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For Bob L

ISSUES FOR DECISION

START

1. 3300 ICBM warhead sublimit*

- Is there flexibility on the number up to 3600?
- Can we apply this sublimit to SLBMs?

This sublimit represents one of the central unresolved issues in START. It is needed to ensure that Soviet ICBM warheads are cut by 50 percent, and to prevent the Soviets from taking most of their cuts in other forces.

The Soviets once proposed to limit any one element of the triad to 60 percent of total warheads. Applying this concept to the present situation would result in a level of 3600 (.6 x 6000). Now they maintain this sublimit is unnecessary, and they criticize it as one-sided in dealing only with ICBMs.

The question is, in pressing the Soviets in Moscow for agreement to the 3300 sublimit, do we have flexibility to agree to apply it to SLBMs, and to adjust the number upward toward 3600.

In the context of a 6000 overall limit, a sublimit of 3300 ICBM or SLBM warheads would permit slightly fewer SLBM warheads than the ratio between ICBM warheads and SLBM warheads in our current force. There is no great significance to the difference between 3300 and 3600. The Soviets could have more than two ICBM RVs per U.S. hard target, and the U.S. would need to employ multiple shelters, mobility, defense, etc., to provide for survivable ICBMs.

2. Mobile ICBMs and the 1650 sublimit

- Can we agree to permit mobile ICBMs, and to discuss verification provisions?
- Can a 1500 heavy ICBM warhead sublimit and a mobile ICBM sublimit (or a combined limit) substitute for the 1650 limit?

* We do not seek any decision or flexibility with respect to the 4800 missile warhead sublimit, or throw weight.

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At some point the inconsistency between the U.S. strategic modernization program (including the road-mobile small ICBM and rail-mobile M-X) and the U.S. START position (banning mobile ICBMs) will need to be resolved. The Soviets also have two active mobile ICBM programs, and oppose a ban.

The question is, if we approach the endgame issues in Moscow (i.e. if the Soviets satisfactorily address the sublimits), can we agree to permit mobile ICBMs provided provisions can be worked out for verification?

If so, we need to decide on our position. There could be a separate sublimit (e.g., 500-1000 mobile ICBM warheads) or a combined sublimit (e.g., 1500-1650 heavy ICBM and MIRVed mobile ICBM warheads). A combined limit would give the U. S. more flexibility (since we have no heavy ICBMs) and this should be our preferred position. This would substitute for our proposed 1650 sublimit, which from the beginning was designed to give us leverage to help attain the sublimits we need?

3. SLCMs

-- Can we propose to resolve this issue through declarations of plans?

The U.S. has proposed no limits on SLCMs because verification appears hopeless. At Reykjavik we agreed to find a mutually acceptable solution. The Soviets propose a ceiling of 400 SLCMs on two types of submarine.

Given the verification problem, we don't want a constraint. We could offer instead to exchange declarations on planned deployments. E.g., the U.S. could declare it plans to deploy no more than 750 long-range nuclear-armed SLCMs. The Soviets would make a similar declaration. (If the Soviets want to declare a number higher than 750, we could adjust our number upward to match it.) These would not be constraints, and plans could change.

The U.S. suggested such an approach in the experts session at Reykjavik. Can we suggest it again in Moscow and try to resolve this issue on this basis?

Defense and Space

4. Time period

-- Non-deployment or non-withdrawal?

-- 10 years?

In Reykjavik we proposed a 10-year non-withdrawal commitment in the context of elimination of ballistic missiles over those ten years. What makes sense in the present context (50% START reductions)? Three candidates:

- 10-year non-withdrawal (Soviet position)
- 10-year non-deployment beyond what is permitted by the ABM Treaty
- 10-year non-deployment in space (Gorbachev's Feb. 28 speech)

We favor non-deployment in space as an opening position. If necessary, this could be reconsidered in the course of the negotiations. A non-deployment commitment differs from non-withdrawal in that it would permit withdrawal from the ABM Treaty during the 10 years to conduct activities necessary to put ourselves in a position to deploy promptly in 1996.

Under any of these approaches, we would not be able to deploy before 1996. If it is important to preserve such an option, we could consider 7 vice 10 years.

5. Prohibited activity

- Defer to the ABM Treaty Review?
- If the Soviets do not agree to defer to the ABM Treaty Review, what do we say?

The central outstanding issue in Defense and Space concerns the nature of the constraints on testing during the period of the agreement. The Soviets propose constraints more restrictive than the restrictive interpretation, and we propose constraints less restrictive than the broad interpretation. Much hinges on our ability to resolve this question.

One possibility is to defer this subject to the ABM Treaty Review, which will begin within the next 6-18 months. If the Soviets agree, this would clear the way for START and would be very much in our interest.

There is a substantial possibility that the Soviets will not agree to defer this question, and it would be risky to go to Moscow with this our only idea on this subject. If necessary, we should seek to work out now an agreement with the Soviets on permitted and prohibited activity. The likely outcome would be more permissive and less ambiguous than the

restrictive interpretation, but more constraining than the broad interpretation (especially in the extreme form advocated by OSD). DOD strongly opposes any change in our position.

The Congress (and the Allies) would prefer a negotiated settlement of this issue. Such an effort may be an essential element of any agreement with the Congress that provides for substantial funding of the SDI program.

INF

6. SRINF

- Can we accept zero SRINF (SS-12/22, SS-23)?
- Do we want follow-on talks on any remaining SRINF and SNF? If so, should they cover missiles down to 150 km?

The U.S. proposes a freeze on the number of SS-12/22's and SS-23's at or below the current Soviet level (about 140), with the right to convert P-II's to P-Ib's and follow-on negotiations on reductions.

The Soviets until last month proposed a freeze (zero for the U.S.). Now they propose to separate this subject out of the LRINF Treaty and treat it in "immediate" negotiations. In Geneva, Karpov suggested elimination of SS-12/22's and SS-23's.

The Allies have not sorted this issue out. The dominant view is to oppose elimination of SRINF as leading toward denuclearization of Europe, and to oppose introduction of U.S. SRINF and conversion of P-II's. (A closely related point is that the fate of the German P-Ia's may depend on the outcome on U.S. SRINF.)

Roz Ridgway and Allen Holmes are seeking this week to force the Allies to face up to the real choice, which is U.S.-Soviet equal rights at or below 140, or zero on both sides. Our preference is zero; OSD favors a higher equal level, and is bringing SACEUR into this issue. If there is no prospect of deployment of US SRINF missiles, it is hard to make a case against elimination of Soviet SRINF. The INF IG is producing a paper on this issue.

Conventional Forces

- 7. What can we say about the need to address this issue?

Since Reykjavik, the treatment of the conventional imbalance as nuclear weapons are reduced has become a vibrant issue. The establishment of a negotiating framework to deal with this issue is at an early and delicate stage.

Without getting into the specifics of what will become Alliance-to-Alliance negotiations, we should be in a position to impress upon the Soviets some general points:

- As we move forward toward reductions in nuclear forces, it is more important than ever that attention be given to negotiations which address the conventional imbalance.
- The objective of negotiations on conventional forces should be the achievement of a stable balance of conventional forces in Europe at lower levels.
- Any agreements must be verifiable.

CW

8. What do we want as an insurance policy?

Even if the Soviets accept our CW challenge inspection proposal, there will remain substantial uncertainty as to whether the Soviets are in fact eliminating their CW capability. This leads to the conclusion that the U.S. should retain some level of capability as an insurance policy and as a deterrent to Soviet use of retained CW assets. We need to think this position through before Moscow, as the Soviets may make a big issue of CW and continue to agree with our proposal. The CW IG is developing a concept involving detailed data exchange and the right to halt the reductions process if warranted by compliance or third country concerns.

Nuclear Testing

9. If the Soviets agree to begin negotiating on TTBT verification, what flexibility do we have on dealing with "next steps"?

The sides came close in Reykjavik to agreement on a formula to commence negotiations. The Soviets proposed negotiations on verification, lowering the threshold, reducing the number of tests, and the TTBT. The U.S. proposed first resolving verification of the TTBT, then (after ratification of the TTBT verification protocol) further step-by-step limitations in

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parallel with reductions. Subsequent rounds of experts meetings have not closed that gap. The Soviets have come in our direction, relegating CTB to a long-term goal. There may be an opportunity to work out a formula in Moscow to begin negotiations.

Testing has become a divisive issue with the Congress, where some are trying to restrict the U.S. test program to tests below 1 kt if the Soviets do likewise. Commencement of negotiations would help head this off.

The Soviets are clearly preparing to negotiate on TTBT verification, so the remaining issue is whether next steps (e.g. an annual quota) are considered subsequently (our position) or in parallel (their position). Our suggestion is to advance the concept of a negotiation embracing TTBT verification and next steps, with TTBT verification first on the agenda and moving automatically to next steps as soon as the TTBT verification agreement is signed. Using signature vice ratification would be a constructive move, and we could discuss ways to record a commitment to move automatically to next steps.

This approach may work. If not, we could consider agreeing to discuss next steps (e.g. a quota) in parallel if this is the only way to commence negotiations, and negotiations are the only way to head off a 1 kt ceiling. DOD will strongly oppose such a move.

Letter to Gorbachev

10. Do we want to convey any of the above ideas to the Soviets before the Moscow meeting? Letter to Gorbachev?

Max Kampelman and Ron Lehman have drafted a section of a letter to Gorbachev that would preview some of our ideas. It would demonstrate commitment and interest on the part of the President, and put the Soviets in a position where they have to respond in Moscow. We support such a letter and the Kampelman/Lehman draft. They are coordinating the text informally with other agency principals.

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