges, and we will press for a round of Under-secretary-level (Armacost-Vorontsov) talks early in the new year.

High Level Meetings

Pressing the Soviets now for further meetings at my level -- to say nothing of yours -- would convey an inaccurate sense of over-eagerness on our part. Too early a meeting could simply lock the Soviets into their current unconstructive approach. We can afford at this stage to be patient on high-level meetings, waiting for them to take the initiative once they have concluded there is nothing to gain by indirect pressure.

Attachment: Paper: "Bringing the Soviets to Closure on  
START/INF: Four Strategies"

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Bringing the Soviets to Closure on START/INF:  
Four Strategies

I. Seek to separate START and INF from other subjects, arguing that agreements in these areas are in our mutual interest and should be brought into force.

While this is the most straightforward path to realization of START and INF agreements, we cannot assume the Soviets will agree to these reductions without something on defense; they certainly are not prepared to do this now. This leads to consideration of other packages.

II. Add a ten-year ABM Treaty non-withdrawal commitment, coupling such a commitment to 50% START and 0/100 INF reductions. Negotiations would continue on further steps, including elimination of offensive ballistic missiles.

Reduction of strategic forces by 50% and SS-20's by 90% would be dramatic steps, and would warrant something on defense. If the package permitted some flexibility for testing during this period, a 10-year non-withdrawal commitment would not damage the SDI program, and such an agreement would broaden support for SDI in the Congress.

III. Execute the START and INF reductions over ten years; and link non-withdrawal to faithful implementation of these reductions.

The reductions to 6,000 strategic warheads and 100 INF warheads would be divided into 10 equal increments from 1987 through 1996. We would agree not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty so long as these reductions were faithfully implemented. This would be similar to the first phase of our July 25 proposal, with the reductions deepened from 30% to 50%, and the time stretched from 5-7 years to 10 years. Other aspects, such as elimination of ballistic missiles and sharing the benefits of SDI would be addressed in subsequent negotiations.

IV. Agree to reduce from 6000 warheads in the second five years to a small residual force.

We can consider such an approach if it becomes necessary to break the current impasse over the reductions in the second five years (elimination of ballistic missiles vs. elimination of strategic forces) in order to secure Soviet agreement to the entire package discussed in Reykjavik.

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NLRR F06-714/S #8695

BY Ci NARA DATE 11/29/07